

The Financial Crisis - a 1 in 200 year event – or a one in 10 year event Professor William Shaw, King's College, London and Ralph Frankland, Aviva UK Life



Agenda – Part 1 – An Actuarial Perspective

A personal perspective, not that of my employer, or the profession

- 2008 a special year?
- Ascribing probabilities to rare events
- A range of views about 2008
- Lessons to be learnt is it about statistics or understanding risk?

What do we mean by 1 in 200?

- At the start of 2008, was the probability that things would turn out as bad as they did more than or less than 0.5% (1 in 200)?
- Many of the "events" that were to happen in 2008 had already begun to unwind in 2007, i.e. we may need to be fluid about which 12 month period we are referring to.
- It may not even be a twelve month period that we are considering. How do you compare a slow drawn out fall, such as January 2000 to March 2003 with a sharper fall as in 1987 which happened over a few weeks.

What features of the 2008 Financial crisis make estimating its probability difficult.

- The 2008 Financial Crisis was not a single event it was a number of different events which affected different markets and different institutions in different ways.
- These events were not independent of one another.
- Understanding the connections between events is vital to understanding the crisis itself.

How do we estimate 1 in 200?

- Market Consistent approach pick an indicator e.g. credit spreads and then find the price of the outturn by comparing with the price of traded derivatives just before the crisis
- The historical approach either pick an indicator and look at past experience of that indicator to estimate its distribution and therefore the half percentile
- Build an economic model to combine a number of metrics defined as in one of the two methods above and project forward deriving the probability from a number of such projections
- Sit a collection of experts in a room and ask them for their views

Issues with these approaches?

- Market Consistent approach markets not sufficiently deep and liquid, especially for extreme risks. But maybe an early warning!
- The historical approach the classic approach employed by actuaries and regulators.
- Using a model is only as good as the model itself. Would we have modelled the chain from US property prices to UK banks? May be the way to understand interactions.
- The collection of experts works if the experts are appropriately distributed!

The historical approach - a bit more detail

- An approach which regulators have used to assist in the calibration of ICA tests (and presumably Solvency II tests)
- Choice between "Data Sampling" and "Distribution Fitting"
- Limited non overlapping data and short periods don't form random walks into longer periods
- How relevant are the experiences of the 1970's, 1930's, 1800's, and beyond to today? How many years data do you need?
- Beware (Be aware) of other prior beliefs e.g. preconceptions over distributions, assumptions about markets, independence/homogeneity of international markets

Alternative Views

- An extreme outlier an event so unlikely that it should not occur even once in the history of the universe.
- A extreme event 1 in 200 years
- A very bad year once in 30 years career worst
- A 1 year in 10 event
- The new paradigm every year will have its problems. In 2008 it was the banks turn.

An extreme outlier – an event so unlikely that it should not occur even once in the history of the universe?

- Claimed by some on the basis of successive daily movements in credit spreads
- Fails to take account of the dynamics of the market in stressed conditions
- Stressed markets become more stressed for various reasons including fear, opportunism, trying to avoid a catastrophe

A extreme event – 1 in 200 years?

- Overall 2008 did look bad from an historical perspective
- For many countries 2008 was a far worse year for equity markets than had been experienced for considerable time.
- Interestingly in the UK the 1973/4 experience had been worse for equities - and overall the first 13 quarters of the millennium produced a worse negative return on equities
- If it really was a 1 in 200 year event is that consistent with equity, the ultimate risk bearer, being so relatively undamaged, at least in the UK?

A very bad year – once in 30 years – career worst?

- A plausible view, hard to dispute
- What about the impact of the changed nature of the financial institutions that dominated the market
- If the risk mitigation strategies were not working at the 1 in 200 level, were they working at any level, or were they actually at the heart of the problem, if so.....

A 1 year in 10 event?

- Possibly, had feedback loops been built into business models with lending driving up the price of property whilst keeping down the crucial loan to "value/price" ratios that a small subsequent fall in property prices could trigger a series of events which would lead to further larger falls triggering worse events?
- Anecdotal evidence suggests this may have been, at least, in part the case and that the use of certain asset backed securities to manage risk may have compounded the problem.
- In which case was the financial crisis an ambush waiting for the first minor reversal in property prices.

A 1 year in 10 event?

Dominoes do fall over, but unless you line them up carefully they don't usually all fall over together

A 1 year in 10 event?



Dominoes do fall over, but unless you line them up carefully they don't usually all fall over together

Was the crisis an accident waiting to happen?

The new paradigm – every year will have its problems? ?

A few observations and lessons

- Hopefully we learn from the past
- 1 in 200 year events happen every day
- Risk management and Donald Rumsfeld
- In business it is very easy to take on risk difficult and costly to remove it.
- Testing to Destruction/Killer Scenarios/Reverse Stress testing

Rumsfeld on Risk

"Reports that say that something has not happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know".

Rumsfeld on Risk

Risks unimagined		Unknown unknowns Risks of which we are not even aware and which are not understood/quantified
Risks known to exist	Known knowns Risks of which we are aware and which are understood	Known unknowns Risks of which we are aware but which are not understood/quantified
	That which is known	That which is not known

Risks unimagined	aware and yet which are	Unknown unknowns Risks of which we are not even aware and which are not understood/quantified
Risks known to exist	Known knowns Risks of which we are aware and which are understood	Known unknowns Risks of which we are aware but which are not understood/quantified

That which is known That which is not known

Unknown knowns	Unknown unknowns
Risks of which we are not	Risks of which we are not even
aware and yet which are	aware and which are not
understood/quantified.	understood/quantified.
A CRO's nightmare	Risks managed statistically
Known knowns	Known unknowns
Risks of which we are aware	Risks of which we are aware but
and which are understood.	which are not fully understood.
Well managed Risks	Typically close managed Risks

Unknown knowns

Risks of which we are not aware and yet which are understood/quantified.

A CRO's nightmare

Someone in the organisation knew about the risk and may have even quantified it

or

Everyone (presumably except the CRO) was aware of the risk, and anyone could have done something about it, but no one did or Everyone knew about the risk, but either thought it was

highly unlikely, or else not very significant

Risk Reduction

- In business it is very easy to take on risk difficult and costly to remove it without taking on other risks, for example:
- An investor may buy equities and be exposed to downside equity risk.
- They may, at a price buy downside protection risk in the form of a put option.
- In doing so they may take on credit risk to the counterparty, basis risk if the option does not exactly match the equity exposure they have an operational and/or a liquidity risk depending on how they manage their collateral.

Risk Reduction

- Prior to the 2008 financial crisis was risk reduction activity well managed? Did it exacerbate some of the risks? Were the risks taken on (including liquidity) less risky than the risks eliminated?
- Certain short term contracts were assumed to be renewable/ replaceable which they proved not to be.
- In an industry that relies on confidence, what happens when that confidence is slightly dented? Did the risk mitigation strategy itself over rely on that same confidence?

New Ideas in Regulation

- Testing to Destruction/Killer Scenarios/Reverse Stress Testing the importance of Thinking the Unthinkable
- What would it take to destroy the company? What can we do to avoid that?
- Is this the cure for the CRO's nightmare?
- A cautious "maybe" only if the CRO has enough imagination and talks to enough people and if enough people listen to the CRO!
- Understanding the business better management of Capital Procyclicality/Contra Cyclicality. Is this a new idea?

In retrospect

- It is suspected by some that the 2008 Financial Crisis was triggered by an event which in itself was not particularly unlikely. However, in recent years certain aspects of the banking industry had developed in such a way that a plausible event triggered a chain of events which led to the Crisis.
- It is possible that had the trigger occurred at some other time the Crisis may have been more or less severe depending on the sensitivity of mechanism underlying the chain of events.
- We may never know for sure! Though hopefully we shall all learn from the experience.