

# The Future of Social Care funding

IFoA Pensions & LTC Working Party Products Research Group

Tom Kenny (Chair) – Just Ailsa Dunn – Hymans Robertson

# The Working Group and the IFoA Support

### **Working Group Members**

- Tom Kenny (chair)
- Ailsa Dunn
- Jerry Barnfield
- Ben Rickayzen
- Audrey Teow
- Linda Daly
- Jesse Haines
- Wendy Beaver
- Mohamed Elsheemy
- Phil Brooks

### **IFoA Support Team**

- Rebecca Deegan
- Steven Graham
- Lisa Rivera



# **Agenda**


- Background on social care funding
- Summary of published results
- Incentive to save what impact will the new means test have?
- Retirement tool the final countdown
- Learning from Australia
- Your input required



# A week is a long time in politics...



# **Changing market dynamics**



# The political timeline (so far)

### **July 2011**

Dilnot Commission recommendations released

### **April 2015**

Care Act 2014 comes into force.
Implementation of national
eligibility threshold and deferred
payments schemes

### Mar 2017

Manifestos released with social care high on the agenda











**Draft Care bill** 

### Mar 2017

Spring budget announces social care Green Paper

### **April 2020**

Implementation of capped charging system due to come into force

# Already a complicated system

- Care act 2014 introduced (in England and Wales only):
  - Deferred payment scheme
  - Care Cap of £72k
  - Increased means testing limits
- Complexity of the system means widespread misunderstanding about split of cost and the support that is available
- Means tested system operated by local authorities, not an extension of the NHS
- Regional variations exist

# What's on the horizon?



"You cannot look at this question as simply being about money in the short term.


If we're going to give people the reassurance they need in the long term, it's about finding a way forward that will give a sustainable solution for the future"




"A Labour government would give social care the funding it needs and give a firm commitment to take failed private care homes into public ownership to maintain social care protection"



# Approximate Probability of reaching the Cap by Age & Gender





--- Percentage probability of surviving to when the Cap is reached

# Possible product innovations





# **Encouraging savings for care**

One of the major challenges to address is the incentive to save for potential future care costs. In our analysis we found:


- 1. The current means testing system is a **disincentive to** saving
- 2. Means testing thresholds as set out in 'the Act' provide a greater level of reward for savers than the existing thresholds, and may increase the level of saving for care, but they **could** still act as a barrier
- 3. Additional money put aside could lead to an increase in the amount that the individual has to contribute to their care costs with **no change in the cost or quality** of care received

# Scope of means testing investigation

- Our aim was to analyse the impact of the new means test limits on incentivising saving towards long term care, extending our scope in 2 ways:
  - expand our analysis to understand the impact on savers of a range of different levels of means testing thresholds
  - overlay the results with **population data** to understand the current population dynamics and who will benefit/lose out from changes to the current thresholds

# Impact of new means test limits (Care Act 2014)





# Impact of change in upper capital limit


Increase in personal funding over the first 3 years, for £10,000 of additional savings under existing and proposed means test limits



Less than 30% of those 85+ have assets of less than £80,000


# What might the future hold?

Increase in personal funding over the first 3 years, for £10,000 of additional savings under existing and proposed means test limits



# **Population dynamics**

### Assets-Income contour for Age 65+



Median assets of £200,000 for those 65+ reducing to £170,000 for those age 85+

- Polarised results driven by home ownership
- Relatively high proportion of asset-rich homeowners
- Total net income clustered around £10-£20,000 p.a.

Median income of £16,000 for those 65+, reducing to £13,000 for those age 85+

# **Summary of findings**

- The current means testing system can cause a disincentive to save with an effective 'tax rate' of over 100% for some people!
- Under the Care Act 2014, those with few assets on entry to care have a higher disincentive to save
- There is less/no disincentive to save for:
  - 1. Those with high assets on entry to care
  - 2. Those with high income in retirement
- Individuals could put money aside into means testing exempt products to reduce their income in retirement and protect their assets eg income bonds, funeral plans, trusts

## Recommendations

- Removal of biases in the means testing system that penalise less wealthy savers
- Introduction of new categories of financial products that allow
  - savings to be exempt from the means test up to a specified threshold, for example
    - savings from pensions ring-fenced for care costs
    - care savings accounts
  - if they do not need to be used then given exemption for Inheritance Tax





# Helping people manage money in retirement


- Developing a straightforward interactive web-based tool to
  - help guide people to manage their income and assets in retirement
  - and, equally importantly, manage their expenditure in retirement
  - in the expectation that care provision may well be needed in later life
- The model is in development
  - aiming to make available later this year
  - show snapshots of the model today
- It's The Final Countdown for their money in retirement



- Capture some key data to initiate the model
- Personal Details
  - include a number of Expenditure Profiles we'll start with a 'Cautious' profile
- Assets
  - includes any DC pots as well as property and savings
- Income
  - includes state pension, DB pensions and annuities
- Potential Care Home Needs
  - care fees depend on needs and vary within region



- Model displays projected income and assets including
  - excess expenditure and care fees over income
  - probability of survival
- User can add/delete events as shown on next slide
  - e.g. one-off or regular drawdown, annuity purchase



Add new event Delete selected event								
Age at Event	Type of Event	Amount 11	£/% J1	Repeat?	Period (Years)			
65	One-Off Drawdown	20000	£	N	0			
67	One-Off Drawdown	5000	£	N	0			
69	One-Off Drawdown	5000	£	N	0			
72	Regular Drawdown	2000	£	Υ	20			
75	Annuity Purchase	45000	£	N	0			
83	Annuity Purchase	6000	£	N	0			

Personal Details		Assets			Income			Potential Care Home Needs						
Gender	Male		House	-	200000	+	State Pension	-	7500	+	Age at Entry to Care	-	85	+
	O Female		Total DC Pots	-	100000	+	Defined Benefit Pensions	-	5000	+	Type of Care Home	•	Nursing	
Current Age	- 65	+	Savings, ISAs and other	_	20000	+						0	Residential	
Taxpayer Status	Non-taxpaver	~	Investments								Care Home Region	ı	North East	~
Choose an Expenditure Profile	Spendthrift	~												

- Changing the Expenditure Profile to 'Spendthrift'
  - reflects extra expenditure in early phase of retirement
  - but assets run out after about 6 years of care home fees












# Why Australia?

- Australia has many parallels with the UK in terms of demographics and post-retirement funding systems
- Limited research completed in recent years comparing the UK and Australian systems
- Several recent and planned legislative and regulatory changes relating to post-retirement funding

### Minimum annual retirement contribution levels

Year	Australia	UK
2017-18	11.0%	2.0%
2018-19	11.5%	5.0%
2019-20	12.0%	8.0%



# Why Australia?

We will focus on relevant learnings from the Australian system comparing four aspects:

- post-retirement demographics
- funding of care
- insurance and other product solutions
- recent and planned government legislative and regulatory changes

# Post-retirement demographics

- Ageing population
  - age 65+ projected to increase from 14% to 22% in 2061
  - age 85+ expected to more than double to 5%

Table 1: Old age dependency

Year	Japan	USA	China	Australia	UK	Thailand
1990	17%	19%	8%	17%	24%	7%
2010	36%	19%	12%	20%	25%	12%
2030	57%	32%	25%	31%	34%	26%
2050	82%	34%	40%	36%	39%	44%

Source: US Census Bureau

Life expectancy (M/F) at age 65 increasing (Source: OECD)


	2010	2014
Australia	18.9/21.8	19.4/22.2
UK	18.2/20.8	18.8/21.3

# Funding of care in Australia



- National information centre launched in 2013
- Caps apply (figures at 20 March 2017)
  - Annual cap of \$26k and Lifetime cap of \$63k
- Means tested care fee need an aged care assessment
  - All assets are included
  - Property disregard applies
- Basic daily fee pegged to Age Pension + accommodation payment (upfront bond or ongoing) + extra services fees

# Funding of care in Australia



Note: 'Other' Includes use of respite RAC only, or use of combinations of permanent RAC, respite RAC and community care. Figure excludes ACAP and TCP use.

Source: AlHW 2014b: Figure 2.8.

Figure 6.3.1: Rates of use of aged care services by sex for people aged 85 and over, 2002–03 to 2010–11

# Legislative and regulatory environment

- Several key regulatory changes expected to encourage market for annuity-type products in Australia:
  - Government enshrined objective of superannuation to provide income in retirement to substitute or supplement the Age Pension
  - "CIPRs" (Comprehensive Income Products for Retirement) framework
  - Removal of impediments to deferred and group/pooled annuity products
  - Consultation on CIPR and MyRetirement products ends on 9
     June 2017

# Legislative and regulatory environment

### PROBLEMS SEEKING TO BE ADDRESSED

Individuals are **self-insuring against longevity risk** and may be living more frugally in retirement than they need to

Individuals face a lack of diversity and choice in retirement income products, in particular an absence of products that efficiently manage longevity risk

The superannuation system is **not achieving its objective efficiently** due to its over-reliance on account-based pensions

Individuals face **complex financial decisions**, a lack of guidance and behavioural biases at retirement but many are unlikely to seek financial advice

# OBJECTIVES OF CIPRS PRODUCTS AND THE CIPRS FRAMEWORK

Increase individuals' standard of living by facilitating risk pooling — providing security of income for life and the potential for higher income in retirement



**Increase the availability and choice** of products that efficiently manage longevity risk



Increase the efficiency of the superannuation system so that it can better meet its proposed objective



Empower trustees to provide members with an easier transition into retirement



# Legislative and regulatory environment

### Current

Account assigned by employer/award from one of 116 MySuper products

New account for each new job assigned by employer/award.

Multiple fees and insurance erode superannuation balance

Disengaged member can seek advice

Consolidate multiple accumulation accounts and open a separate pension account

Complex decisions at retirement

Lower standard of living in retirement to avoid outliving savings

Life stage

First job

Subsequent jobs

Planning for retirement

Transition to retirement

Retirement

Recommended

<u>Single</u> high-performing account allocated by competitive process.

Members retain their account for each new job, unless they choose another fund.


More efficient system, lower fees

Income projections on statements

Seamless transition.

Pre-selected CIPR supports decision making and greater risk pooling.

Higher and more enduring income in retirement



# **Products**

- Annuity market different direction of travel:
  - annuitisation levels 3% in Australia but rising
  - 75% in UK (pre-2014) and now 30% UK (Q3 2016)
- Retirement and care annuities now widely available on platforms and via industry superannuation funds
- Growing equity release market
- Deferred annuities likely to become popular
- Growing market for care insurance
  - Challenger's CarePlus annuity sales AUD 90m 1H17, +100% vs 2H16



# **Discussion points**

- 1. What do you think will be in the Green Paper?
- 2. If the means test threshold changes to be £100k including property how will consumers behaviour change? What can insurers react?
- 3. What should change in the social care funding system?
- 4. How are pensions freedoms going to affect social care funding?
- 5. What are the barriers to product innovation in the LTC market?

# Questions Comments

The views expressed in this presentation are those of invited contributors and not necessarily those of the IFoA. The IFoA do not endorse any of the views stated, nor any claims or representations made in this presentation and accept no responsibility or liability to any person for loss or damage suffered as a consequence of their placing reliance upon any view, claim or representation made in this presentation.

The information and expressions of opinion contained in this publication are not intended to be a comprehensive study, nor to provide actuarial advice or advice of any nature and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice concerning individual situations. On no account may any part of this presentation be reproduced without the written permission of the IFoA.

# Appendix 1: Assumptions underlying the model

- Illustrations in the pack, unless stated otherwise, are based on:
  - Assumptions underlying our care cap model:
    - care costs based on Laing & Buisson report
    - survival rates based on PSSRU/BUPA Report on Length of Stay in Nursing Homes in England (2011)
    - all amounts inflated by 3.5% per annum
    - as cap increases, the percentage of the cap achieved remains constant
    - individuals choose to continue to make top-up payments even after cap is reached
  - Means testing model :
    - Income of £12,000 on entry to care equal to the personal expense allowance
    - Results focus on the impact of surviving 3 years in LTC

# **Appendix 2: Regional variations**

### **Scotland:**

- Free personal care for over 65s and free nursing care for all (at local authority rates).
- National deferred payment system.

### **Northern Ireland:**

 Means tested benefits – lower limit is £14,250 and upper limit is £23,250

### Wales:

- Means tested benefits at single 'capital limit' of £24k
- Greater integration of health and social care system

Regional variation in level of provision (eligibility criteria) and costs

- across jurisdictions
- within some jurisdictions

### **England:**

Care Act 2015 proposals relate to England.

- New Charge Cap
- New deferred payment system.