

# Modeling the post-crisis world: sovereign debt and other credit risk issues

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# Modeling the post-crisis world: sovereign debt and other credit risk issues

What has changed? What are the challenges? How far have we come? What can we learn?



# Agenda

- Credit in the Pre and Post Crisis World
- · Problems in credit modeling
- · Corporate Credit vs Sovereign Credit
- Solving the Problem: What can cutting edge models achieve?
- Quantitative comparison of Sovereign debt modeling approaches
- Summary



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# **The Pre and Post Crisis World**




### **The Pre Crisis World**

Pre 2007 life seemed so simple:




# **The Pre Crisis World**




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# **The Post Crisis World**



# **The Post Crisis World**

Models which were once well specified are no longer so



Source: Conning/Bloomberg



# **The Post Crisis World**

#### And everyone is now concerned about credit risk being everywhere

Which of the following issues pose the GREATEST RISK TO YOUR INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO over the next 12 months?

hoice
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# **The Post Crisis World**

### People are asking;

- · are my credit risks adequately modeled?
- is my definition of a credit risky instrument broad enough?



# **Capital Market Modeling Perspective**

# Most of the models developed for Capital Modeling focused on corporate credit

- · Driven partly by the academic literature
- · Cost of developing new models
- · Fear of the sophisticated models






# **3 Problems in Credit Modeling**



# **Credit Modeling Problem 1**

Mainstream corporate credit models are too simple



# **Credit Modeling Problem 2**

### The credit risk component does not explain the spreads of credit risky instruments

### High spreads imply high default probabilities

Table 7 Results from the regression of credit spread changes on financial and macroeconomic variables. This table reports the parameter estimates and their Newey-West

*t*-statistics from the regression of annual credit spread changes on contemporaneous values in the indicated variables. Change in default rate represents the change in the annual percentage default rate of U.S. nonfinancial corporate bonds for the 1866–2008 period, and the vari-ables represent the corresponding changes in the explanatory variables described in Table 4.

Variable	Coefficient	t-Statistic
Intercept	0.00008	0.27
Change in default rate	-0.00161	-0.17
Stock return	-0.00292	-2.22
Change in volatility	0.00723	2.04
Change in riskless rate	-0.14680	-2.32
Consumption growth	-0.00189	-0.17
IP growth	0.00078	0.37
Inflation rate	-0.00002	-0.01
GDP growth	0.00483	0.83
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>		0.1386



Schaefer, Strebulaev, Corporate bond default risk: A 150-year perspective,



# **Credit Modeling Problem 3**

There are significant differences in the behaviour of different credit instruments


- Default rates
- · Spread behaviour
- Bond Return Distributions
- · Mechanics of default and restructuring

### We will now look at some of these aspects

- · Concentrate on corporate credit and Eurozone Sovereign credit
- · Why do we need separate modeling approaches?
- · What is possible using state of the art modeling approaches?
- Does it matter?



# Default Rates Sovereign vs. Corporate




# Credit risk is likely to be a significant component of spread

- The Greek situation is nothing new
- In fact the current global situation is timid on a long historical basis
- Corporate default rates have spiked at various points in history too
- Free lunches can become expensive quickly




Fig. 1. Historical default rate for the 1866–2008 period.

Source: Rheinhart and Rogoff "This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises" (top), Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, Strebulaev, Corporate bond default risk: A 150-year perspective, (Bottom)




### **Sovereign Debt Spread Behaviour**

# **Sovereign Debt Spread Behaviour**








# **Corporate Bond Spread Behaviour**

# Sovereign Debt – Bond Return Distributions


"High Risk" Sovereign Debt exhibits a marked "default hump" in the tail of the return distribution

- More pronounced than High Yield Corporates
- Might imagine given longer histories secondary and tertiary humps due to multiple credit events



Source: Conning/Bloomberg






# **Sovereign Debt – Default Mechanics**

# **Corporate Debt – Default Mechanics**

### Most corporate defaults are "absorbing" states

- The bonds don't transition out of default
- A recovery rate (RMV) is paid
- This RMV is time dependent and may depend on the prevailing default environment

Recovery Rate/Default Rate Association Do on Default Rates








# **New Credit Modeling Approaches**



# **GEMS® Defaultable Sovereign Debt Model**

### Model of yields and spreads

- Output is a stochastic term structure
- Stochastic credit events
- Reproduces wide range of observed dynamics
- Correlation (incl. tail correlation) with equity, interest rates, corporate bonds and other asset classes
- CLR and RMV
- Relatively Parsimonious (ca. 12 parameters govern the stochastic processes)



# The GEMS Corporate Yield Model

In 2010 Conning developed a new corporate bond model based on the latest published research

The model is a multi factor arbitrage free model of the corporate credit market


- Stochastic spreads
- · Codependency with government yields
- · Time varying transition and default dynamics
- Time varying recovery rates
- Real World and Risk Neutral versions
- Ability to produce the jump like behaviour in spreads observed during the 2008 crisis
- · Accurate fits to initial market spread curves
- Correlation between spreads of different rating < 1</li>
- · Pricing of bonds within an arbitrage free framework



Inter Crises Lull and No Return to Pre Crisis Levels




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


# Defaultable Sovereign Spread Sample Paths

Periodic Crises Followed by Return to Pre Crisis Levels Record Crisis Spreads and High Default Rates




### **GEMS Corporate Credit Spread Evolution**



### 2008 was characterised by a rapidly increasing spreads

- The model incorporates a process for capturing such events
- Jumps decay away smoothly over time





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# Modeling Sovereign Debt - A Short Case Study



# **Sovereign Debt – Common Approaches**

Institutional investors investing in this asset class have come under regulatory pressure to adopt a more realistic approach

#### Several approaches are commonly seen

- · Ignore it and treat them as non-defaultable
- · Modelling a return index
- Modelling using a corporate bond model (e.g. Merton, JLT, JLT+, other)

### None of these approaches is particularly satisfying because Sovereign credit is not like other credit




# **Does Modeling Approach Matter?**

### Look at Several Portfolios:

- Start from universe of active bonds from UK, DE, Eurozone (at 31/03/2013)
- Consider portfolios with modified durations from 3 to 10 years, initial value GBP 1bn
- Hold duration and asset
  allocation constant
- Model the Sovereign Debt 3 ways
  - Non Defaultable
  - AA or BBB Corporate
  - Defaultable Sovereign Model

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


# Result

# Differences in cost of capital over 1, 3 and 5 year horizons:

- Low duration portfolios show the smallest differences (ca. GBP750k)
- As duration increases model selection is increasingly important (ca. GBP 1m)
- Corporate bond models generally overestimate the risk
- Non defaultable models
  underestimate it
- For longer time horizons the differences are generally larger

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# **Summary**

### Our view of credit risk has changed

- · Our definition is broader
- · The need for robust modeling approaches greater

### But there are challenges for both researchers and users

· Markets are complex

# Sovereign credit differs from corporate credit in a number of important ways

- · Spread behaviour dormant/active "cycles"
- Return distributions "loss tail hump"
- The precise details of future cash flows post credit events

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# Summary

Some aspects of two models built specifically to address limitations in corporate and sovereign credit modeling were presented

#### How important is model selection?

 Comparisons with other modeling approaches showed significant differences -> differences become larger with increasing duration

#### Work still to be done

- · Stochastic recovery rates where appropriate
- · Liquidity effects

Inspite of this improved approaches to credit risk modeling have been developed in the last 6 years. Ultimately we should always aim to use the most realistic granular models, because the effect of model choice is not simple to estimate.

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Questions Comments

Expressions of individual views by members of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and its staff are encouraged.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the presenter.



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### **The Post Crisis World**

And as interest rates fell allocations to credit risky asset classes increased

- This is likely to continue
- Credit risks must be properly managed

Are you planning to increase, decrease or maintain YOUR ALLOCATION to the following asset classes in the next 12 months? (%)

High Yield Debt	36		24 3		37
US Investment Grade Corporates	35			46 5	14
Real Estate	34	22	5		39
Emerging Market Debt	31	19 1			49
Private Equity	27	22	9		41
Bank Loans	25	26 <mark>1</mark>			48
Mezzanine Debt	23 13 3	3			61
US Equities	21	34	10		35
European Investment Grade Corporates	21		40	13	26
Mortgage-Backed Securities	19		45	12	24
Local Government Debt	18		45	20	18
Emerging Market Equities	16	26 <mark>2</mark>			57
Hedge Funds	14 22	8			56
US Financial Credit	14			57 9	20
European Equities	10 29	8			53
Commodities	7 22 1				70
Energy Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs)	6 14 1				80
European Financial Credit	5 35	5	24		36
Cash/Short-Term Instruments	5		54		39 2

I Increase 🛛 🔲 Maintain 📩 Decrease 💻 Do not invest

Source: Goldman Sachs

