

Cyber Operational Risk Scenarios for Insurance Companies

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Cyber Working Party Representatives





Cyber Risk Investigation Working Party

The purpose of the working party's research is to provide insight for actuaries working on **capital requirements** for insurers setting out the **potential impact of cyber risk events** and the **measures available to mitigate this risk**.

The aim is to create a greater awareness of the risks for insurers, and highlight emerging issues in an area that is changing rapidly as the dependency on computer systems to support insurer's business increases.













Sessional Paper





Cyber operational risk scenarios for insurance companies Research project

By the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries' Cyber Risk Investigation Working Party



Presented to the Institute & Faculty of Actuaries



Agenda

1) Overview

- Cyber Insurance Losses
- Attacker Motivations
- Threat Vectors
- Operational Risk Landscape

2) Our Journey

- Building Scenarios and Framework
- Main Learning Outcomes

3) Outputs Discussion

- Summary of Results
- Could Cyber sit under a rule of thumb?
- Controls (NIST) Assessment

4) Summary





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Overview Rory Egan





Attacker Motivations



- Dispute
- Vengeance
- Data Manipulation



- Theft of PII
- Credit Card Theft
- Theft of IP
- Ransomware
- DDoS
- Corp. Espionage
- Extortion





State Sponsored Group

- Theft of PII
- Theft of Secret
 Intelligence
- Cyber Warfare
- DDoS
- Sabotage

Extremist Groups

- Publicity
- Recruitment
- Widespread
- Disruption
- Espionage
- Sabotage





- Impress friends
- Gain credit in computer communities
- Unauthorized Entry
- DDoS



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Operational risk landscape



TOP 5 RISKS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES

Source: Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty. Responses: 515

Cyber incidents (e.g. cyber crime, IT failure, data breaches)

Changes in legislation and regulation (e.g. government change, economic sanctions, protectionism, Brexit, Eurozone disintegration)

Market developments (e.a. volatility, intensified competition / new entrants, M&A, market stagnation, market fluctuation)

Business interruption (incl. supply chain disruption) NEW

New technologies (e.g. impact of increasing interconnectivity, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, drones) NEW



Source: Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty.

Respondents: 104 Responses: 116

Cyber incidents (ę
breaches)	

e.g. cyber crime, IT failure, data





Business interruption (incl. supply chain disruption)

Loss of reputation or brand value



Why Cyber Operational Risk should be assessed

Capital Load

Cyber risk is routinely cited as one of the most important sources of operational risks facing organisations today

Regulation

Regulators and legislators are increasing their focus on this topic (GDPR)

Risk Assessment

Actuaries need to have a robust assessment of the potential losses stemming from cyber risk, as part of an overall risk management framework

Consistent Framework

A logical, consistent and unbiased solution is needed



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Building a Framework for Quantification - Our journey

Simon Cartagena

- 1. Brainstorming
- 2. Scenario development



3. Group assessments of selected scenarios

- Results and challenges
- 4. Framework approach development
 - Why do it?
 - · How do we build scenario that is relevant and consistent?
 - Draw on sources available e.g. CRO Forum/NIST*/Threat reports etc.
 - How do we build one that is quantifiable?
 - What are the tangible & intangible costs
 - What are the most important aspects of assessments?
 - Consistency/repeatable/updatable
 - Being able to communicate the outputs
 - Threat actors/vectors- how much should we care?







*National Institute of Standards and Technology

5. Scenario quantification

- Vulnerable controls & mitigation assessment against the NIST framework
- Ground up costs estimation approach leveraging CRO forum
- Frequency/Severity impacts assessment
- Consistency of estimates
- Transparency/justification of estimates

6. Validation

- Do the scenarios make sense to experts? Use experts as often as possible!
- Actuaries cannot solve this on their own
- Breaking down language/jargon/acronym barrier, talking in the same language is difficult
- Uncertainty vs absolutes: combining actuarial and cyber/IT schools of thought to produce a useful basis for quantification.









Main Learning Outcomes

- 1. Build a scenario structure/taxonomy
- 2. Build a cost structure/taxonomy
- 3. Think about the threat actors and vectors
 - scenario should be relevant to your entity
- 4. Consult Cyber/IT experts (as many as possible)
- 5. The Cyber landscape changes rapidly, be prepared to keep learning and evolving







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Scenarios -**Outputs Discussion**

Visesh Gosrani

Summary of Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Scenario:	Employee leaks data at a General Insurer	Cyber extortion at a Life Insurer	Motor insurer telematics device hack
Threat Vectors:	Insider attack, social engineering	External attack, social engineering	External attack, software vulnerabilities
Security:	Protect & respond	Detect, respond & recover	Identify, protect & detect
Main Cost Component:	Compensation, regulatory fines	Business interruption, reputational damage	Remediation (device replacement)
1 in 200 Loss (£m): (% of annual revenue)	£211m ∼2%	£180m ~6%	£70m ∼18%



Could Cyber sit under a rule of thumb?

- Different groups
 - Personnel changes
 - Developing cyber environment
- Varying scenarios
- Types and sizes of insurer
 - Differing motives
 - Differing attack perimeters
 - Take Cyber maturity into account
- Estimating a 1 in 200



Controls (NIST) Assessment

Summary of the key controls for each scenario that impact the severity and/or the frequency of the event. Key Risk Management and Operational assessment for the scenarios would therefore focus on improving or mitigating these key control areas.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Scenario:	Employee leaks data at a General Insurer	Cyber extortion at a Life Insurer	Motor insurer telematics device hack
	 Protection e.g. Access Controls, Data Security and Information Protection Processes 	 Detect e.g. Security Continuous Monitoring and Detection Processes 	 Identify e.g. Asset Management & Inventory
	 Respond e.g. Response Planning, Communication and Improvements 	 Respond e.g. Analysis, Mitigation and Improvements 	 Protect e.g. Access Controls, Data Security, Remote Management and Information
	Improvements	 Recover e.g. Recovery planning, lessons learned 	 Detect e.g. Anomalies and Events

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This is really important!

- Firms need to take Cybersecurity seriously
 - We currently estimate each of these scenarios would be a significant cost to a business (largely driven by required speed of response, fines & regulatory response)
- The NIST framework is a useful place to start when assessing your key Cyber Operational risks
- Figures produced are highly subjective
 - Key uncertainties exists on the likelihood of each scenario and is bespoke depending on each firm.
 - Knowledge/experiences varies so widely from person to person
- Communication rationale for scenario selection and cost calculation is important for transparency and development, given speed of development of subject matter land Faculty

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Appendix

Scenario 1: Employee leaks data at General Insurer

Overview

The insurer has a global presence, with over £10bn in revenue. The UK motor insurance book is a major unit of the insurer, with £1bn annual premium. The UK motor insurance portfolio contains 4m data records, with 3m policyholders on risk and 1m legacy records.

All motor insurance data was published online. The data leak was noticed by a policyholder who called the emergency claims team. This did not get escalated appropriately and it took another day before key staff members were aware of the data breach. Slow response and poor communication with the public led to a backlash from policyholders who took to social media to vent their anger.



Cost Impacts		
Total Cost	£210.5m * ~2% of Revenue	
Top 3 Cost Drivers	 Compensation Regulatory Fines Financial Ombudsman fine 	£130m £40m £25m

Risk Mitigation (NIST)



• Protection e.g. access controls, data security and information protection processes; • Respond e.g. response planning, communication and improvements



Company Info

Scenario 2: Cyber extortion at a Life Insurer

Overview			Cost Impacts	
Company Info	The insurer is a subsidiary of a FTSE100 listed financial services group. GWP = £3bn, and profit = £300m. They recently begun an IT transformation programme. It has an outsourcing arrangement with a data services company to develop, test, maintain and support new technology applications, both during and after the transformation phase.	Total Cost	£179.5m * ~6% of Revenue	
Event Narrative	A group of hackers carry out series of attacks. Ransomware worm infects almost all of the systems. Request for a ransom payment of £15m is received. Revised ransom figure of £7.5m is paid to the hackers, this does NOT result in the decryption of data. Malware decontamination is needed. The incident has a huge impact on the firm's business. Media focuses on the poor internal controls. Reputational fallout is catastrophic as many customers are not able to check their balances and the firm suffers a significant drop in sales as well as regulator scrutiny.	Top 3 Cost Drivers	1) Lapses) 2) (Productivity) 3) Data Restoration	





£120m £33m £10m

Scenario 3: Motor insurer telematics device hack

Company Info	Medium sized UK only motor insurer using telematics devices. GWP £400 million, fleet of 500,000 cars using its telematics device. Average premium of £500 per annum per client for the telematics product, resulting in c£250m premium p.a. for the telematics product.
	All telematics devices get backed rendering the devices (costing cF50 each) unusable. Every device needs to be
Event arrative	recelled and realized. Service data from the devices is comprehended and nubliched aplice. Comprehended
	devices are used as part of a Potnot to Joursh a distributed DDoS
	devices are used as part of a bother to faultin a distributed bbos.
	Week 10 - 20: Devices replaced. End of year 1: The Information Commissioner's Office applies a fine due to loss of
- ž	customer data resulting from device security weaknesses. Years 3 - 5: Damages incurred from complaints cases,
	reputational damage remains and sales are reduced. Year 5: Incident now in past and reputation restored.

Overview



Cost Impacts





· Identify e.g. asset management and inventory; • Protect e.g. access controls, data security, remote management and information protection processes; and Detect e.g. anomalies and events.

