



Institute  
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# The FCA's focus on competition and behavioural economics

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# FCA: new focus and toolkit

*“Competition will be king as we [the FCA] move forward.*


*And that means tomorrow is unlikely to look like today”*

*Martin Wheatley,  
CEO, FCA  
March 2014*


- Strategic objective is to **ensure markets function well**; achieved through:
  - securing an appropriate degree of **protection for consumers**
  - protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system
  - **promoting effective competition** in the interests of consumers
- **Early intervention** to deliver speedy and proactive consumer protection
- **Market studies** to investigate and remedy market-wide issues
- Concurrent Competition Act powers from April 2015

# FCA proposes an integrated analysis of market-wide problems

- Effective competition needs both the demand and supply sides of market to work well
- Consumers should have information they can access, assess and act on
- Firms should compete on price, quality, service and innovation



# The typical anatomy of a market study



# Make the most of market studies

- Begin with the end in mind
- Engage early and as often as possible
- Plan, and practice, your communications so that critical strategic points and evidence are clear (particularly if a later legal appeal may be likely)
- Educate non-industry specialists in the FCA team on the complexity and history of your market/product
- Help the FCA design appropriate customer surveys and experiments; participate, don't sit back
- Think about how best to measure product and customer segment profitability e.g. attributing shared costs, accounting for intangible assets and economic capital
- Dedicate sufficient internal resource to manage *ad hoc* information requests and consultation responses

# Behavioural economics (“BE”)

- Economics and psychology combining to better explain real customer (or firm) choices
- People exhibit “**bounded rationality**” and “**bounded willpower**”
- Some **persistent and predictable** biases in decision making
- But choices are highly context specific

- Framing matters:

$$8 \times 7 \times 6 \times 5 \times 4 \times 3 \times 2 \times 1 > 1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times 6 \times 7 \times 8$$

*“Gandhi was younger than 140 when he died, how old was he?”*

>

*“Gandhi was older than 9 when he died, how old was he?”*

- People hate losses: Loss ~ 2 x equivalent gain
- Rules of thumb to shortcut complex questions:

*“Is this a good financial adviser?”*



*“Is this financial adviser likeable?”*

- Relativity matters:

*“Would you drive 15 minutes to save 50% on a £20 toaster?”*

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*“Would you drive 15 minutes to save 2.5% on a £400 TV?”*

- Overconfidence:

In a Swedish survey of car drivers, 68% rated themselves as being better than the average driver, and no one rated themselves as being below average

# BE may be particularly important in improving retail financial markets


The FCA thinks that retail financial markets are prone to biases:

- Most customers find financial products complex
- Many financial decisions require assessing risk and uncertainty
- Decisions often require trade-offs between the present and the future
- Financial decisions can be emotional
- It can be difficult to learn about financial products

*“Behavioural economics enables regulators to intervene in markets more effectively, and in new ways, to counter business models [that do not compete on price and quality] and secure better outcomes for consumers”*

*Martin Wheatley, FCA CEO,  
April 2013*

# Biases affect many parts of making a choice





# Biases affect competition and market function

- **Market may not correct biases itself**
- **Biases could lead to negative distributional effects** – less sophisticated consumers cross-subsidise the more sophisticated
- **Biases could create or strengthen firm market power.** Biases may mean consumers don't search enough, search on the wrong basis, and don't switch to better offers
- **Biases could dampen effects of entry or incentives to innovate.** Excellence is not rewarded by customers switching
- **Biases may lead to spurious pricing/product differentiation and complexity**
- **Firms decisions may be distorted by biases**
- **Biases may render remedies of other market failures ineffective** (even harmful) e.g. information remedies.

# All financial products will tick some of the FCA's indicators of concern, but FCA will focus on those ticking most of them

	Signs	Potential indicators
Firms	<b>Rip-offs</b> – uncompetitively high margins	1. Persistent excess profits
		2. Price dispersion unrelated to cost
	<b>Suckers</b> – concentrated profits from a small group of customers	3. High penetration rate for high-margin unessential add-ons
		4. Cross-subsidies between consumer groups or products
		5. Very different financial sophistication across customers
Product	<b>Bargains</b> – innovations that appear very cheap	6. “To good to be true” headline prices or returns
		7. Material charges or exclusions hidden or under-emphasised
	<b>Traps</b> – contract features that target behavioural biases	8. Teaser rates, especially with automatic renewal
		9. Cancellation charges or hurdles
		10. “Default” options for some key contract elements
Consumers	<b>Regret</b> – reported or potential regret	11. Widespread reports of consumer complaint
		12. Product purchased rarely – little scope to learn
	<b>Folly</b> – choices out of line with common sense	13. Product inconsistent with other products owned or with stated goals
		14. Product clearly provides poor value for some customers
	<b>Confusion</b> – observed or likely confusion	15. Consumers unable to describe key product features/prices after purchase
		16. Product complicated by structure or number of options

# Techniques to identify biases

- Reviewing internal strategy, product and governance documents
- Crunching through actual consumer consumption data to find patterns and specific customer segments
- Stated and revealed preference surveys (e.g. conjoint)
- Random controlled trials – experiments, simulations and field trials
- Academic BE literature



# How the FCA might use BE in remedies

- **Provide information** in a specific way (prohibit ways of displaying information)
- **Change the choice environment** e.g. change the default
- **Control product distribution.** Require products to be sold or promoted only through certain channels or to certain customer groups
- **Control products.** Ban specific product features designed to exploit

Preference for remedies that do **not** restrict choice

A tension between paternalism and individual consumer responsibility/freedom

Remedies need to be necessary, trialled and proportionate

Performance of remedies must be monitored and possibly amended in future

# But the FCA faces a high standard of proof

- Rigorous cost-benefit analysis is needed before any intervention to avoid **policy errors, unintended consequences** and **legal challenge**
- E.g.
  - Federal Trade Commission and mortgage brokers
  - CAT judgment in *Barclays Bank Plc v. Competition Commission*
- The FCA itself notes: *“If the FCA mistakenly intervenes to ‘correct’ reasonable consumer choices, our interventions could impose costs for no real benefit, or even make people worse off”.*

*“One of the key messages to come from the behavioural economics literature is that **consumer behaviour is highly contextual and multi-dimensional** and that, before we can be confident that intervening will actually enhance the position of consumers taken as a whole, it is necessary to have robust evidence. This usually comes at a significant cost”.*

*UAE, CCP, 2013*

# What matters for actuaries?

- Insurance products will be in the spotlight – e.g. complexity, emotions, cross-subsidy, uncertainty
- Actuaries' role in product design and pricing make them a critical first line defence in terms of governance, strategy and marketing
- Actuaries need to communicate the complexity of their work to the FCA during market studies
- Actuaries have comfort with crunching through key datasets to identify consumer consumption patterns – quantification matters

There's plenty of opportunity ...



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# Questions

# Comments

Expressions of individual views by members of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and its staff are encouraged.

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