

The Actuarial Profession
making financial sense of the future

Life conference and exhibition 2011



**Stable Measures
of Risk Capital**

20-22 November 2011

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Agenda

Introduction: tail risk in a multi-period context

The purpose of capital and impact of regulation

Regime dependence – Point in Time v. Through the Cycle

Solvency II

Multi-period modelling

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Introduction: tail risk in a multi-period context

Introduction

'Stable' measures of tail risk refers to:

- Behaviour of risk measures over more than 1 period
- What characteristics do some risk measures exhibit...
- ... and what characteristics should they exhibit?

Discussion rapidly leads to:


- Conditional v unconditional risk measures
- Purpose of capital
- Individual v systemic perspective

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Capital requirements under Solvency II

Liability side of balance sheet consists of:

- Best estimate liability (expected liability, discounted at risk free rate)
- Solvency capital requirement (BEL + SCR cover liability in 1 year's time with 99.5% probability)
- Market value margin (cost of SCR over contract lifetime)
- Additional buffer
 - Withstand short-term balance-sheet volatility
 - Fund new business strain
 - Withstand moderately adverse events?



Technical provisions

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How large should buffer be? Some possible approaches

Nil, i.e. able to withstand 99.5% of losses over 1 year

- Holding capital before it's required is inefficient

SCR+buffer able to withstand 99.5% of losses over runoff


- If we are likely to need further capital over time, budget for it now

What do we expect?

- Purely holding SCR means high likelihood of needing new capital if new business is written at a steady rate
- Multiyear approach should mean that more shocks can be withstood

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Example




Simplified version of example
from Hardy & Wirch NAAJ 2004

Liability payable at time 2


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Calculate capital based on 95% Tail VaR



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Calculate capital based on 95% Tail VaR



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How much capital to hold?

1 step ahead tail measure:

- Certain to be able to cover liability after 1 step
- But certain to need more capital after 1 step

*TOO
COLD?*

Iterated tail measure:

- Hold excess capital in 99% of outcomes

*TOO
HOT?*


2 step ahead tail measure:

- Ignoring intermediate step
- Need additional capital in 10% of outcomes

*JUST
RIGHT?*


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Switch outcomes: what happens?



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Capital requirement inconsistent



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So what might 'just right' look like?

Would like a capital rule that is stable in the sense that:

- It's not "too conservative" in its requirements early on
- It takes account of future capital needs
- It is relevant and dynamically consistent

Oh, and in addition

- we would like stability across economic regimes...

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The purpose of capital and impact of regulation

What are the goals of capital requirements?

- Reduce the risk of default
 - reassure capital providers, policyholders, society
- Help manage risk in a broad sense
 - set risk appetite; make risk transfer/hedging decisions; pricing; performance management and incentives
- Reduce frictional costs of raising new capital
 - Provide resource for taking on new business, M&A,...

⇒ **Need a coherent way to determine capital**

- Over and above minimum regulatory requirement
- Over a multi-year horizon (ORSA)

Competing regulatory objectives

Cycles / mean-reversion

Regime shifts

Stable capital

Un-stable risk measure

Flexibility

Time inconsistency

Long-term investment

Proper risk incentives

Counter-cyclicality

Contagion

Reference: Andrew Haldane "Control rights (and wrongs)", Speech October 2011
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech525.pdf>

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
Traditional vs. modern insurance regulation

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| • Long-term | • 1-year |
| • Claim-paying ability | • Exit/transfer value |
| • Asset-based discounting | • Exogenous "risk-free" rate |
| • Implicit margins | • Explicit risk-based capital |
| • Judgement/discretion | • Data |
| • Assumptions | • Prices |
| • Intrinsic value | • Intrinsic + time value |
| • Infrequent valuation | • Frequent valuation |

Risk of individual insolvencies replaced with risk of systemic failure?

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Modern regulation is more pro-cyclical





Feedback results from cross-links between insurers and capital markets

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Regime dependence
Point in Time vs. Through the Cycle


“Edge of the world” framework

- At time 0 we are at centre of the world 
- We have a view of the edge 

At time 1, a moderate loss occurs

4 cases:

- Edge unmoved
- Edge moves less than centre
- Centre and edge both moved equally
- Edge has moved more than centre




Extent to which losses are absorbed determines cyclical impact

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Information content of adverse event

- is **unconditional** in price space: targets a fixed '1 in 200' price level
- is **mean reversion**: adverse event lowers likely severity of next event
- is **unconditional** in return space: latest event has no impact on next
- is **procyclical**: latest event leads to strengthened view of next one



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Examples

1. Fixed absolute stress

- Downside interest rate event may already be extremely small positive rates
- Peak spreads from credit crisis might form a post-crisis 1-in-200 event

2. Mean reversion

- After 20% equity fall, 40% stress might reduce to 30% (44% total)

3. Fixed relative stress

- Expense risk stress may be unlikely to react to new expense assumptions

4. Increased stress

- Credit crisis dramatically changed views on credit risk
- Equity falls typically associated with higher volatility

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Solvency II

Solvency II – competing objectives

Economic based capital

- “The supervisory regime should provide for a **risk-sensitive** requirement, which is based on a **prospective** calculation” (Recital 60)
- “SCR should be determined as the economic capital to be held by insurance and reinsurance undertakings in order to ensure that ... undertakings will still be in a position, with a probability of at least 99.5 %, to meet their obligations to policy holders and beneficiaries over the following 12 months” (Recital 64)

Avoid pro-cyclicality

- “mitigate **undue potential pro-cyclical effects** of the financial system and avoid a situation in which insurance and reinsurance undertakings are unduly forced to raise additional capital or sell their investments as a result of **unsustained adverse movements** in financial markets” (Recital 61)

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To earn long-term market risk premiums need to be able to withstand fluctuations

Buffer capital/ORSA

- Excess capital sufficient to absorb volatility

Hedging

- Equivalent to contingent capital

Diversification

- Stable risk premium in tail events

Product design

- Fluctuations absorbed by customers

Capital absorption

- Absorbed by technical provisions / capital

Reference: World Economic Forum – the Future of Long-term Investing


<http://www.weforum.org/issues/future-long-term-investing>

Reference: Committee on the Global Financial System, Paper no. 44, Fixed Income Strategies of Insurance Companies and Pension Funds <http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs44.htm>

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
Issues and counter-cyclical mitigants

- Recovery period
- TTC calibration of Standard Model




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Equities symmetrical adjustment mechanism Operation - per QIS5, and Article 106(3)




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Is it effective? Yes with no cap/floor



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Is it effective? Cap/floor limits significantly



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Multi-period modelling

Modelling set-up discussion 1

- Want to explore how large buffer should be
- Running off a fixed set of contracts (e.g. trees earlier) doesn't capture full dynamics: other levers available include
 - Volume of new business
 - Risk hedging (investment policy, reinsurance)
 - Raising of new capital / paying out dividends
- The joint problem of setting policies for these as well as capital buffer is really what we're after

Modelling set-up discussion 2

- Cost of capital not modelled as fixed premium to risk-free
 - More buffer means less risk to capital providers
 - Simple approach is to calculate cost according to standard deviation of projected outcomes over following year
 - Default option cost should perhaps be subtracted but should be small and ignored here

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
Toy insurer

- Assume firm wants to write contracts where the risk emerges over two years
 - Notional N
 - Pay $N(1+s[1]+s[2])$ at end of 2 years, where $s[i]$ is known at end of i 'th year. Normally distributed.
 - Charge premium equal to MVM
- Each year, aim to write $N=100$ new business subject to capital availability
 - If insufficient for $N=60$ then raise additional capital so that $N=80$ can be written
 - Return excess capital to shareholders

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Two capital policies: new business volumes


- One year approach. Hold enough for next year ($P=99.5\%$)
- Two year approach. Hold enough for 99.5% of runoffs
- End up writing similar amounts of business – slightly less for the two-year, as more initial capital needed to support it



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
New capital raising: likelihood

- Two year buffer + limited willingness to write less business does act as a shock absorber
 - Despite policy requiring more capital to write new business
- Likelihood of seeking further capital is about a fifth lower



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New capital raising: size



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Comments

- Total capital requirement ends up being similar over time
- Possibility of capital being unavailable or costly means future business may be difficult to execute
- Trade offs between buffer policy, level of business and frequency of capital raising

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Further work


- Need to quantify trade offs so alternative strategies can be more easily compared
- Risk adjusted return on capital
- Costs of raising capital – cf Smith (1996)
 - Suggests a zone for buffer capital – raise capital or pay dividends on borders of this zone
- Insurance v financial risk
 - Is there a difference? Why take financial risk when there's a capital cost?

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Questions or comments?

Expressions of individual views by members of the Actuarial Profession and its staff are encouraged.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the presenters



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