

## The Pensions Quagmire

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## The Quagmire

- Every aspect of pensions provision is surrounded by government-imposed complexity
- Includes: state pensions, taxation of funds, tax qualification for funds, contracting out, regulation, social security benefits, taxation of personal income in retirement
- State tries to “micro-manage” personal incomes in retirement to achieve social objectives
- An individual can have ten income sources when on an income of <£10,000 per year

## Structure

- Take *some* aspects of the quagmire and examine them in greater detail
- Look at the consequences of these problems
- Examine possible solutions

## State Pension System

- Basic state pensions (BSP)
  - Contributory principle
  - Full pension £82.05 a week
  - Link between national insurance contribution record and pension received
  - 44 years contributions needed for a full pension


## State Second Pension (S2P)

- Replaced state earnings related pension (SERPS) and made much more complex
- Contributory
- Based on average revalued earnings between lower and upper national insurance contribution (NIC) limits (earnings related)
- Full record can earn pension of 20% of revalued earnings between lower and upper NIC limits
- Pension accrued revalued in line with national average earnings; rises in line with prices in payment
- Actual rate of accrual (amount of pension received relative to earnings) varies with earnings: now horrendously complex
- Individuals and schemes can "contract out" if they make appropriate alternative provision but rebates of national insurance contributions given for contracting out now inadequate


## Social Security

- Massive increase in means-tested benefits since 1997; 50% of pensioners now entitled to them
- Complex taper provisions: minimum income guarantee, pension credit and savings credit
- In addition to basic benefit there is: housing benefit, council tax benefit, "winter-fuel" allowance, television licence...
- No time to explain all these but best illustrated by chart showing marginal rates of benefit withdrawal by income

## Marginal Tax and Benefit Withdrawal Rates



## Tax System for Pensioners



## Illustration of Disincentives to Save

Return on saving for individual saving £20 per month

Actual return, net of the Pension Credit  
Number of years of work and saving

Real investment return	10	20	30	40
2%	-10%	-3%	-1%	-1%
4%	-7%	-1%	1%	2%
6%	-5%	1%	3%	5%

## Tax Treatment of Pensions

- Two coherent types of tax system
  - Taxes on expenditure only
  - Taxes on all income (including returns from saving)
- Pensions saving is supposed to follow expenditure tax
  - Income put into pension schemes not supposed to be taxed until an annuity is taken
- Two major exceptions
  - Returns from equity investment are taxed
  - Tax free lump sum

## Fundamental Problem

- Much of the problem is a manifestation of “public choice” economics.
- Governments have provided special benefits for interest groups that have significant electoral power.
  - Dispersed costs versus concentrated benefits
- Any answer to the problems of UK pensions must address this problem at its root.

## How Not to Solve the UK Pensions Problem

- The citizen's pension
  - Proposed by NAPF, supported by PPI and, it seems, many in government
- Abolish the contributory principle and the accrual principle
- Pay a much higher basic pension to all citizens
- Abolish earnings related pensions
- Abolish contracting out
- Pension would be paid at a level determined by the Parliament of the day (say £135 a week at first)

## Why Not a Citizen's Pension?

- A citizen's pension has neat simplicity but...
- Ignores public choice economics
  - As the population ages, pensioners make up a larger proportion of voters
  - Continual pressure for higher pensions
  - Those who benefit do not pay
    - Lose link between contributions and benefits
  - Contracting out creates pressure for fair accrual processes
    - transparent link between contributions, benefits and rebates: like vouchers
- Why treat the old poor differently from the young poor?
- Who is a citizen?

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## Alternative Proposals

- Single contributory pension benefit, payable from age 70
- Single means-tested benefit that is not age related
- Individuals and schemes should be allowed to contract out of the state pension
- No special income tax allowances for the elderly
- The pension tax-free lump sum should be abolished but pension funds should not be taxed on equity investments
- Significantly reduced regulation of pension schemes
- Regulations surrounding the purchase of annuities should be relaxed significantly
- Independent Pensions Commission

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