

### Risk Measures: Beyond Coherence?

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## Agenda

- Risk measures: What are they good for?
- Risk measurement and risk aversion
- Coherent (and other) risk measures
- Beyond coherence:
  - Liquidity and aggregation
  - Background risk
  - A regulatory perspective
- Discussion (hopefully)

## **Risk Measures**

- Risk measures are functions
  - You put in a (loss) distribution
  - You get out a number
- They can be used for
  - Comparing risks
  - Pricing
  - Capital allocation (as in portfolio management)
  - Capital allocation (as in regulatory requirements)

## Some risk measures

- Expected loss: (1+λ)·E[X]
- Standard deviation: σ(X)
- Percentile: Pr(X ≤ VaR<sub>a</sub>(X)) = a
- Tail Conditional Expectation: E[X|X>VaR<sub>a</sub>(X)]
- Lloyd's RBC: E[max{X-(NP+RBC),0}] = NP·ELC

## **Risk aversion**

- A risk measure adds a margin to expected loss.
- Hence it forms a representation of risk aversion:
  - How risk averse are we? How much is the margin?
  - In which way are we risk averse? How do we calculate the margin?
- Ways in which to model risk aversion
  - Exaggerate the probabilities of adverse scenarios
  - Exaggerate the consequences of adverse scenarios

## Distorting probabilities (1)

- If working with a probability distribution, the method consists of "blowing up" its tail.
- For a tail function S(x) = Pr(X>x), apply the non-linear transform S<sup>\*</sup>(x) = g(Pr(X>x)).
- The risk measure equals the expected loss under the transformed probability distribution:  $\rho(X) = \int_{0}^{\infty} S^{*}(x) dx \quad (\text{recall that } \mu = \int_{0}^{\infty} S(x) dx )$

#### **Transformed Probability Distributions**



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## Distorting probabilities (2)

- If working with samples (e.g. from a DFA model), re-weight them according to (an increasing function of) their ranks.
- After re-weighting, take the average.
- If the CDF is F(x) = Pr(X≤x), this corresponds to:
  ρ(X)=E[X⋅h(F(X))]
  for appropriate increasing function h

#### Weighting of samples in the distortion approach



#### Weighted samples



## **Distorting losses**

- An alternative way of modelling risk aversion relies on the transformation of potential losses.
- Method: transform each sample x<sub>i</sub> by v(x<sub>i</sub>).
- v is a convex and increasing "disutility" function.
- Take the average of the transformed samples.
- Apply inverse v<sup>-1</sup> to recover original scale.
  ρ(X) = v<sup>-1</sup>(E[v(X)]

#### Utility-like transformation of losses



## Properties of risk measures

- Different risk measures are characterised by alternative sets of properties
- Different sets of properties correspond to alternative notions of risk aversion
- Let's have a look...

### Coherence (Artzner et al., 1999)

•  $\rho(X+Y) \leq \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$ ,

meaning that pooling risks is always beneficial

• ρ(a·X) = a·ρ(X), a≥0

meaning that the scale of loss does not matter

- Can be constructed by distorting probabilities:
  ρ(X) = E[X·h(F(X))]
- TailVaR is coherent, VaR isn't

### Additivity (Gerber, 1974)

- $\rho(X+Y) = \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$  for independent (X,Y)
- $\rho(X+Y) \le \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$  for negative correlation
- $\rho(X+Y) \ge \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$  for positive correlation
- Can be constructed by distorting the losses:

$$v(x) = \exp(\beta X) \Rightarrow \rho(x) = \frac{1}{\beta} \ln E[\exp(\beta X)]$$

Such risk measures are quite sensitive to scale.

### Convexity (Föllmer and Schied, 2002)

- $\rho(\lambda X + (1-\lambda)Y) \le \lambda \rho(X) + (1-\lambda) \rho(Y)$
- "Must diversify in order to pool, not pool in order to diversify"
- The two classes described previously are special cases
- Can construct using a combination of distortion and utility approaches (Tsanakas and Desli, 2003 BAJ)

## Departures from coherence

- Coherence nowadays forms the most widely accepted set of properties for risk measures.
- However, there are situations where the properties of coherent risk measures may not be appropriate.
- Typically this happens if the scale of potential losses is an issue.
- Three such situations are now described.

## Liquidity risk

- In the case that a highly adverse scenario takes place, additional capital will have to be raised.
- Trying to raise £1m and £100m are two very different things.
- Coherent risk measures are scale invariant:
  ρ(aX) ≤ a·ρ(X)

and do not address this issue.

## Aggregation risk

- Some people would also argue that you should never accumulate highly correlated risks.
- This is intricately linked with liquidity aggregating many highly correlated positions is like investing in one large risk.
- Coherent risk measures are subadditive:
  ρ(X+Y) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y)
  and again do not take account of this issue.

### Convex risk measures to the rescue

 If liquidity and aggregation are concerns, we could use a convex risk measure instead, e.g., "exponential TailVaR":

$$\rho(X) = \frac{1}{\beta} In E \left[ e^{\beta X} \mid X > Q_X(a) \right]$$

- For small losses behaves approximately like a coherent risk measure.
- For larger losses it becomes more and more sensitive to liquidity and aggregation.

#### Sensitivity of risk measures to portfolio size



## Background risk

- You hold a risk Y that you cannot get rid of.
- You add some new (say independent) exposure X to that.
- Small amounts of the new risk X diversify your initial exposure.
- The more of X you take on though, the more X dominates your portfolio, hence the less diversification benefit it contributes.

## Background risk (cont'd)

- Capital allocation techniques can determine the benefit from taking on exposure in new risk X.
- Consider the portfolio Y+  $\lambda$ ·X
- Calculate the aggregate risk, using e.g. TailVaR
- Determine the contribution of the new exposure λ·X to the aggregate risk.
- Plot that against exposure  $\lambda$ .

#### Risk contribution in the presence of background risk



# Regulation

- Coherent risk measures encourage the pooling of portfolios.
- It is desirable that such pooling does not increase the shortfall risk.
- Consider two loss portfolios X, Y.
- A regulator suggests a coherent risk measure ρ for determining respective capital ρ(X), ρ(Y).

# Regulation (Cont'd)

- The loss from each portfolio, in excess of capital, is borne by "society".
- These losses are respectively: max{X - ρ(X),0}, max{Y - ρ(Y),0}
- Suppose now that the holders of risks X and Y decide to merge them.
- New risk to "society" is: max{X+Y- ρ(X+Y),0}

# Regulation (Cont'd)

- It was shown by Dhaene et al. (2004), that, if p is subadditive, the shortfall risk to "society" after the merger can be higher than before.
- Hence pooling can be good for insurers, but bad for policyholders, due to increased shortfall risk!
- A bit controversial but there is something in it.

## Conclusion

- There are different ways of constructing risk measures, depending on how our risk aversion is manifested.
- Coherent risk measures are the leading paradigm, but sometimes do not adequately capture risk.
- They can be enriched by introducing some sensitivity to the scale of potential shortfall.