

The sting in the tale...






May 2013

What are tail events and why do we care?

- · Outside of likely outcomes
- · Potentially extreme
- "Death Events"?
- Change course permanently
- Hard to quantify
- · Swans vs. ugly ducklings





May 2013

Black swans

- · High-impact, hard-to-predict, rare
- Non-computable
- Hindsight





Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan (2007)



May 2013

White swans

• "Contrary to conventional wisdom, crises are not black swans but white swans: the elements of boom and bust are remarkably predictable"





Nouriel Roubini, Crisis Economics (2011)



May 2013

The changing landscape






May 2013


Shift in emerging market vs. developed market risks

Learning from past problems



May 2013


Starting from a precarious position



Source: ONS

May 2013 8

Walking a financial repression tightrope



May 2013


World GDP growth



May 2013 10

Fault lines

- "Too big to fail" economies?
- Contain country shocks



USA



May 2013 11

Macroeconomic shock drivers

Source: US Treasury, Federal Reserve

Debt **Equality** Resources US National Debt vs. Unfunded **Electricity - Consumption Unemployment Rate** Liabilities 30 · 25 · 20 · % 15 5,000 \$ 16.7 tn 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 2004 2006 2012 2008 2010 2006 2008 2010 2012 2002 2004 Germany - Spain - China - United States \$ 123.0 tn US unfunded liabilitiesUS national debt Institute and Faculty of Actuaries

Source: CIA World Factbook May 2013 12

Right here, right now



- Debt overhang to last generations
- Money printing and inflation bias
- Unfunded liabilities on top



- Risk of a wealth monopoly
- · Loss of jobs in tradable sectors



· Capacity constraints, prone to supply shocks



13 May 2013

Politics and Policy

- Coalitions
- Split power
- Populist parties
- Competitiveness
- Benefits
- · Capital and labour migration





Institute and Faculty of Actuaries

May 2013

From chatter to matter - Quantifying scenarios





May 2013 15

Tail risk hedging

A robust estimation of downside risks

- From abstract ideas to quantitative scenarios
- · Discussion, challenge, consensus, review






May 2013 16

Why simplifications don't work well

Estimating liability values and swap MTM



Calculation	Error
PV01 * Stress	16.5%
[(1+Start rate) / (1+End rate)] ^ Duration	-0.2%
Change in TP liabilities	1.5%
Correct swap MTM	0%


- 1. "PV01 * Stress " can be significantly misleading
- 2. "[1+ start rate / 1 + end rate]^ duration" is much closer
- 3. Can be misleading to consider hedges as a proportion of TP liability risk



May 2013 17

Why simplifications don't work well


Expected returns assumptions



- · Definition of risk-free rate can significantly impact projected assets
- Allowance for downgrades and defaults is often overlooked, it reduces credit returns by c.25bps p.a.
 Institute and Faculty of Actuaries

May 2013 18


Receding tail risks or complacency?



Institute and Faculty of Actuaries

May 2013 19

Understanding sensitivity of alternative candidate portfolios



May 2013

Historic scenario example: Japan's Lost Decade(s)



- Banking deregulation and high saving led to excessive lending, particularly in real estate
- · Reduced interest rates failed to stimulate the economy, with investors reluctant to take risk
- · Growth was anaemic and inflation steadily fell, along with ongoing banking stability issues
- · Stimulus packages misallocated capital and rising fiscal concerns led to mixed policies



May 2013

Stagflation scenario - a brief description

- Year 1&2 Austerity Plus More QE (see Debt Deflation)
 - Weak UK and US growth government austerity and consumer deleveraging, corporates remain conservative
 - Fed Quantitative Easing effects are muted, more stimulus is required each time and desperate measures
- Year 3 Problems escalate as destabilising tendencies increase
 - Stimulus generates real economic growth, but inflationary pressures increase. Realised inflation overshoots
 - Despite destabilising tendencies, governments and central banks continue austerity and monetary easing
 - Towards the end of the year, the economy is at a cliff's edge and financial markets show signs of a panic
- Year 4 Governments retain control over solvency and economic conditions, but growth suffers and inflation
 expectations have increased
 - Government accepts higher interest rates and weaker economic performance
 - Growth stalls and a lack of further stimulus. Corporates focus on repaying debt, but suffer defaults
 - Previous monetary stimulus drives inflation to an elevated level of 5%
 - Belief remains that inflation is not spiralling out of control, but inflation expectations move up permanently



May 2013 22

Stagflation - impact on assets

Assets	Nominal Returns	Real Returns	Comment
GBP EQUITY	-19.5%	-38.4%	
EUR EQUITY	24.9%	6.0%	Unhedged
JPY EQUITY	15.0%	-3.9%	Unhedged
USD EQUITY	-10.4%	-29.3%	Unhedged
EMERGING MARKET EQUITY	20.0%	1.1%	Unhedged
GBP PROPERTY	-0.5%	-19.5%	
GBP CORP 10 YEAR	-11.1%	-30.0%	
EUR CORP 10 YEAR	-4.0%	-22.9%	Hedged
USD CORP 10 YEAR	-13.1%	-32.0%	Hedged
GILT LINKED 10 YEAR	19.2%	0.3%	_
GILT 10 YEAR	-12.1%	-31.0%	
BUND 10 YEAR	-2.6%	-21.5%	Hedged
UST 10 YEAR	-12.1%	-31.0%	Hedged
OIL	11.6%	-7.3%	Unhedged
GOLD	29.0%	10.1%	Unhedged
ACTUAL RPI INFLATION	4.4%		Annual
EUR GBP	28.3%		
EM GBP	42.9%		
JPY GBP	21.9%		
USD GBP	10.0%		

- The (GBP) returns above are expected cumulative asset class returns over the 4-year scenario horizon
- · The more extreme the scenario, the greater uncertainty and views across this scenario differ significantly
- Given heightened uncertainty it is more appropriate to analyse market impacts as broad asset classes
- · Excessive focus on specific markets could lead to over confidence in actions taken to mitigate this scenario



May 2013 23

Attribution by risk driver across scenarios

Focus in on fewer, key scenarios based on likelihood and impact



- ✓ Identify key risks and drivers
- ✓ Assess alternative hedge attractiveness
- ✓ Build a safety net

- ✓ Improving asset allocation
- ✓ Opportunistic hedging
- ✓ Systematic hedging



Institute and Faculty of Actuaries

May 2013

Disclaimer

Legal & General Investment Management does not provide advice on the suitability of its products or services

This document is intended for educational purposes and should not be relied on for any other reason

Legal & General Investment Management

Authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority and regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority

One Coleman Street
London
EC2R 5AA



May 2013 25