

## Sponsor Covenant Risk and Actuarial Advice

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24.02.06

### Incorporating sponsor covenant risk

- How do traditional methodologies fit?
- Disclosure & advice
- Effect on management of schemes

### Different points of reference

- Trustee concerns
  - Ensure payment of promised pension for scheme members
  - Whilst trying not to bankrupt sponsor
- Company concerns (= shareholder concerns?)
  - Keep cost of providing pension to a minimum
  - Whilst keeping rest of company going
- Sponsor covenant has to be key to any funding plan

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## Trustees' point of view


- Members' "assets":
  - Value of current pension fund assets
  - Value of promise from company to make good any deficit
  - Value of contingent assets available on default
    - Ring-fencing of company assets / Escrow accounts
- Liabilities: Value of promised pensions (buyout value?)
- Trustees' aim: Members' "assets" = Liabilities

## Shareholders' point of view

- Shareholders' "liability":
  - Deficit in pension fund now
  - Possible deficit in pension fund in the future
    - e.g. if risky assets are held
- Cost to shareholders:
  - Contributions to meet deficit from actuarial valuation
  - Economic cost of any deficit in the future
  - PPF Levy
- Shareholders' aim:
  - Continuation of company
  - Members' "assets" = Liabilities ??

## Company promise

Traditionally, no allowance for sponsor default risk in contribution calcs



No sponsor default => Present value of contributions = D (=£100m)

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### But sponsor default risk exists

- Can think of promised contributions as a corporate bond
- Credit risk lowers value of promise
  - Less chance of receiving all contributions
- How significant is this risk?



### Credit ratings as measure of risk

- AAA rated company: minimal risk of default
  - Bank of England etc.
- BB/B rated companies: sub-investment grade
  - Encompasses majority of UK private companies & public company subsidiaries (Source: S&P)
- CCC rated company: very high risk of default



### Simple example of credit risk

- Company promises £100m in 5 year's time
  - Assume risk-free rates are 0%
  - No default risk => promise worth £100m now
- Assume annual default probability
  - Use S&P historic default probabilities
  - Sufficient for illustrative purposes
  - Wrong for pricing purposes
    - Typically understates cost of default risk



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
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### Simple example of credit risk


- AAA default probability: <0.02% p.a.
- BB default probability : 1-2% p.a.
- B default probability : 5-10% p.a.
  
- Probability of company existing in 5 years
  - AAA:  $(1 - 0.02\%)^5 = 99.9\%$
  - BB:  $(1 - 1.5\%)^5 = 92.7\%$
  - B:  $(1 - 7.5\%)^5 = 67.7\%$

### Simple example of credit risk



### Impact on traditional advice

Default risk will reduce the value of the promise



But by how much?

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
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### Value of promise with default risk




Present value of future contributions (PVfc) =  $\sum \text{payoff} * \text{probability}$   
 If  $c = £20m$  p.a. and  $p = 10\%$  p.a. then  $PVfc \approx £74m < \text{Deficit}$



### Impact on traditional advice

A more accurate representation would be...



But trustees wanted £100m?



### Implications

- Trustees' want Members' "assets" = Liabilities
- By ignoring sponsor default risk, traditional advice leads to Members' "assets" < Liabilities
- Traditional advice not sufficient to secure members' benefits




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
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### Making up the difference

- Higher contributions?
  - Similar to increased coupons on corporate bonds
  - Such that promise including default risk = £100m
- Credit risk mitigation?
  - Credit Insurance / contingent assets / ...


### Increased contributions?

Set contributions such that promise including default risk worth deficit



### Increased contributions?

Default probability =  $p$  (= 10%)



In this example we would need  $c = £27.1m$  for  $PVfc = £100m$

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
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### Problem solved?

- Are higher contributions the answer?
- We can solve for the contribution amount such that value of promise = deficit
- But higher contributions have risk


### Reality is just one outcome

What if reality was as follows...



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What if reality was as follows...



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
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## Insurance contracts

- Instead need to think of £27.1m p.a. as £20m p.a. + an insurance premium
  - Cost of protection against company default
- Remember, deficit would only be guaranteed if insurance was actually purchased

## Pricing an insurance contract




Cost of this insurance contract is  $\approx$  £26m  
As expected: deficit = contributions (£74m) + insurance (£26m)

## Incorporating default risk

With the purchase of an insurance contract

Company promise



What types of "insurance" are available?



### Default risk mitigation

- Credit default swap (CDS)
  - Traded instrument
  - Typically only larger companies
  - Payout linked to a reference bond
    - So priority can be an issue
- Credit Insurance
  - Typically valid only for a limited period of time
  - Limited availability / expensive



### Default risk mitigation

- Third-party guarantees i.e. letter of credit
  - Calling conditions can be complex
  - Typically enforces an extension at end of initial term
  - Expensive compared to borrow & fill
    - Providers will charge a significant fee
- Cross-group guarantees
  - Make any support obligations clear



### Default risk mitigation

- Priority of debt
  - *pari passu* clauses – prohibition of creating prior ranking debt
  - Limited opportunity for improving pension fund priority
  - Negative pledges
- Financial covenants
  - i.e. accelerated funding if covenant deteriorates
  - Complicated – could cause full default



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## Default risk mitigation

- Security
  - Charge over assets (contingent assets)
    - E.g. Property
    - Inventory
    - Subsidiaries
  - Escrow account
- Value of security on company default not the same as market value of security now!

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## Contingent assets

- Example of charge on assets
  - Property with market value of £100m
  - Charge given such that property passes to pension fund should company default
- But would this be sufficient?

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## Contingent assets

- Property might not be worth £100m at default?
- So value now of charge over property < £100m
- Pension fund might need more/less than £100m at company default
  - Dynamic process
  - Charge could reduce as contributions made
  - Charge might have to increase as economic conditions change

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
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### But aren't equities the answer?

- Typical pension fund assets are mis-matched
- Traditional advice takes advance credit for the equity risk premium (looks at the "long-term")
- But ignores the risks
- And default risk doesn't allow for the "long-term"


### Company promise with mis-matching

No allowance for sponsor default risk and advance credit for equity risk



### Company promise with mis-matching

The outcome of the funding plan is volatile




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
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
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
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
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## Company promise with mis-matching


But the downside risk typically has a much greater cost



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FUNDING THE COST OF PENSION DEFICIT RISK

## Company promise with mis-matching

Putting it all together...



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## Refresher: call & put options

- "call option" – contract which gives the right but not the obligation to buy an asset at some time in the future for a price fixed at the current date
  - Purchase of call option gives exposure to up-side risk
  
- "put option" – contract which gives the right but not the obligation to sell an asset at some time in the future for a price fixed at the current date
  - Purchase of put option gives protection against down-side risk

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FUNDING THE COST OF PENSION DEFICIT RISK

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
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## Contributions & options


- If risky assets perform better than expected  
Company can stop paying contributions early
  - A type of call option
- If risky assets don't perform as well as expected  
the Company has to make up the deficit
  - A type of put option

## Company promise with mis-matching

So a better depiction of the funding plan might be...



## Company promise with mis-matching




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
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## Value of promise

Assuming contributions of £10m p.a. + final amount in 5 years




For this example we made simple approximations about the volatility of the deficit

Approximate value of the promise is £66m  
Only if company promises to make volatile final payment in 5 years



## Company promise with mis-matching

At best the promise is only worth £66m



## How much would security cost?

- Put option from company is typically not recognised as part of the funding plan
- So to guarantee security Trustees would need to insure against default risk and the risk of any final deficit




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
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## Cost of security

Assuming only contributions of £10m p.a.

Need to protect against the risk that final deficit in 5 years time is greater than 0




Approximate cost of this security is £63m

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## Incorporating default risk

With insurance contract / contingent assets

Company "promise"



Without insurance or contingent assets Members' "assets" << liabilities

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## How does advice need to change?

- Disclosure of economic reality is vital
  - Significant change from current practice
  - Important for both Trustees and Shareholders
- A minimum demand from Trustees?
  - Members' "assets" should have economic value equal to the current deficit allowing for default risk (& risky assets)
- An awareness that uncertainty represents a cost for shareholders

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### How does advice need to change?

- Higher contributions not necessarily sufficient
  - Unless insurance purchased (but not easily available)
- Need to think about contingent assets
  - Won't guarantee benefits unless structured appropriately
  - Could require significant amount of capital to be set aside by the company

### Opportunities

- Innovation - involvement in the discussions on structuring of company assets to back the promise
- Modelling all this is difficult but not impossible
  - Not an excuse for ignoring the problem
  - Education about the principles would be a start
- If actuaries don't advise on this someone else will
  - The market – M & A
  - Investment banks / ratings companies

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