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Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis

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
Agenda

- The crisis and the lessons learnt
- The lessons from an insurance perspective
- Looking forward





This crisis is a low frequency high severity event!






Characteristics of the crisis and lessons

- Huge parts of the banking system and capital markets stopped working
- Asset markets dropped dramatically, often due to illiquidity issues; valuations and correlations between asset values have been distorted
- Hedging became very expensive, hedges worked imperfectly, financing instruments became extremly expensive or unavailable
- A financial crisis of major size causes also the real economy to collapse. It was surprising how rapidly, strongly and simultaneously the real economy reacted
- In a systemic crisis many markets don't operate as usual the issue is the accumulation of problems



The crisis developed slowly until Lehman defaulted



Lessons

- A global banking crisis is still possible in our modern world; the superior risk management of banks was and is an illusion
- There are means to prevent systemic crises. Regulation and infrastructure can be improved. It was also a crisis of execution and partly political will
- There are also means to limit the crisis impact on the real economy and capital markets; there is an important role for governments in such a situation
- Crises are not only difficult to forecast but also the development of such extreme crises is extremly difficult to predict. Crisis management is not a rock solid science
- The banking system needs better regulation and execution of its regulation plus it needs better infrastructure but governments should not run the banks



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Insurance industry withstood the crisis, but was not unscathed

Balance sheets adversely affected...

- Massive asset write-downs resulting in realised and unrealised losses
- Ratings downgrades
- Liquidity risk surprises
- Complex products left unhedged

...last-resort solutions relied upon


- Back-up funds tapped
- Dilutive capital raised
- Government bailouts

Also insurance is affected but there is no comparison to banking




Insurers capital situation

Shareholder's Equity* Index Jun 2007=100, USD



Shareholder's Equity by country* Index Q4 2007=100, USD



Sources: Company reports, Bloomberg, Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting

Between end of 2007 and end 2008 non-life insurers lost 20%, life insurers 40% of their shareholder's equity. Since the begining of 2008 shareholder capital increased by 10%.



Lessons for insurers

■ Insurers can hardly remain unaffected by the type of crisis just experienced → that is why capital has to be put aside for market risk

Important lessons for risk management

- Correlations in tail events are totally different → important implications for asset/ liabilty management
- Many financial instruments are very expensive/work imperfectly/ work different / are not available in a crisis → important issue for corporate finance
- Given the dimension of the crisis the negative surprises in insurance remained limited; there are important lessons for risk management however

... continued


- The crisis did not come out of the blue but developed slowly; there is time to react and prepare
- For being among the winners you had to realise the crisis earlier than competitors and act on it
- Managing a crisis is different from day to day management

Companies cannot prevent a systemic crisis to happen but can manage it better

Subprime Crisis in Insurance: The London Market Excess of Loss Spiral (LMX)

have time to absorb even big shocks







Insurance industry to raise its voice, as regulatory environment evolves

Key objectives for the industry

Emphasise (re)insurance
specificities	

 Differentiate between the business model of (re)insurers and banks

Promote sound risk and capital management

Establish economic and risk-based regulatory framework

Maintain market access and level playing field

 Secure governments' commitments to open trade and fair competition

Achieve accounting convergence

Enforce market-consistent valuation and avoid pro-cyclicality



Insurance and reinsurance are part of the solution, and not sources of the crisis



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
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



Global economy: signs of bottoming out confirmed





There are signs of improvements but the recovery is not assured





Sources: Swiss Re ER&C, Bloomberg

For unemployment to peak or inflation to rise substantially it needs a strong recovery, which does not seem likely until 2011



Self sustained recovery probable but still not certain

Positive

- Recovery is under way, government impulses are massive
- It is expected that demand for durable goods and capital goods kicks in over the course of 2010
- Inflation is not an issue as long as capacity utilisation remains low

Negative


- Unemployment will increase substantially before it will peak (in Europe it is currently held back)
- The recovery is financed through increasing government debt, which is difficult to maintain in the long run


To watch in 2010

- Will private demand pick up enough to allow governments to gradually withdraw?
- Is the recovery strong enough to reduce unemployment?
- Inflation needs attention, when the economy is back on track



Credit spreads down, equities up – more potential for improvements






Capital markets recovered forcefully already




What do capital market improvements mean for insurers?



The expected rise in interest rates is an accounting not an economic issue for insurers

Rate development in non-life insurance

Relationship between combined ratio and profitability for different interest rate levels (US P&C market)



Sources: A.M. Best, estimates by Economic Research & Consulting.

[1] based on 1H08 effective statutory tax rates.

[2] 9M08 total investment yield was 3.0% and CR was 105

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Insurance rates don't reflect the low interest rate development



Summary

- In a systemic crisis many markets fail to operate in an orderly manner
- The management challenges in a crisis differ totally from those in "normal" times
- The challenges ahead are recapitalisation, coping with low interest rates and soft markets