Periodical Payment Orders Working Party Update
GIRO 2017 Report (Industry Survey)

by the Periodical Payment Orders Working Party

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Public Report

21 December 2018
Industry Survey

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Introduction

Release

The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries’ (“IFoA”) Periodical Payment Orders (“PPO”) Working Party 2017 industry survey consists of a quantitative industry survey, the data for which was taken as at 31 December 2016, and a qualitative industry survey, the responses for which were collected between December 2016 and March 2017 inclusive.

This release of the IFoA PPO Working Party 2017 industry survey supersedes any prior publication.

Similar studies have been published by the IFoA PPO Working Party annually since 2010.

Each year, the participants in the quantitative industry survey have changed, and, each year, the analysis uses a new, full historic snapshot from each of the participating companies. Likewise, each year, the participants in the qualitative industry survey have changed.

The data between surveys will therefore not be directly comparable, as a different mix of companies will have participated in each successive survey. Changes in claims classification by insurers can also lead to differences in results between successive surveys.

Participants

The data we have received for the quantitative industry survey comprises 517 Motor PPO claims and 49 Liability PPO claims (566 PPO claims in total). We also received data for 165 PPO claims from the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB).

The insurers surveyed account for over 90% of the Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) regulated market (based on 2015 gross premium volumes) for Motor, including Personal and Commercial insurance, Comprehensive and Non-Comprehensive covers. In addition, there are further companies which contribute to the survey but do not appear in the 2015 PRA returns.

For the qualitative industry survey, 14 insurers and 5 reinsurers were interviewed.

We are very grateful to all the participants, without whom the industry survey would not be possible.

The following companies are happy to be acknowledged for their participation in the quantitative industry survey (though please note that this list does not include all participants):

- Acromas Insurance Company Limited
- Admiral
- Allianz
- Aviva
- AXA
- Co-Op Insurance
- Covéa Insurance
- DLG
- esure
- Motor Insurers’ Bureau
- NFU Mutual
- RSA
- Tesco Underwriting
The following companies are happy to be acknowledged for their participation in the qualitative industry survey (though please note that this list does not include all participants):

- Acromas Insurance Company Limited
- Admiral
- Ageas Insurance
- AIG
- Allianz
- Aviva
- AXA
- Co-Op Insurance
- Covéa Insurance
- DLG
- esure
- Liberty Specialty Markets
- LV=
- Markel International
- NFU Mutual
- RSA
- Swiss Re
- Tesco Underwriting
- XL Catlin

Contact

If you have any questions regarding the industry survey, including requests for information or statistics from the data that are not published within this document, please contact Sharon Cumberbatch at the IFoA (Sharon.Cumberbatch@actuaries.org.uk) in the first instance, who will put you in contact with the IFoA PPO Working Party. Alternatively please contact Peter Saunders, Chair of the IFoA PPO Working Party at the time of publication (IFoA_PPO_WP_Chair@outlook.com).

Notes

The material contained in this report and any oral representation of it by the IFoA PPO Working Party is explicitly outside the scope of Technical Actuarial Standard (“TAS”) 100 and TAS 200, as issued by the Financial Reporting Council (“FRC”).

This report complies with “APS X2: Review of Actuarial Work”, as issued by the IFoA, in that the work documented in this report has been subject to a peer review by an appropriately qualified actuary who was otherwise not involved in the analysis undertaken.

This report supports the research effort of the IFoA PPO Working Party and is not written advice directed at the particular facts and circumstances of any given situation and / or data

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those held by the authors (the members of the IFoA PPO Working Party) individually and do not represent the views and opinions of their employers or the IFoA. Although the authors have used their best efforts, no warranty is given about the accuracy of the information and no liability can be accepted for anybody relying on the accuracy of the information or following the recommendations in this report.
Executive summary

Introduction

The IFoA PPO Working Party has, for a number of years, been collecting quantitative data and qualitative information from insurers and reinsurers on PPO claim settlements, analysing movements and trends in that data and information, and publishing the results of the studies in an annual report. This helps actuaries and other interested parties to better understand this type of claims settlement, and how PPOs affect the reserving, pricing, risk management and capital requirements of insurers and reinsurers.

In this report, the IFoA PPO Working Party 2017 industry survey, we provide an update on the numbers and sizes of claims settling as PPO claims, PPO propensities, claims inflation and claimant mortality experience, together with claims handling information such as delays to settlement, claimant life expectancies and injury classifications. We consider the reserving of PPO claims from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective, and examine the effect of varying assumptions around the rate of return used for assessing the amount of damages in respect of future loss in personal injury cases. We additionally present data on an accident year basis and look at special features of PPO claims, such as stepped payments and variation orders.

It should be noted that all of the data, analysis and exhibits in this report are before the change to the Ogden discount rate in 2017 (see below).

Ogden discount rate

The Lord Chancellor announced on 27 February 2017 that the UK discount rate, the rate of return used for assessing the amount of damages in respect of future loss in personal injury cases, would be reduced from 2.5% per annum to -0.75% per annum, effective from 20 March 2017. On 27 March 2017, effective from 28 March 2017, the same rate was set for Scotland by the Scottish Ministers.

The data for the IFoA PPO Working Party 2017 quantitative industry survey was taken as at 31 December 2016, with the responses for the qualitative industry survey having been collected between December 2016 and March 2017 inclusive.

As such, the analysis and exhibits presented in this report are under the prevailing discount rate at the time, namely 2.5% per annum.

However, the IFoA PPO Working Party has supplemented the 2017 qualitative survey with further rounds of questions (firstly in spring 2017, and then again in August 2017) specifically in relation to the change in the discount rate, and early indications of the impact of the change in the Ogden discount rate to -0.75% per annum are presented in this report.
The headline results for the IFoA PPO Working Party 2017 industry survey are:

**Level of concern about PPO claims (qualitative survey)**

For both participating insurers and reinsurers, the level of concern about PPO claims has, for the most part, remained at the same level since the previous year. This is also the case for the Boards of the participating insurers and reinsurers.

**The number of claims settling as a PPO claim (quantitative survey)**

The number of Motor (non-MIB) claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016 has continued the decreasing trend observed since settlement year 2012, with a 34.8% reduction since 2015 and a 58.9% reduction since 2012. In contrast, the number of large claims settling as a lump sum claim (i.e. a non-PPO claim) has exhibited a more stable trend over the same period, with an 8.3% increase since 2012; however, as for PPO claims, the number large claims settling as a lump sum in 2016 exhibits a reduction compared with 2015, in this case a 9.0% reduction.

The number of Liability claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016 also exhibits a reduction compared with 2015 (note that, in fact, there are no Liability claims settling as PPO claims in 2016 in the data provided), but with such low numbers of claims it is not possible to comment on whether this is anything other than volatility. However, the average number of claims settling as a PPO claim in settlement years 2013-2016 is 78.8% lower than the average number of claims settling as a PPO claim in settlement years 2009-2012.

The number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016 continues at a similarly low level to that observed for 2015, although the number of claims settling as a PPO claim since 2006 has been quite variable from year to year. Considering the period where PPO settlements have been more widespread, say settlement years 2009 and post, the MIB has settled 24.2% of all Motor PPO claims.

**PPO propensity (quantitative survey)**

The standardised Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, adjusting for differences in the mix of large claims by size between years, has fallen from 24.9% in settlement year 2015 to 22.1% in settlement year 2016 (a drop from 24.2% to 18.6% on a non-standardised basis), and from a weighted average of 32.9% in settlement years 2009-2013 to 25.1% in settlement years 2014-2016 (a drop from 34.0% to 22.5% on a non-standardised basis). (See Appendix C to this report for the definition of PPO propensity, and Appendix B to this report for an explanation of the standardisation basis.)

The standardised Liability PPO propensity has fallen from 4.5% in settlement year 2015 to 0.0% in settlement year 2016 (a drop from 3.1% to 0.0% on a non-standardised basis), and from a weighted average of 13.8% in settlement years 2009-2012 to 4.1% in settlement years 2013-2016 (a drop from 14.3% to 4.0% on a non-standardised basis).

**Indexation of PPO claims (quantitative survey)**

Since the Court of Appeal upheld the ruling in the Thompstone vs Tameside and Glossop Acute Services NHS Trust court case in 2008, the majority of PPO claims have had inflation of the PPO claim regular payments linked to the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (“ASHE”).
For Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, 87.1% of those claims settling as a PPO claim linked to ASHE in 2016 were linked to the ASHE 80th percentile. For Motor (MIB) PPO claims, the equivalent figure was 100%. For Liability claims settling as a PPO claim, there are no claims present in the 2016 settlement year cohort.

**Payment components for PPO claims (quantitative survey)**

For Motor (non-MIB) claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016, the average lump sum payment was £2.32 million and the average initial annual PPO payment (summed across all heads of damage) was £103.6 thousand. Across all settlement years, the equivalent figures were £1.87 million and £88.3 thousand respectively (although note that these figures are in nominal terms and have not been adjusted for inflation, the average settlement date being March 2012).

For Liability claims settling as a PPO claim, there are no claims present in the 2016 settlement year cohort, and so summary statistics have not been provided separately for the 2016 settlement year alone. Across all settlement years, the average lump sum payment was £1.33 million and the average initial annual PPO payment (summed across all heads of damage) was £69.9 thousand (although note that these figures are in nominal terms and have not been adjusted for inflation, the average settlement date being April 2011).

For Motor (MIB) claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016, the average lump sum payment was £0.96 million and the average initial annual PPO payment (summed across all heads of damage) was £36.5 thousand. Across all settlement years, the equivalent figures were £1.25 million and £58.7 thousand respectively (although note that these figures are in nominal terms and have not been adjusted for inflation, the average settlement date being May 2011).

**Injury type and care regime categorisation (quantitative survey)**

The IFoA PPO Working Party, with the help of a number of claims professionals, devised a categorisation of PPO injury types and care regimes, with the intention of this categorisation becoming UK standard practice, to be used by all insurers and reinsurers. This categorisation was presented as part of the output of the IFoA PPO Working Party in 2014.

28% of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and 20% of the Liability PPO claims we received for the 2017 quantitative industry survey, the data for which was taken as at 31 December 2016, had this categorisation attached.

As a consequence, for this survey, we continue to be able to provide more in depth analysis of how the characteristics of PPO claims are affected by the type of injury sustained by the claimant and the type of care they receive. We have restricted this analysis to the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims only, and the summary statistics are provided in Appendix O to this report.

**Mortality of PPO claimants (quantitative survey)**

Considering all PPO claims (i.e. Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims combined), in total there have been 46 observed deaths since settlement, against an expected number of 11.5 deaths assuming unimpaired mortality, representing a multiplier of 4.0 (for male and female PPO claimants combined). This result is statistically significant.
However, there remains very limited data on which to base any firm conclusions in relation to the mortality of PPO claimants. There is also an inherent bias in any analysis of the mortality of PPO claimants, in that we will not observe people living much longer than expectations for a very long time to come, which is more likely to overstate mortality than to understate mortality. **We therefore stress caution in using the results of the mortality analysis presented here and in the remainder of this report.**

**Reserving for PPO claims (qualitative survey)**

Around 80% of participating insurers and reinsurers use a probabilistic approach to mortality in reserving for settled PPO claims with just over 20% using an annuity certain approach. A wider variety of approaches are used for reserving for future PPO claims, with most participating insurers considering future pure IBNR PPO claims within the methods used for future PPO claims on existing large claims, and only a small number reserving for future pure IBNR PPO claims explicitly. All participating reinsurers established their own reserves for future PPO claims.

In valuing PPO claims for reserving purposes, all participating insurers discounted their PPO cashflows. For future PPO claims, nearly two-thirds of participating insurers discount to valuation date with the remainder discounting to future expected settlement date.

For participating insurers, the range of real discount rates (considering both the inflation of payments and discounting in respect of investment returns) for reporting under current UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) / International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) was between -1.5% per annum and +1% per annum, with the most commonly used real discount rate being 0% per annum. While the range of real discount rates used by insurers has remained constant since our previous survey, the distribution of the real discount rates used has shifted slightly to more negative discount rates.

For participating reinsurers, the range of real discount rates used was between -1% per annum and 0% per annum, with two participating reinsurers not discounting at all due to US GAAP reporting requirements.

Under Solvency II, as the investment return assumption is prescribed by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (“EIOPA”), it is the choice of the ASHE (or payment) inflation rate that will determine the real discount rate used. The majority of participating insurers maintained the ASHE inflation rate used under current UK GAAP / IFRS, with two insurers maintaining a 0% per annum real discount rate by setting the ASHE assumption to equal the EIOPA investment return assumption. Of the other approaches used by participating insurers, responses included using RPI and using market-implied risk free yields.

**Reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims (quantitative survey)**

In order to consider the size of reserves on a consistent basis, we have estimated the total cost and outstanding reserve for each of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims in the quantitative industry survey on a cashflow basis. **Given the approximations and assumptions inherent in the underlying analysis, the results of the reserve analysis presented here and throughout this report should be treated with caution.**
Comparing our estimate of outstanding reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims (i.e. PPO claims in payment), as at 31 December 2016, using various discount rate assumptions, to an estimate at the prevailing Ogden discount rate of +2.5% per annum, indicates that reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims would be 70% greater at an Ogden discount rate of 0% per annum and 207% greater at an Ogden discount rate of -0.75% per annum (compared with at an Ogden discount rate of +2.5% per annum in both cases).

**Early indications of the impact of the change in the Ogden discount rate to -0.75% per annum**

Participating insurers were asked if they had seen any changes in the speed of settlement of claims or in claimant / lawyer behaviour. As at August 2017, some respondents said that it was too early to comment; some noted that very few (or no) claim settlements had occurred since the “announcement of an announcement” in December 2016 (see the Ogden discount rate section of this report for further detail); others noted a general slowing down of settlements, and that claimant lawyers had actively sought to slow down lump sum settlements until after the discount rate announcement.

Some respondents noted that they had succeeded in settling large claims at rates higher than -0.75% per annum since the Ogden discount rate change (i.e. at 0% per annum to +2.5% per annum).

In August 2017, we received quantitative feedback regarding the number of non-PPO and PPO large claims for 2017 to date, pre- and post-the effective date of 20 March 2017 for the reduction of the Ogden discount rate to -0.75% per annum in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This quantitative feedback was provided by 7 participating insurers.

Within the data provided, no large claims settled as PPO claims between 1 January 2017 and 19 March 2017, whereas the equivalent period for 2016 saw around 20% of the year’s PPOs settle.

Within the data provided, in the period between 20 March 2017 and 31 August 2017, the PPO propensity was 12%. This represents a drop in PPO propensity of around 50% from 2016 whole year levels.

The PPO propensity for 2017 from 1 January 2017 to 31 August 2017 was 8%. This represents a drop in PPO propensity of 60-70% from 2016 whole year levels.
Highlights of the 2017 quantitative industry survey

In this section, we provide some of the key highlights of the 2017 quantitative industry survey, the data for which was taken as at 31 December 2016. We provide more detailed results of the analysis carried out as part of the quantitative industry survey in Appendices B to R to this report.

The insurers surveyed account for over 90% of the PRA-regulated market (based on 2015 gross premium volumes) for Motor, including Personal and Commercial insurance, Comprehensive and Non-Comprehensive covers. In addition, there are further companies which contribute to the survey but do not appear in the 2015 PRA returns.

The insurers which have agreed to be acknowledged for their participation in this survey are listed in the Introduction to this report, although please note that the list does not include all participants.

It is worth noting that, due to the timing of the 2017 quantitative industry survey, the analysis and exhibits presented in this report are under the prevailing discount rate at the time, namely 2.5% per annum. We provide some early indications of the impact of a change in the Ogden discount rate in a later section of this report.

PPO propensity and other summary statistics on general characteristics of PPO claims

In Appendix D to this report, we provide summary statistics for all of the PPO claims in the 2017 quantitative survey, for a number of characteristics, both cumulative across all settlement years and also separately for the pre-2016 settlement years and the 2016 settlement year alone.

For example, Figure 1 shows that, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, the average age of the claimant at settlement is 34.2 years, with an average delay of 6.4 years between the accident date and settlement date, an average future life expectancy at settlement date of 44.3 years which represents an average reduction in life expectancy of 15.3 years, and with an average settlement of £1.87 million lump sum and £88.3 thousand annual PPO payment. (See the notes in Appendix D for further detail on the interpretation of these statistics, in particular for the payment components.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>28.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delay until settlement</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay until settlement</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future life expectancy at settlement</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy reduction</td>
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<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
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<td>61,000</td>
<td>72,537</td>
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<td>Lump sum (£)</td>
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<td>1,632,709</td>
<td>1,169,005</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>482</td>
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<th>2016</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age at settlement</td>
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<td>28.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<td>Delay until settlement</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future life expectancy at settlement</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy reduction</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
<td>103,601</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>66,116</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lump sum (£)</td>
<td>2,315,389</td>
<td>2,437,500</td>
<td>1,237,291</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Summary statistics for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims
In Appendices E to K to this report, we provide further summary statistics and analysis of the number, propensity and general characteristics of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims in the 2017 quantitative survey.

The key headline figure is the propensity of an injury claim to settle as a PPO claim. Unless stated otherwise, the PPO propensity statistics discussed in this report are defined as the number of PPO claims as a proportion of large claims. The definition of a large claim is a claim that is greater than £1 million in 2011 terms, indexed at 7% per annum. (See the notes in Appendix C to this report for further detail on the definition of large claims.)

Figure 2 shows the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO large claims underlying the PPO propensity statistics, by settlement year. The number of claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016 has continued the decreasing trend observed since settlement year 2012, with a 34.8% reduction since 2015 and a 58.9% reduction since 2012. In contrast, the number of large claims settling as a lump sum claim (i.e. a non-PPO claim) has exhibited a more stable trend over the same period, with an 8.3% increase since 2012; as for PPO claims, the number of large claims settling as a lump sum in 2016 exhibits a reduction compared with 2015, in this case a 9.0% reduction.

The data collected for the quantitative industry survey clearly shows that the likelihood of a claim settling as a PPO varies with the size of the claim, with larger claims being more likely to have settled as a PPO (see Figure 10).

In our statistics looking at the change in PPO propensity by settlement year, we have therefore considered a standardised PPO propensity which adjusts for (or removes) the volatility in the PPO propensity arising from differences in the mix of large claims by amount between years. In Appendix B to this report, we explain the standardisation basis for Motor (non-MIB) claims and for Liability claims. (The data collected from the MIB does not include non-PPO large claims, and so we are not able to produce PPO propensity statistics or standardised PPO propensity statistics for MIB claims.)
Figure 3 shows the Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity and the standardised Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by settlement year. The standardised Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity has fallen from 24.9% in settlement year 2015 to 22.1% in settlement year 2016 (a drop from 24.2% to 18.6% on a non-standardised basis), and from a weighted average of 32.9% in settlement years 2009-2013 to 25.1% in settlement years 2014-2016 (a drop from 34.0% to 22.5% on a non-standardised basis).

Figure 3: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity and standardised Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by settlement year

Figure 4 shows the distribution of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity for insurers, separately for claims settled between 2009 and 2015 and claims settled in 2016.

Figure 4: Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity for insurers that have settled at least 25 large claims (including PPO claims) in the last five years, separately for claims settled between 2009 and 2015 and claims settled in 2016.
The equivalent graphs for Liability PPO claims are shown in Figures 5 to 7. The number of claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016 also exhibits a reduction compared with 2015 (note that, in fact, there are no Liability claims settling as PPO claims in 2016 in the data provided), but with such low numbers of claims it is not possible to comment on whether this is anything other than volatility. However, the average number of claims settling as a PPO claim in settlement years 2013-2016 is 78.8% lower than the average number of claims settling as a PPO claim in settlement years 2009-2012. The standardised Liability PPO propensity has fallen from 4.5% in settlement year 2015 to 0.0% in settlement year 2016 (a drop from 3.1% to 0.0% on a non-standardised basis), and from a weighted average of 13.8% in settlement years 2009-2012 to 4.1% in settlement years 2013-2016 (a drop from 14.3% to 4.0% on a non-standardised basis).
Figure 7: Distribution of Liability PPO propensity for insurers that have settled at least 25 large claims (including PPO claims) in the last five years, separately for claims settled between 2009 and 2015 and claims settled in 2016

Figure 8 shows the number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year. The number of claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016 continues at a similarly low level to that observed for 2015, although the number of claims settling as a PPO claim since 2006 has been quite variable from year to year.

Figure 9 shows the proportion of Motor claims settling as a PPO claim that are settled by the MIB. Considering the period where PPO settlements have been more widespread, say settlement years 2009 and post (i.e. following the Court of Appeal upholding the ruling in the Thompstone vs Tameside and Glossop Acute Services NHS Trust court case – see Appendix L to this report for further details), the MIB has settled 24.2% of all Motor PPO claims.
In a number of the analyses summarised in this report, we consider claims in various claim size bands. As for the definition of large claims, in each case, the claim size thresholds are also defined in 2011 terms, indexed at 7% per annum. A claim falls in a given band if it is greater than or equal to the lower bound of the band, but less than the upper bound of the band (where there is an upper bound). For PPO claims, the claim size is determined using a real discount rate of 2.5% per annum. (See the notes in Appendix C to this report for further detail on the definition of large claims, and also for an explanation of the distinction between incremental threshold and cumulative threshold.)

Figure 10 shows how the Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity varies by claim size band, and Figure 11 shows this trend by settlement year.

**Figure 9: Proportion of PPO claims, by settlement year – MIB and the rest of the industry**

**Figure 10: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009**
**Figure 11: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), and by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009**

The equivalent graphs for Liability PPO claims are shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13. (Note that, in Figure 13, the claim size bands have been grouped in order to reduce the volatility and to emphasise the underlying trend.)

**Figure 12: Liability PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009**
We provide a large number of further summary statistics and analysis of the number, propensity and general characteristics of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims in the 2016 quantitative survey in Appendices E to K to this report. Examples for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims include the number of PPO claims by age of driver at accident date and by gender of driver (Figure 14), the number of PPO claims by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant (Figure 15), the delay between the accident date and settlement date (Figure 16 and Figure 17) and the future life expectancy of the claimant at settlement (Figure 18 and Figure 19).
**Figure 15:** Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant

**Figure 16:** Distribution of the delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
Figure 17: Distribution of the delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009

Figure 18: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
Finally, in Appendix H to this report, we provide triangles of non-PPO large claims, PPO claims and PPO propensity rates for non-MIB Motor claims, which take into account the accident year of a claim as well as its time to settlement. Figure 20 is an example. We have also provided graphs showing the accident year cumulative development of the number of non-MIB Motor PPO claims. It is clear from the data for the older accident years that we can expect some further development of the number of PPO claim settlements, even for these older accident years, although the extent of this development is difficult to quantify.

**Figure 19:** Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009

**Figure 20:** Triangle showing the accident year cumulative development of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims
Indexation of PPO claims

In Appendix L to this report, we provide a number of summary statistics for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims in relation to the index used to inflate PPO claim regular payments.

The index used to inflate PPO claim regular payments was originally automatically linked to the Retail Prices Index ("RPI").

However, in 2006, a court case was brought in the form of Thompstone vs Tameside and Glossop Acute Services NHS Trust which questioned this assumption and suggested that the payments for future cost of care would be better linked to wage inflation. The court agreed and the annual inflation increase was linked to the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings ("ASHE"). The case was appealed and a number of other cases were put on hold pending the outcome. In 2008, the Court of Appeal upheld the ruling that an index other than RPI can be chosen if thought more appropriate. Since then the majority of PPO claims have had inflation linked to ASHE, as can be seen in Figure 21.

ASHE is produced by the Office for National Statistics ("ONS") every November, based on data as at April. It covers a wide range of occupations, though the vast majority of PPO claims so far have, in respect of care costs, been linked to sub-category 6115, relating to care assistants and home carers.

Within a particular job category, the ASHE earnings inflation measures are further split into percentiles. A PPO claim will have the annual inflation linked to a specific percentile, for example to those whose earnings are in the top 10% of earners in the category (i.e. the 90th percentile).

Figure 22 shows that, where the applicable index for the primary head of damage is ASHE, the overwhelming majority of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims for recent settlements are linked to the 80th percentile.
Figure 22: Where the applicable index for the primary head of damage is ASHE, the proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims linked to specific percentiles, by settlement year

Figure 23 shows the annual inflation in ASHE 6115 by specific percentile. Of note is that, while annual inflation has been low or even negative for some of the percentiles (including the 80th percentile), the latest data for 2016 and 2017 shows a significant uptick in annual inflation, particularly at the lower percentiles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.54%</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
<td>2.29%</td>
<td>2.71%</td>
<td>2.59%</td>
<td>3.64%</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>3.27%</td>
<td>2.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.56%</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
<td>2.93%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>3.06%</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
<td>2.41%</td>
<td>2.72%</td>
<td>2.47%</td>
<td>3.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>0.77%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>-0.61%</td>
<td>-0.74%</td>
<td>-0.85%</td>
<td>-1.33%</td>
<td>-2.07%</td>
<td>-1.38%</td>
<td>-1.11%</td>
<td>-1.05%</td>
<td>-1.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>-0.23%</td>
<td>-1.39%</td>
<td>-1.12%</td>
<td>-0.87%</td>
<td>-0.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.45%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>-0.27%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>1.76%</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>-0.10%</td>
<td>-0.78%</td>
<td>-0.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3.59%</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>1.65%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>8.43%</td>
<td>5.44%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>5.48%</td>
<td>4.66%</td>
<td>3.32%</td>
<td>3.28%</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>5.43%</td>
<td>5.73%</td>
<td>4.81%</td>
<td>4.21%</td>
<td>3.77%</td>
<td>2.97%</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
<td>3.28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 23: Annual Inflation in ASHE 6115, by specific percentile and by year (as at April of that year)
Payment components for PPO claims

The summary statistics in Appendix D to this report indicate that:

- For Motor (non-MIB) claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016, the average lump sum payment was £2.32 million and the average initial annual PPO payment (summed across all heads of damage) was £103.6 thousand. Across all settlement years, the equivalent figures were £1.87 million and £88.3 thousand respectively (although note that these figures are in nominal terms and have not been adjusted for inflation, the average settlement date being March 2012).

- For Liability claims settling as a PPO claim, there are no claims present in the 2016 settlement year cohort, and so summary statistics have not been provided separately for the 2016 settlement year alone. Across all settlement years, the average lump sum payment was £1.33 million and the average initial annual PPO payment (summed across all heads of damage) was £69.9 thousand (although note that these figures are in nominal terms and have not been adjusted for inflation, the average settlement date being April 2011).

- For Motor (MIB) claims settling as a PPO claim in 2016, the average lump sum payment was £0.96 million and the average initial annual PPO payment (summed across all heads of damage) was £36.5 thousand. Across all settlement years, the equivalent figures were £1.25 million and £58.7 thousand respectively (although note that these figures are in nominal terms and have not been adjusted for inflation, the average settlement date being May 2011).

In Appendix M to this report, we provide a number of further summary statistics for the lump sum element of PPO claims and for the initial regular payment amount of PPO claims, separately for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims.

For the purposes of comparison, we also provide some of the equivalent summary statistics for Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims, and it is interesting to note that, while the average size of the lump sum element of Motor (non-MIB) claims has been increasing for both PPO claims and non-PPO claims, when stripping out the effect of inflation, the average size of the lump sum element of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims has been relatively flat whereas the average size of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims has fallen markedly (see Figure 24 and Figure 25).

The lump sum element of non-PPO claims includes compensation for future care costs, whereas the lump sum element of PPO claims does not, as these are included in the annual payments. There are therefore potentially two conclusions that can be drawn from the trends in Figure 24 and Figure 25:

- As the lump sum amounts (before stripping out the effect of inflation at 7% per annum) are similar for both Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims, there is a suggestion of bias for PPOs to be awarded in larger cases.

- The marked fall in the average size of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims (after stripping out the effect of inflation at 7% per annum) suggests that the inflation on the cost of care element (and also on the loss of earnings element) assumed within the lump sum settlement
may be lower than 7% per annum. This is supported by the annual inflation in ASHE 6115 statistics shown in Figure 23.

Figure 24: Average size of the lump sum element of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, nominal and with inflation removed (assuming inflation of 7% per annum), by settlement year

Figure 25: Average size of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims, nominal and with inflation removed (assuming inflation of 7% per annum), by settlement year
Special features of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and other statistics

In Appendix N to this report, we provide a number of summary statistics in relation to stepped payments, variation orders and indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, together with a small number of other statistics for these PPO claims. Definitions for these special features are also provided in Appendix N to this report.

Figure 26 shows the proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims with special features.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Proportion of PPOs</th>
<th>Number of Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stepped Payments</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation Orders</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indemnity Guarantees</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse Indemnity Guarantees</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributory Negligence</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 26: Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims with special features, together with the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims in the survey with responses received on those special features

In terms of injury type:

- 27% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims relating to brain injury have a stepped payment.
- 62% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims relating to spinal injury have a stepped payment.

This compares with a general Motor (non-MIB) PPO claim population average of 35%, as shown in Figure 26.

Again in terms of injury type:

- 13% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims relating to brain injury have a variation order.
- 42% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims relating to spinal injury have a variation order.

This compares with a general Motor (non-MIB) PPO claim population average of 19%, as shown in Figure 26.
Injury type and care regime categorisation

The IFoA PPO Working Party, with the help of a number of claims professionals, devised a categorisation of PPO injury types and care regimes, with the intention of this categorisation becoming UK standard practice, to be used by all insurers and reinsurers. This categorisation was presented as part of the output of the IFoA PPO Working Party in 2014, and is reproduced in Appendix O to this report.

28% of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and 20% of the Liability PPO claims we received for the 2017 quantitative industry survey, the data for which was taken as at 31 December 2016, had this categorisation attached.

As a consequence, for this survey, we continue to be able to provide more in depth analysis of how the characteristics of PPO claims are affected by the type of injury sustained by the claimant and the type of care they receive. We have restricted this analysis to the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims only, and the summary statistics are provided in Appendix O to this report.

We note, however, that the summary statistics provided here and in Appendix O to this report are based on only a small subset of data, and this is likely to have contributed to the volatility in experience in the summary statistics provided.

Figure 27 shows the distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims by injury type categorisation and Figure 28 shows the distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims by care regime categorisation.

![Figure 27: Detailed split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party injury type categorisation](image-url)
Nature of injury

In Appendix P to this report, we provide a number of summary statistics in relation to the nature of injury for PPO claims.

We note that 75% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims involve brain injury as the primary injury type, with that proportion varying significantly by the age of claimant as shown in Figure 29.
Mortality of PPO claimants

In Appendix Q to this report, we provide a number of summary statistics in relation to the mortality of PPO claimants.

To increase the sample size, we have considered all PPO claims in this analysis, i.e. Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims combined. We note, however, that there remains very limited data on which to base any firm conclusions. We also note that there is an inherent bias in any such analysis, in that we will not observe people living much longer than expectations for a very long time to come, which is more likely to overstate mortality than to understate mortality. Furthermore, a number of simplifying assumptions have been made in the underlying analysis, as discussed in Appendix Q to this report. We therefore stress caution in using the results of the analysis presented here and in Appendix Q to this report.

Figure 30 and Figure 31 show the “initial exposure” and number of deaths by age group for male and female claimants respectively, the “initial exposure” being a measure of the total number of years of exposure for PPO claims in the quantitative industry survey, taken as the number of years from settlement date to 31 December 2016 or date of death if applicable.

*Figure 30: Number of years of exposure for PPO claims and number of deaths, for male PPO claimants, by age of claimant at settlement date*
Figure 31: Number of years of exposure for PPO claims and number of deaths, for female PPO claimants, by age of claimant at settlement date

Figure 32 shows the observed (i.e. actual) number of deaths by claimant age band (at settlement date) against those that would have been expected for the survey sample using unimpaired mortality rates based on the ONS mortality rates (its most recent forecast projections, as detailed in Appendix Q to this report).

In total there have been 46 observed deaths since settlement, against an expected number of 11.5 deaths assuming unimpaired mortality, representing a multiplier of 4.0 (for male and female PPO claimants combined). This result is statistically significant. We note, once again, the inherent bias in this analysis (and other analyses in Appendix Q to this report), in that we will not observe people living much longer than expectations for a very long time to come, which is more likely to overstate mortality than to understate mortality.
Reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

In Appendix R to this report, we provide a number of summary statistics in relation to the size of reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims.

In order to consider the size of reserves on a consistent basis, we have estimated the total cost and outstanding reserve for each of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims in the quantitative industry survey on a cashflow basis. Given the approximations and assumptions inherent in the underlying analysis, the results here and in Appendix R to this report should be treated with caution.

Figure 33 compares our estimate of outstanding reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims (i.e. PPO claims in payment), as at 31 December 2016, using discount rate assumptions ranging from -2% per annum to +2% per annum, to an estimate at the prevailing Ogden discount rate as at 31 December 2016 of +2.5% per annum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Discount Rate</th>
<th>Reserve Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2.00%</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.00%</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.75%</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 33: Reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at various real discount rates, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, expressed as a multiple of the reserve estimated at a +2.5% per annum real discount rate

Ogden discount rate

We discuss the Ogden discount rate in a later section of this report, including the impact of a reduction in the Ogden discount rate from 2.5% per annum to -0.75% per annum (as announced by the Lord Chancellor on 27 February 2017, effective from 20 March 2017 in England, Wales and Northern Ireland; and as announced by the Scottish Ministers on 27 March 2017, effective from 28 March 2017 in Scotland).

We also discuss the impact of an increase in the Ogden discount rate from -0.75% per annum to 0% per annum (the Lord Chancellor announcing on 7 September 2017 a change in the methodology underlying the determination of the discount rate, and noting that the new discount rate may lie within the range of 0% per annum to 1% per annum when this new methodology has been implemented; and the accompanying Financial Memorandum to the Damages (Investment Returns and Periodical Payments) (Scotland) Bill indicating that the proposed discount rate would currently (i.e. at the time of publication) be 0% per annum).
Highlights of the 2017 qualitative industry survey

In this section, we provide some of the key highlights of the responses to the 2017 qualitative industry survey. We provide more detail around the responses to the qualitative industry survey in Appendix S to this report.

14 insurers and 5 reinsurers were interviewed for the qualitative industry survey, the responses having been collected between December 2016 and March 2017 inclusive. The companies which have agreed to be acknowledged for their participation in this survey are listed in the Introduction to this report, although please note that the list does not include all participants.

It is worth noting that, very occasionally, some of the survey questions were unanswered by some participants. This was occasionally through choice, but more commonly as the interviewee did not know the answer or could not readily obtain the information.

It is also worth noting that, due to the timing of the 2016 qualitative industry survey, the responses were given prior to the change in the Ogden discount rate and are therefore representative of the situation under the prevailing discount rate at the time, namely 2.5% per annum. We provide some early indications of the impact of a change in the Ogden discount rate in a later section of this report.

Level of concern about PPO claims

For both participating insurers and reinsurers, the level of concern about PPO claims has, for the most part, remained at the same level since the previous year. This is also the case for the Boards of the participating insurers and reinsurers.

Reserving for PPO claims

Around 80% of participating insurers and reinsurers use a probabilistic approach to mortality in reserving for settled PPO claims with just over 20% using an annuity certain approach. A wider variety of approaches are used for reserving for future PPO claims, with most participating insurers considering future pure IBNR PPO claims within the methods used for future PPO claims on existing large claims, and only a small number reserving for future pure IBNR PPO claims explicitly. All participating reinsurers established their own reserves for future PPO claims.

In valuing PPO claims for reserving purposes, all participating insurers discounted their PPO cashflows. For future PPO claims, nearly two-thirds of participating insurers discount to valuation date with the remainder discounting to future expected settlement date.

For participating insurers, the range of real discount rates (considering both the inflation of payments and discounting in respect of investment returns) for reporting under current UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) / International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) was between -1.5% per annum and +1% per annum, with the most commonly used real discount rate being 0% per annum. While the range of real discount rates used by insurers has
remained constant since our previous survey, the distribution of the real discount rates used has shifted slightly to more negative discount rates.

For participating reinsurers, the range of real discount rates used was between -1% per annum and 0% per annum, with two participating reinsurers not discounting at all due to US GAAP reporting requirements.

For those participating insurers using a fixed assumption, the range of ASHE inflation rates used was between +3% per annum and +4.5% per annum, with the distribution shifting upwards compared with last year. For those participating insurers using a fixed assumption, the range of investment returns used was between +2.0% per annum and +5.0% per annum, with the distribution perhaps shifting downwards compared with last year.

Under Solvency II, as the investment return assumption is prescribed by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (“EIOPA”), it is the choice of the ASHE (or payment) inflation rate that will determine the real discount rate used. The majority of participating insurers maintained the ASHE inflation rate used under current UK GAAP / IFRS, with two insurers maintaining a 0% per annum real discount rate by setting the ASHE assumption to equal the EIOPA investment return assumption. Of the other approaches used by participating insurers, responses included using RPI and using market-implied risk free yields.

Half of participating insurers did not consider making an allowance within their reserves for the impact of variation orders or indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees coming into force, and instead valued PPO claims based on the current payment schedule alone. Of the other half, only two participating insurers allowed for variation orders or indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees coming into force after considering them. Two reinsurers considered variation orders, but not indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees. This finding is unsurprising, given that very few variation orders or indemnity guarantees have been triggered to date.

Most participating insurers did not include a bad debt provision for PPO claims under current UK GAAP / IFRS but did include a bad debt provision under Solvency II.

The majority of participating insurers and all participating reinsurers estimate reserve uncertainty for PPOs either stochastically or through scenario testing. For those participants able to provide an estimate, the gross of reinsurance coefficients of variation for settled PPOs were between 20% and 30%.

In terms of risk margin, for those participating insurers that calculated (or could estimate) a PPO risk margin, the (approximate) risk margin as a proportion of best estimate ranged between 15% and 85%.

**Treatment of PPO claims within capital modelling**

The majority of participating insurers and reinsurers used an internal model or partial internal model to allow for PPO claims in the Solvency Capital Requirement (“SCR”) calculation, with the remainder using the Standard Formula.
Of those participating insurers and reinsurers using an internal model or a partial internal model, half had an explicit stochastic PPO model.

In terms of the allowance for PPO claims under Pillar I (which considers the 1/200 level over a one year time horizon) and for the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (“ORSA”) under Pillar III (which considers the volatility of the run off to ultimate), almost all participating insurers and reinsurers for which this work has been finalised for PPO claims noted a lower capital requirement for Pillar I vs Pillar III: five said that the one year measure of risk was between 25% and 40% of the ultimate measure of risk; one said the one year measure was only 15% of the ultimate measure; and one said there was no difference.

Three participating insurers said that they had different bases for evaluating economic and regulatory capital: of these, two used the standard formula for PPOs in evaluating their SCR but used an internal model for PPOs in evaluating their economic capital.

**Treatment of PPO claims within pricing**

All participating insurers allow for the cost of PPO claims within their pricing, although around 80% only do so implicitly. Likewise, all participating insurers allow for the cost of capital for PPO claims when pricing, albeit only implicitly in around 60% of cases. 60% of participating reinsurers explicitly allow for PPO claims in the pricing of their contracts.

**The impact of PPO claims on reinsurance purchase and availability**

Only two participating insurers had explicitly changed their reinsurance programme as a result of PPO claims. In contrast, four out of five of participating reinsurers had changed their reinsurance offerings as a result of PPO claims.

Of those participating reinsurers continuing to write Motor Excess of Loss (“XoL”) business, there was either a strong preference for or a requirement for capitalisation clauses. However, only about a quarter of participating insurers had a capitalisation clause on their reinsurance contracts.

**Alternative risk transfer for PPO claims**

Of the participating insurers, all but one respondent would consider transferring the risk associated with PPO claims if the right option arose. The most significant hurdles in constructing a transaction were a prohibitively high price of such risk transfer solutions, and the lack of a solution that matched to ASHE inflation.

**Investment strategy in relation to PPO exposures**

About 70% of the participating insurers and 20% of the participating reinsurers had changed their investment strategy as a result of PPO claims, with two of these changes coming in the last year. Two
participating insurers review their asset/liability matching position regularly, adapting for PPO claims implicitly but without explicitly changing investment strategy as such. Only two participating insurers held ring-fenced assets specifically for PPO liabilities, although a number of other insurers held long duration assets to cover all longer-term liabilities. One participating reinsurer held assets specifically to match PPO liabilities.
Ogden discount rate

Background

The Damages Act 1996 provided for the Lord Chancellor (and his / her counterparts in Scotland), after consulting the Government Actuary and HM Treasury to prescribe the rate of return to be used for assessing the amount of damages in respect of future loss in personal injury cases. The higher the discount rate, the lower the required lump sum award.

The Wells -v- Wells judgement of the House of Lords in 1999 concluded that that the damages in respect of future pecuniary loss should be based on the real yields available on index-linked gilts (“ILGs”). The Wells vs Wells judgement specified a discount rate of 3.0% per annum to be used in such cases.

In July 2001, following a consultation exercise, the Lord Chancellor set the discount rate to be used in such cases to be 2.5% per annum for England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In February 2002, the same rate was set for Scotland by the Scottish Ministers.

Since that time, claimants’ representatives have long been arguing that the rate is too high and judicial review proceedings have been brought in this regard, including Helmot vs Simon (2010), Love vs Dewsbury (2010), Harries vs Stevenson (2012), Tortolano vs Ogilvie Construction Ltd (2013) and Russell vs Health Service Executive (2014).

The UK Ministry of Justice (“MoJ”) issued a consultation paper on 31 July 2012 on the subject of the determination of the discount rate underlying the future care and future loss of earnings components of damage awards (“Damages Act 1996: The Discount Rate. How should it be set?”).

The MoJ then issued a second consultation paper on 12 February 2013 (“Damages Act 1996: The Discount Rate. Review of the Legal Framework”). The MoJ identified two broad methodologies that might be adopted to set the discount rate: (a) To use an ILGs-based methodology applied to current data (option 1); (b) To move from an ILGs-based calculation to one based on a mixed portfolio of appropriate investments (option 2). However, the MoJ did not establish any principles for how the rate would be obtained using the second approach, and how it would be adjusted for risk.

The MoJ announced in 2014 its intention to establish a panel of three experts “to provide advice about the investments that claimants in personal injury cases should be assumed to make with their lump sum damages for future pecuniary loss and the expected yields from those investments”. A panel of independent experts was established, and their report was published in 2017.

The Lord Chancellor announced on 27 February 2017 that the UK discount rate would be reduced from 2.5% per annum to -0.75% per annum, effective from 20 March 2017. On 27 March 2017, effective from 28 March 2017, the same rate was set for Scotland by the Scottish Ministers.

The Lord Chancellor’s statement explained that the specified discount rate was obtained by taking the three year simple average gross real redemption yield on ILGs as at 31 December 2016 excluding those ILGs with less than 5 years to maturity. This real yield of -0.83% per annum was then rounded to the nearest 0.25% points to acknowledge the inherent uncertainties and imprecisions involved in setting a representative discount rate, thereby leading to a discount rate of -0.75% per annum.
It is worth noting that the real yield on ILGs has fallen substantially over a number of years (see Figure 34), and has continued to remain at a low level since 31 December 2016, and so the same calculation with no change in methodology would be expected to produce a lower discount rate today and in the near future.

![Figure 34: Historical real yield on index-linked gilts](image)

*Source: FTSE (semi-annual gross redemption yield at 3% inflation assumption), Willis Towers Watson investment practice*

The MoJ issued a further consultation paper on 30 March 2017 entitled “The Personal Injury Discount Rate – How it should be set in future”, the consultation closing on 11 May 2017. The core issues examined in the consultation paper were: (a) What principles should guide how the rate is set? (Are the present principles still fit for purpose? What should the principles be? What investment returns should be taken into account in setting the rate? Should the possibility of a PPO affect the decision as to the relevant investments?); (b) How often should the rate be set? (Should this be left open, as now, or would a set pattern of review be better? Would an annual, three year or five year system be better? Should reviews be triggered by degrees of change in investment returns?); (c) Who should set the discount rate? (Should the power to do so remain with the Lord Chancellor and his / her counterparts in Scotland, or would it be better for someone else, possibly an expert panel, to set the rate?). The consultation paper also considered whether sufficient use was being made of PPOs.

On 7 September 2017, the Lord Chancellor announced the results of the review, saying that there would be a change in the methodology underlying the determination of the discount rate for personal injury claims, and noting that if the new approach were to be applied then the rate might be in the region of 0% to 1% per annum.
Civil Liability Bill

The Government announced, under the “Civil Liability Bill”, its proposals concerning whiplash claims and the Ogden discount rate in England and Wales.

The Civil Liability Bill was introduced to the House of Lords on 20 March 2018, with the key elements of the proposals in relation to whiplash claims (Part 1 of the Bill) appearing to be broadly similar to those set out under the previous Prisons and Courts Bill. These are:

- The introduction of a fixed tariff system for general damages on injury duration between 0 and 24 months for Road Traffic Act (“RTA”) whiplash-related claims.
- The raising of the small track claim limit for Personal Injury claims from £1,000 to £2,000 for all Personal Injury claims, and from £1,000 to £5,000 for RTA claims.
- The requirement for medical reports for every RTA whiplash-related claim.

The key elements of the proposals in relation to the Ogden discount rate (Part 2 of the Bill) are:

- Changing the legal framework under which the discount rate is set, in particular setting it with reference to an investment strategy with a higher expected return than assumed under the current framework to reflect how claimants invest their compensation in practice.
- Specifying that the discount rate should be set at least every three years with the Lord Chancellor retaining discretion to set the discount rate within three years if necessary, with the first review initiated within 90 days of the legislation coming into force and requiring completion within 140 days.
- Setting up an expert panel for the Lord Chancellor to consult on the issues to consider in setting the discount rate.

The Civil Liability Bill received its Third Reading in the House of Lords on 27 June 2018 and was introduced to the House of Commons on 28 June 2018 with a number of amendments (such as the first review of the discount rate to take place without the expert panel, and subsequent reviews to be carried out within a maximum of five years rather than three years). The Second Reading in the House of Commons took place on 4 September 2018; the Public Bill Committee Stage took place on 11 September 2018 and was followed by the Report Stage and Third Reading on 23 October 2018. The House of Lords agreed to the House of Commons’ amendments on 20 November 2018, and the Civil Liability Bill received Royal Assent on 20 December 2018.

In anticipation of Royal Assent and in preparation for the first review of the Ogden discount rate under the new legislation, the Government opened a consultation “Setting the Personal Injury Discount Rate: A Call for Evidence” (opened 6 December 2018; due to close on 30 January 2019), in which it is seeking up-to-date data and information on a wide range of topics relevant to the setting of the discount rate under the provisions of the Civil Liability Bill, including investments available to claimants, investment advice provided to claimants, investments made by claimants and model investment portfolios.

Although implementation of Part 1 of the Civil Liability Bill has been delayed to perhaps April 2020 in order to allow testing of the various systems including IT systems, the expectation is that implementation of Part 2 of the Bill will follow an independent timetable and that a revised Ogden discount rate may be in place by summer 2019.
On 15 June 2018, the Scottish Government published the “Damages (Investment Returns and Periodical Payments) (Scotland) Bill”, with some notable differences to the Civil Liability Bill including:

- The discount rate being assessed by the Government Actuary for each review.
- The discount rate being set by reference to a notional investment portfolio constructed on the basis of portfolios described as cautious.

The accompanying Financial Memorandum indicated that the proposed discount rate under the Damages (Investment Returns and Periodical Payments) (Scotland) Bill would currently (i.e. at the time of publication) be 0% per annum.

On 18 December 2018, the Scottish Parliament debated and agreed the general principles of the “Damages (Investment Returns and Periodical Payments) (Scotland) Bill”, with Stage 2 of the process scheduled for early 2019.

Impact of a reduction in the discount rate to -0.75% per annum

The reduction in the discount rate from 2.5% per annum to -0.75% per annum has a significant impact on the value of individual claim settlements.

Figure 35 and Figure 36 illustrate the percentage increases in the whole of life and loss of earnings multipliers by age at trial and gender, taken from the Ogden tables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at Date of Trial</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Females</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.50% Real Yield (1)</td>
<td>-0.75% Real Yield (2)</td>
<td>Percentage Increase ( (2) - (1) ) / (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.50% Real Yield (1)</td>
<td>-0.75% Real Yield (2)</td>
<td>Percentage Increase ( (2) - (1) ) / (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>34.90</td>
<td>118.67</td>
<td>240%</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.47</td>
<td>125.20</td>
<td>253%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>34.06</td>
<td>108.31</td>
<td>218%</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.75</td>
<td>114.70</td>
<td>220%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>32.10</td>
<td>88.96</td>
<td>177%</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.97</td>
<td>94.99</td>
<td>188%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>29.60</td>
<td>71.43</td>
<td>141%</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.68</td>
<td>76.95</td>
<td>151%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>26.52</td>
<td>55.66</td>
<td>110%</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.76</td>
<td>60.52</td>
<td>118%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>22.69</td>
<td>41.44</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.14</td>
<td>45.71</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>29.19</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.83</td>
<td>32.68</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 35: Multipliers for pecuniary loss for life from the Ogden tables (males Table 1 and females Table 2) assuming no impairment, for discount rates of 2.5% per annum and -0.75% per annum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at Date of Trial</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Females</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.50% Real Yield (1)</td>
<td>-0.75% Real Yield (2)</td>
<td>Percentage Increase ( (2) - (1) ) / (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.50% Real Yield (1)</td>
<td>-0.75% Real Yield (2)</td>
<td>Percentage Increase ( (2) - (1) ) / (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>26.64</td>
<td>52.02</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.88</td>
<td>52.71</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>22.84</td>
<td>38.71</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>39.27</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>18.09</td>
<td>26.52</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>26.88</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>12.11</td>
<td>15.29</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.26</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 36: Multipliers for loss of earnings to pension age 65 from the Ogden tables (males Table 9 and females Table 10) assuming no impairment, for discount rates of 2.5% per annum and -0.75% per annum**

Following the Lord Chancellor’s announcement on 27 February 2017, a claim was settled on a PPO basis with damages totalling £28 million based on predicted life expectancy, reported to be the highest settlement that has been approved in respect of a personal injury claim. The lump sum
element of the PPO claim was revised from an initial agreed figure of £4.9 million in January 2017 to a revised figure of £9.1 million in March 2017.

In terms of industry impact, estimates have varied considerably, but figures of £4 billion to £6 billion one-off reserve charges for insurers and reinsurers have been discussed in the insurance press. Insurance premiums increased soon after, with Motor Comprehensive premiums increasing by 8.4% in the second quarter of 2017 (largely attributable to the reduction in the discount rate and an increase in Insurance Premium Tax) and by 18.5% in the year to 30 June 2017, according to the Confused.com Car Insurance Price Index in association with Willis Towers Watson. Prior to the 1 July 2017 reinsurance renewal, reports were circulating that Motor reinsurers were seeking to double rates.

A big unknown at this stage is the likely impact on PPO propensity. Will insurers and reinsurers now prefer a PPO to a lump sum? Will lump sums now be seen as relatively more attractive than PPOs for claimants? This is discussed further in a later section of this report. The Government has asked the Civil Justice Council to consider what barriers may exist to increase the uptake of PPOs.

**Impact of an increase in the discount rate to 0% per annum**

The potential increase in the discount rate from -0.75% per annum to 0% per annum will again have a significant impact on the value of individual claim settlements.

Figure 37 and Figure 38 illustrate the percentage increases (in this case decreases) in the whole of life and loss of earnings multipliers by age at trial and gender, taken from the Ogden tables.

### Figure 37: Multipliers for pecuniary loss for life from the Ogden tables (males Table 1 and females Table 2) assuming no impairment, for discount rates of -0.75% per annum and 0% per annum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at Date of Trial</th>
<th>0.75% Real Yield</th>
<th>0.00% Real Yield</th>
<th>Percentage Increase (2 - 1) / (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>118.67</td>
<td>63.89</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>108.32</td>
<td>78.31</td>
<td>-28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>88.96</td>
<td>67.22</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>71.43</td>
<td>56.34</td>
<td>-21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>55.66</td>
<td>45.76</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>41.44</td>
<td>35.45</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>29.19</td>
<td>25.92</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Females              |                  |                  |                                 |
| 0.75% Real Yield     |                  |                  |                                 |
| 0.00% Real Yield     |                  |                  |                                 |
| Percentage Increase  |                  |                  |                                 |
| (2 - 1) / (1)        |                  |                  |                                 |
| 5                    | 125.21           | 67.48            | -50%                            |
| 10                   | 114.70           | 81.97            | -29%                            |
| 20                   | 94.99            | 70.96            | -25%                            |
| 30                   | 76.95            | 60.02            | -22%                            |
| 40                   | 60.52            | 49.24            | -19%                            |
| 50                   | 45.71            | 38.73            | -15%                            |
| 60                   | 32.68            | 28.78            | -12%                            |

### Figure 38: Multipliers for loss of earnings to pension age 65 from the Ogden tables (males Table 9 and females Table 10) assuming no impairment, for discount rates of -0.75% per annum and 0% per annum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at Date of Trial</th>
<th>0.75% Real Yield</th>
<th>0.00% Real Yield</th>
<th>Percentage Increase (2 - 1) / (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>52.02</td>
<td>43.81</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>38.71</td>
<td>33.90</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>26.52</td>
<td>24.13</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>15.29</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Females              |                  |                  |                                 |
| 0.75% Real Yield     |                  |                  |                                 |
| 0.00% Real Yield     |                  |                  |                                 |
| Percentage Increase  |                  |                  |                                 |
| (2 - 1) / (1)        |                  |                  |                                 |
| 20                   | 52.71            | 44.34            | -16%                            |
| 30                   | 39.27            | 34.36            | -12%                            |
| 40                   | 26.88            | 24.45            | -9%                             |
| 50                   | 15.50            | 14.65            | -6%                             |
| 60                   | 5.02             | 4.93             | -2%                             |
Early indications of the impact of the change in the Ogden discount rate

The IFoA PPO Working Party supplemented the 2017 qualitative industry survey with further rounds of questions (firstly in spring 2017, and then again in August 2017) specifically in relation to the change in the Ogden discount rate to -0.75% per annum.

In spring 2017, many participants felt that they had had insufficient experience to draw any firm conclusions. We therefore asked a similar set of questions in August 2017.

In this section, we provide some of the key highlights of the responses to these supplementary questions. We provide more detail around the responses to these supplementary questions in Appendix T to this report.

Qualitative early indications

In August 2017, all but two of the participating insurers (out of the 15 that responded) valued non-PPO claims within the Actuarial Best Estimate reserves on an Ogden -0.75% per annum basis (i.e. the prevailing discount rate). Of the two participating insurers that valued non-PPO claims within the Actuarial Best Estimate reserves on a different basis, one did so at 0% per annum and the other at +0.25% per annum.

Participating insurers were asked what percentage change in PPO propensity they had assumed as part of their Actuarial Best Estimate calculations. 14 participants responded to this question, with a wide range of responses from no reduction to a 90% reduction.

Participating insurers were asked what their previous assumed reductions in PPO propensity would have been, from scenario analyses, had the Ogden discount rate fallen to 0% per annum, -0.75% per annum or -1.5% per annum. Generally, the lower the discount rate, the larger the percentage decrease in PPO propensity participating insurers expected. However, some participating insurers expected the same reduction in propensity in all three scenarios and others expected no change at all. 10 participants responded to this question.

In terms of additional reserve margins for further reductions in the Ogden discount rate, this was often as part of a general margin. In some cases, this was at a level being sufficient to cover a reduction to -2.0% per annum.

Participating insurers were asked if they had seen any changes in the speed of settlement of claims or in claimant / lawyer behaviour. As at August 2017, some respondents said that it was too early to comment; some noted that very few (or no) claim settlements had occurred since the “announcement of an announcement” in December 2016; others noted a general slowing down of settlements, and that claimant lawyers had actively sought to slow down lump sum settlements until after the discount rate announcement.

Some respondents noted that they had succeeded in settling large claims at rates higher than -0.75% per annum since the Ogden discount rate change (i.e. at 0% per annum to +2.5% per annum).
Quantitative early indications

In August 2017, we received quantitative feedback regarding the number of non-PPO and PPO large claims for 2017 to date, pre- and post-the effective date of 20 March 2017 for the reduction of the Ogden discount rate to -0.75% per annum in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This quantitative feedback was provided by 7 participating insurers.

Within the data provided, no large claims settled as PPO claims between 1 January 2017 and 19 March 2017, whereas the equivalent period for 2016 saw around 20% of the year’s PPOs settle.

Within the data provided, in the period between 20 March 2017 and 31 August 2017, the PPO propensity was 12%. This represents a drop in PPO propensity of around 50% from 2016 whole year levels.

The PPO propensity for 2017 from 1 January 2017 to 31 August 2017 was 8%. This represents a drop in PPO propensity of 60-70% from 2016 whole year levels.
# Appendix A  Glossary of terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASHE</td>
<td>Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWE</td>
<td>Average Weekly Earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalisation clause</td>
<td>A clause which allows (or even compels) a reinsurer to settle an individual PPO liability as a lump sum with an insurer, on a pre-agreed basis, once such an award has been made / agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIOPA</td>
<td>European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRC</td>
<td>Financial Reporting Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAAP</td>
<td>Generally Accepted Accounting Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFoA</td>
<td>Institute and Faculty of Actuaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRS</td>
<td>International Financial Reporting Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILG(s)</td>
<td>Index-linked gilt(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogden tables</td>
<td>Government Actuary’s Department’s “Actuarial Tables with explanatory notes for use in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Cases” published by The Stationery Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORSA</td>
<td>Own Risk and Solvency Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPO(s)</td>
<td>Periodical Payment Order(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>Prudential Regulation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPI</td>
<td>Retail Prices Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTA</td>
<td>Road Traffic Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Solvency Capital Requirement (under the Solvency II regime)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAS</td>
<td>Technical Actuarial Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XoL</td>
<td>Excess of Loss (reinsurance programme)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B  Standardisation for PPO propensity statistics

The data collected for the quantitative industry survey clearly shows that the likelihood of a claim settling as a PPO varies with the size of the claim, with larger claims being more likely to have settled as a PPO (see Figure F.12 and Figure G.8, for example).

In our statistics looking at the change in PPO propensity by settlement year, we have therefore considered a standardised PPO propensity which adjusts for (or removes) the volatility in the PPO propensity arising from differences in the mix of large claims by amount between years.

In this appendix, we explain the standardisation basis for Motor (non-MIB) claims and for Liability claims. The data collected from the MIB does not include non-PPO large claims, and so we are not able to produce PPO propensity statistics or standardised PPO propensity statistics for MIB claims.

B.1 Standardisation for Motor (non-MIB) claims

Figure B.1 shows the proportion of Motor (non-MIB) large claims in each claim size band, for each settlement year. The claim size thresholds are defined in 2011 terms, indexed at 7% per annum. 

![Figure B.1: Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) large claims in each claim size band, by settlement year](image)

Averaging across settlement years 2009 to 2016 gives the proportion of large claims in each claim size band shown in Figure B.2, and this is the large claim distribution that underlies the standardised Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity figures discussed in this report.
The standardised Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity for a given year is estimated by combining the Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensities for each claim size band for that settlement year, as shown in Figure F.13, with the proportion of large claims in each claim size band shown in Figure B.2.

**B.2 Standardisation for Liability claims**

Figure B.3 shows the proportion of Liability large claims in each claim size band, for each settlement year. The claim size thresholds are defined in 2011 terms, indexed at 7% per annum. Averaging across settlement years 2009 to 2016 (for consistency with the Motor analysis) gives the proportion of large claims in each claim size band shown in Figure B.4, and this is the large claim distribution that underlies the standardised Liability PPO propensity figures discussed in this report. The standardised Liability propensity for a given year is estimated by combining the Liability PPO propensities for each claim size band for that settlement year, as shown in Figure G.10, with the proportion of large claims in each claim size band shown in Figure B.4.
Figure B.3: Proportion of Liability large claims in each claim size band, by settlement year

Figure B.4: Proportion of Liability large claims in each claim size band, averaged across settlement years 2009 to 2016 inclusive, used for standardisation
Appendix C  Definitions of large claims, and incremental and cumulative thresholds

C.1  Large claims

The PPO propensity statistics discussed in this report are defined as the number of PPO claims as a proportion of large claims.

The definition of a large claim is a claim that is greater than £1 million in 2011 terms, indexed at 7% per annum. So, if considering settlement year, a claim settling in 2008 is deemed large if it is greater than £816,298 (£1,000,000 x 1.07^{-3}), and a claim settling in 2016 is deemed large if it is greater than £1,402,552 (£1,000,000 x 1.07^{5}).

In a number of the analyses summarised in this report, we consider claims in various claim size bands. In each case, the claim size thresholds are also defined in 2011 terms, indexed at 7% per annum. A claim falls in a given band if it is greater than or equal to the lower bound of the band, but less than the upper bound of the band (where there is an upper bound). For PPO claims, the claim size is determined using a real discount rate of 2.5% per annum.

C.2  Incremental threshold and cumulative threshold

A number of the analyses are described as using incremental thresholds and cumulative thresholds.

In an incremental threshold analysis, a claim will only fall in a single claim size band. In a cumulative threshold analysis, a claim may fall in multiple claim size bands.

For example, considering the two Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity figures below, a £3.25 million claim (in 2011 terms) will fall in the £3m-£4m band in Figure C.1, and it will fall in each of the £1m+, £1.5m+, £2m+, £2.5m+ and £3m+ bands in Figure C.2.
Figure C.1: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009

Figure C.2: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by cumulative large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009
Appendix D  Summary statistics for all PPO claims

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics for all of the PPO claims in the quantitative industry survey, for the following characteristics:

- Age of claimant at settlement (years)
- Delay from accident date until settlement date (years)
- Future life expectancy at settlement date (years)
- Life expectancy reduction (years)
- Initial annual PPO payment (summed across all heads of damage) (£ nominal)
- Lump sum payment (£ nominal).

The figures are shown cumulative across all settlement years, and also separately for the pre-2016 settlement years and the 2016 settlement year alone.

Where only a single claim is available in a given cohort (i.e. a sample size of 1), summary statistics are not provided for reasons of data protection.

The figures have not been adjusted for inflation and so may under-estimate the size profile of future PPO claims. It is worth noting that the average settlement date of a PPO claim contained within the quantitative industry survey is as follows:

- The average settlement date of a non-MIB Motor PPO claim is March 2012.
- The average settlement date of a MIB Motor PPO claim is May 2011.
- The average settlement date of a Liability PPO claim is April 2011.

D.1 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
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<th>2016</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>33.9, 27.9</td>
<td>38.3, 28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay until settlement</td>
<td>6.4, 5.6</td>
<td>45.2, 47.4</td>
<td>32.0, 32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future life expectancy at settlement</td>
<td>44.3, 46.8</td>
<td>14.8, 13.2</td>
<td>103.601, 90.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy reduction</td>
<td>15.3, 13.5</td>
<td>14.8, 13.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
<td>69,268, 63,085</td>
<td>67,220, 61,000</td>
<td>103,601, 90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lump sum (£)</td>
<td>1,870,555, 1,670,667</td>
<td>1,670,667, 1,179,258</td>
<td>2,315,389, 2,437,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures have not been adjusted for inflation and so may under-estimate the size profile of future PPO claims. It is worth noting that the average settlement date of a PPO claim contained within the quantitative industry survey is as follows:

- The average settlement date of a non-MIB Motor PPO claim is March 2012.
- The average settlement date of a MIB Motor PPO claim is May 2011.
- The average settlement date of a Liability PPO claim is April 2011.

Figure D.1: Summary statistics for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims
### Figure D.2: Summary statistics for Private Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

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<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Age at settlement</td>
<td>Mean: 33.2</td>
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<td>Median: 25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Median: 15.4</td>
<td>Standard Deviation: 1</td>
<td>Standard Deviation: 1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Life expectancy reduction</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future life expectancy at settlement</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
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<td>93,059</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lump sum (£)</td>
<td>1,695,561</td>
<td>1,003,064</td>
<td>1,680,000</td>
<td>1,085,777</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>796,264</td>
<td>795,411</td>
<td>78,271</td>
<td>79,696</td>
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<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>1,304,137</td>
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<td>1,085,800</td>
<td>1,101,128</td>
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### Figure D.3: Summary statistics for Commercial Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

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<th></th>
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<td>Mean: 36.3</td>
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<td>Median: 31.7</td>
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<td>Standard Deviation: 1</td>
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<td>Life expectancy reduction</td>
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<td>43.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future life expectancy at settlement</td>
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<td>18.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
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<td>91,978</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>70,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lump sum (£)</td>
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<td>1,803,064</td>
<td>1,631,279</td>
<td>1,101,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>65,171</td>
<td>70,411</td>
<td>77,965</td>
<td>79,624</td>
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<td>Standard Deviation</td>
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<td>1,101,128</td>
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<td>1,208,000</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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### Figure D.4: Summary statistics for Private Comprehensive Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

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</tr>
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<td>Future life expectancy at settlement</td>
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<td>16.2</td>
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<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
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<td>1,109,007</td>
<td>1,208,000</td>
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<td>Median</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Skewness</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay until settlement</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Lump sum (£)</td>
<td>1,576,769</td>
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**Figure D.5: Summary statistics for Private Non-Comprehensive Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims**

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<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
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<td>Future life expectancy at settlement</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>367</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy reduction</td>
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<td>50.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
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<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
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<td>60,000</td>
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<td>Lump sum (£)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20.5</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
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<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
<td>91,652</td>
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<td>57,310</td>
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**Figure D.6: Summary statistics for Brain injury Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims**

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<td>16.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
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<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
<td>19.1</td>
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<td>87,500</td>
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<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
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<td>Delay until settlement</td>
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<td>Future life expectancy at settlement</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>98</td>
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<td>Life expectancy reduction</td>
<td>37.3</td>
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**Figure D.7: Summary statistics for Spinal injury Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims**
## D.2 Liability PPO claims

For Figure D.8, there are no claims present in the 2016 settlement year cohort, and so summary statistics are not provided separately for the pre-2016 settlement years and the 2016 settlement year alone. Likewise, summary statistics are not provided separately for Figure D.9 and Figure D.10.

### Table D.8: Summary statistics for Liability PPO claims

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
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<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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### Figure D.8: Summary statistics for Liability PPO claims

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<th>All</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
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<td>18.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
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<td>16.8</td>
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<td>Annual PPO payment (£)</td>
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<td>47,500</td>
<td>70,323</td>
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<td>Lump sum (£)</td>
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### Figure D.9: Summary statistics for Brain injury Liability PPO claims

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<td>Delay until settlement</td>
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<td>Future life expectancy at settlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy reduction</td>
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<td>Lump sum (£)</td>
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### Figure D.10: Summary statistics for Spinal injury Liability PPO claims
D.3 Motor (MIB) PPO claims

For Figure D.13, there are no claims present in the 2016 settlement year cohort, and so summary statistics are not provided separately for the pre-2016 settlement years and the 2016 settlement year alone.
Appendix E   Number of PPO claim settlements

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics for the number of PPO claims in the quantitative industry survey, by settlement quarter and by settlement year.

E.1   Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Liability PPO claims combined

![Figure E.1: Number of (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement quarter](image1)

![Figure E.2: Number of (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year – Motor and Liability](image2)
Figure E.3: Proportion of (non-MIB) PPO claims that settle in each quarter, by settlement year

Figure E.4: Proportion of (non-MIB) PPO claims that are paid (i.e. start) in each quarter, by settlement year
E.2 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

Figure E.5: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year

Figure E.6: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private and Commercial Motor, by settlement year
Figure E.7: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor, by settlement year and by cover type

E.3 Liability PPO claims

Figure E.8: Number of Liability PPO claims, by settlement year
E.4 Motor (MIB) PPO claims

![Graph showing the number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims by settlement year]

*Figure E.9: Number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year*

E.5 Motor (MIB) PPO claims versus the rest of the industry (i.e. Motor (non-MIB)) PPO claims

![Graph showing the number of PPO claims by settlement year for MIB and the rest of the industry]

*Figure E.10: Number of PPO claims, by settlement year – MIB and the rest of the industry*
Figure E.11: Proportion of PPO claims, by settlement year – MIB and the rest of the industry
Appendix F  Propensity of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics for the propensity of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims by:

- Settlement year
- Insurer
- Cover type and class of business
- Incremental large claim threshold band (two different sets of bandings)
- Cumulative large claim threshold band (two different sets of bandings)
- Type of injury
- Claimant characteristics (age at accident and gender)
- Driver characteristics (age at accident and gender).

Unless otherwise specified, the propensity is expressed as the number of PPO claims as a proportion of the number of large claims.

The PPO propensity for settlement year 2008 (at 16.5% using the above definition) is considerably lower than that for subsequent years (at a weighted average of 29.8% for 2009-2016 inclusive), and so the data underlying the summary statistics within this appendix have been restricted to settlement years 2009 and post to reduce the potential for distortion.

See Appendix C for the definition of a large claim, and an explanation of the incremental threshold analysis and the cumulative threshold analysis. See Appendix B for an explanation of the standardisation basis used for Motor (non-MIB) claims.

F.1  Propensity by settlement year

![Graph showing number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO large claims by settlement year]

*Figure F.1: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO large claims underlying the PPO propensity statistics, by settlement year*
Figure F.2: **Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity and standardised Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by settlement year**

Figure F.3 uses a different measure of PPO propensity, expressing the number of PPO claims as a proportion of the average gross earned premium. The number of PPO claims settled in a given year is divided by an average gross earned premium based on the premium earned over a six year period starting seven years earlier (i.e. the number of PPO claims settled in 2012 is divided by the average annual amount of gross premium earned during the period 2006 to 2011 inclusive). These PPO propensity figures include all PPO claims and not just those over £1 million, and are in terms of the number of PPO claims per £1,000 million of gross earned premium.

Figure F.3: **Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, expressed as the number of PPO claims as a proportion of the average gross earned premium, by settlement year**

Figure F.4 also uses a different measure of PPO propensity, expressing the number of PPO claims as a proportion of the average earned vehicle years. The number of PPO claims settled in a given year is divided by an average earned vehicle years based on the vehicle years earned over a six year period starting seven years earlier (i.e. the number of PPO claims settled in 2012 is divided by the average...
annual vehicle years earned during the period 2006 to 2011 inclusive). These PPO propensity figures include all PPO claims and not just those over £1 million, and are in terms of the number of PPO claims per million earned vehicle years.

**Figure F.4: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, expressed as the number of PPO claims as a proportion of the average earned vehicle years, by settlement year**

**F.2 Propensity by insurer**

**Figure F.5: Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity for insurers that have settled at least 25 large claims (including PPO claims) in the last five years, for claims settled since 2009**
Figure F.6: Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity for insurers that have settled at least 25 large claims (including PPO claims) in the last five years, separately for claims settled between 2009 and 2015 and claims settled in 2016.

In Figure F.7, the size of the bubble (the area) represents the number of insurers in a given propensity band.

Figure F.7: Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity for insurers that have settled at least 25 large claims (including PPO claims) in the last five years, comparing the PPO propensity of claim settlements in 2015 with those in 2016.
F.3 Propensity by cover type and class of business

Figure F.8: Private / Commercial split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Motor written premiums

Figure F.9: Private Motor Comprehensive/ Non-Comprehensive split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Motor written premiums and Motor vehicle years exposed
Figure F.10: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by class of business, for claims settled since 2009

Figure F.11: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, for Private and Commercial Motor, by settlement year
F.4 Propensity by incremental large claim threshold band

Figure F.12: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009

Figure F.13: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), and by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009
Figure F.14: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009

Figure F.15: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), and by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009
F.5 Propensity by cumulative large claim threshold band

Figure F.16: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by cumulative large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009

Figure F.17: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by cumulative large claim threshold band (2011 terms), and by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009
Figure F.18: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by cumulative large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009

Figure F.19: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by cumulative large claim threshold band (2011 terms), and by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009
F.6 Propensity by type of injury

Figure F.21 uses data from those insurers that provided the nature of injury for their non-PPO large claims as well as for their PPO claims. This is only a small subset of data, as can be seen from the right vertical axis (500 large claims in total).

Figure F.21: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by type of injury, for claims settled since 2009
F.7 Propensity by claimant characteristics

Figure F.22 uses data from those insurers that provided the claimant age at accident for their non-PPO large claims as well as for their PPO claims. This is only a small subset of data, as can be seen from the right vertical axis (401 large claims in total).

![Propensity by claimant age at accident](image1)

*Figure F.22: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by claimant age at accident, for claims settled since 2009*

Figure F.23 uses data from those insurers that provided the claimant gender for their non-PPO large claims as well as for their PPO claims. This is only a small subset of data, as can be seen from the right vertical axis (390 large claims in total).

![Propensity by claimant gender](image2)

*Figure F.23: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by claimant gender, for claims settled since 2009*
F.8 Propensity by driver characteristics

Figure F.24 uses data from those insurers that provided the age of driver at accident for their non-PPO large claims as well as for their PPO claims. This is only a small subset of data, as can be seen from the right vertical axis (300 large claims in total).

![Figure F.24: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by age of driver at accident, for claims settled since 2009](image)

Figure F.25 uses data from those insurers that provided the gender of the driver for their non-PPO large claims as well as for their PPO claims. This is only a small subset of data, as can be seen from the right vertical axis (320 large claims in total).

![Figure F.25: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by driver gender, for claims settled since 2009](image)
Appendix G  Propensity of Liability PPO claims

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics for the propensity of Liability PPO claims by:

- Settlement year
- Insurer
- Class of business
- Incremental large claim threshold band
- Cumulative large claim threshold band
- Type of injury
- Claimant characteristics (age at accident and gender).

Unless otherwise specified, the propensity is expressed as the number of PPO claims as a proportion of the number of large claims.

The PPO propensity for settlement year 2008 (at 2.5% using the above definition) is considerably lower than that for subsequent years (at a weighted average of 9.9% for 2009-2016 inclusive), and so the data underlying the summary statistics within this appendix have been restricted to settlement years 2009 and post to reduce the potential for distortion.

See Appendix C for the definition of a large claim, and an explanation of the incremental threshold analysis and the cumulative threshold analysis. See Appendix B for an explanation of the standardisation basis used for Liability claims.

The number of Liability claims settled in each year, and also the number of Liability PPO claims, in the data we have received for the quantitative industry survey is small, especially when considered relative to the equivalent Motor claims data received. The small number of Liability claims is likely to have contributed to the volatility in experience in the summary statistics provided in this appendix.
G.1 Propensity by settlement year

![Graph showing Propensity by settlement year](image)

**Figure G.1:** Number of Liability PPO claims and Liability non-PPO large claims underlying the PPO propensity statistics, by settlement year

**Figure G.2:** Liability PPO propensity and standardised Liability PPO propensity, by settlement year

Figure G.3 uses a different measure of PPO propensity, expressing the number of PPO claims as a proportion of the average gross earned premium. The number of PPO claims settled in a given year is divided by an average gross earned premium based on the premium earned over a six year period starting seven years earlier (i.e. the number of PPO claims settled in 2012 is divided by the average annual amount of gross premium earned during the period 2006 to 2011 inclusive). These PPO propensity figures include all PPO claims and not just those over £1 million, and are in terms of the number of PPO claims per £1,000 million of gross earned premium.
Figure G.3: Liability PPO propensity, expressed as the number of PPO claims as a proportion of the average gross earned premium, by settlement year

G.2 Propensity by insurer

Figure G.4: Distribution of Liability PPO propensity for insurers that have settled at least 25 large claims (including PPO claims) in the last five years, for claims settled since 2009
Figure G.5: Distribution of Liability PPO propensity for insurers that have settled at least 25 large claims (including PPO claims) in the last five years, separately for claims settled between 2009 and 2015 and claims settled in 2016.

An equivalent to Figure F.7 for Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity has not been included in this appendix for Liability claims, as there are no Liability claims settling as PPO claims in 2016 in the data provided.

G.3 Propensity by class of business

Figure G.6: Employers’ Liability/Public Liability split of the number of Liability PPO claims and Liability written premiums.
Figure G.7: Liability PPO propensity, by class of business, for claims settled since 2009

G.4 Propensity by incremental large claim threshold band

Figure G.8: Liability PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009
Figure G.9: Liability PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), and by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009

Figure G.10: Liability PPO propensity, by grouped (£1m-£3m, £3m+) incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), and by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009
G.5 Propensity by cumulative large claim threshold band

Figure G.11: Liability PPO propensity, by cumulative large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009

Figure G.12: Liability PPO propensity, by cumulative large claim threshold band (2011 terms), and by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009
G.6 Propensity by type of injury

Figure G.14 uses data from those insurers that provided the nature of injury for their non-PPO large claims as well as for their PPO claims. This is only a small subset of data, as can be seen from the right vertical axis (58 large claims in total).

Figure G.14: Liability propensity, by type of injury, for claims settled since 2009
G.7 Propensity by claimant characteristics

Figure G.15 uses data from those insurers that provided the claimant age at accident for their non-PPO large claims as well as for their PPO claims. This is only a very small subset of data, as can be seen from the right vertical axis (60 large claims in total).

![Figure G.15: Liability PPO propensity, by claimant age at accident, for claims settled since 2009](image)

Figure G.16 uses data from those insurers that provided the claimant gender for their non-PPO large claims as well as for their PPO claims. This is only a small subset of data, as can be seen from the right vertical axis (50 large claims in total).

![Figure G.16: Liability PPO propensity, by claimant gender, for claims settled since 2009](image)
Appendix H  Accident year triangles for Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO and PPO claims

In this appendix, we provide triangles of non-PPO large claims, PPO claims and PPO propensity rates for non-MIB Motor claims, which take into account the accident year of a claim as well as its time to settlement.

As we have only collected data on large claims settled since 2008, the top left hand side of each triangle is incomplete. The cells shaded in blue in the cumulative triangles should therefore be treated with caution, as these are missing settlements prior to 2008.

We have also provided graphs showing the accident year cumulative development of the number of non-MIB Motor PPO claims, separately for the years for which PPO settlements were less commonplace (i.e. prior to 2008) and for the years for which PPO settlements have been more widespread (i.e. 2008 and post). It is clear from the data for the older accident years that we can expect some further development of the number of PPO claim settlements, even for these older years, although the extent of this development is difficult to quantify.

We have combined accident years prior to 2001, and the oldest accident year included is 1987.

H.1 Incremental triangles

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![Figure H.1: Triangle showing the accident year incremental development of the number of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO large claims](image1)

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![Figure H.2: Triangle showing the accident year incremental development of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims](image2)
**Figure H.3: Triangle showing the incremental accident year Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity rates**

### H.2 Cumulative triangles

**Figure H.4: Triangle showing the accident year cumulative development of the number of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO large claims**

**Figure H.5: Triangle showing the accident year cumulative development of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims**
Figure H.6: Triangle showing the accident year cumulative Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity rates

H.3 Cumulative development graphs

Figure H.7: Graph showing the accident year cumulative development of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – years for which PPO settlements were less commonplace
Figure H.8: Graph showing the accident year cumulative development of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – years for which PPO settlements have been more widespread
Appendix I  General characteristics of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims by the following characteristics:

- Age of driver at accident date and gender of driver (including class of business and cover type)
- Age of claimant at accident date and gender of claimant (including class of business and cover type)
- Age of claimant at settlement date and gender of claimant
- Age of driver and age of claimant at accident date
- Delay to settlement
- Life expectancy of claimant at settlement date
- Reduction in life expectancy of the claimant.

I.1  Age of driver at accident date and gender of driver

Figure I.1: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of driver at accident date
Figure I.2: Split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by gender of driver

Figure I.3: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of driver at accident date and by gender of driver
Figure I.4: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor, by age of driver at accident date and by gender of driver

Figure I.5: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Commercial Motor, by age of driver at accident date and by gender of driver
Figure I.6: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor, by age of driver at accident date and by cover type

Figure I.7: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor Comprehensive, by age of driver at accident date and by gender of driver
Figure 1.8: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor Non-Comprehensive, by age of driver at accident date and by gender of driver

I.2 Age of claimant at accident date and gender of claimant

Figure 1.9: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date
Figure I.10: Split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by gender of claimant

Figure I.11: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant
Figure I.12: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor, by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant

Figure I.13: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Commercial Motor, by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant
Figure I.14: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor, by age of claimant at accident date and by cover type

Figure I.15: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor Comprehensive, by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant
I.3 Age of claimant at settlement date and gender of claimant

Figure I.16: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor Non-Comprehensive,  
by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant

Figure I.17: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date  
and by gender of claimant
I.4 Age of driver and age of claimant at accident date

Figure I.18: Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date and by age of driver at accident date

Figure I.19: Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor, by age of claimant at accident date and by age of driver at accident date
**I.5 Delay to settlement**

The delay to settlement is calculated as the time elapsed between the accident date and PPO settlement date, rounded to the nearest whole year.

*Figure I.20: Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Commercial Motor, by age of claimant at accident date and by age of driver at accident date*

*Figure I.21: Distribution of the delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009*
Figure I.22: Distribution of the delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009

Figure I.23: Average delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date, for claims settled since 2009
Figure I.24: Average delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date, by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009

Figure I.25: Scatter graph of the delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and the age of claimant at accident date

For the scatter graph in Figure I.25, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: -0.49
- Spearman correlation coefficient: -0.49

The coefficients represent the strength and direction of the correlation between the two variables, ranging between -1.00 and +1.00. A larger absolute value represents a stronger relationship in the data, the sign indicating the direction.
Figure I.26: Scatter graph of the delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and the age of claimant at accident date, for claims settled since 2009

For the scatter graph in Figure I.26, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: -0.48
- Spearman correlation coefficient: -0.46

I.6 Life expectancy of claimant at settlement date

The term “life expectancy” in this document is defined as the future life expectancy at the time of settlement, as per the quantitative industry survey responses. It is not clear whether the data collected represents the claimant experts’ views, the defendant experts’ views, internal views, or a combination of these.

Figure I.27: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
Figure I.28: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009

Figure I.29: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private and Commercial Motor, for claims settled since 2009
Figure I.30: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor, by cover type, for claims settled since 2009.

Figure I.31: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date, for claims settled since 2009.
Figure I.32: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date, by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009

Figure I.33: Scatter graph of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and the age of claimant at settlement date

For the scatter graph in Figure I.33, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: -0.78
- Spearman correlation coefficient: -0.75
Figure I.34: Scatter graph of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and the age of claimant at settlement date, for claims settled since 2009

For the scatter graph in Figure I.34, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: \(-0.78\)
- Spearman correlation coefficient: \(-0.75\)

I.7 Reduction in life expectancy of the claimant

The percentage reduction in life expectancy is defined as:

\[
\frac{\text{unimpaired life expectancy} - \text{life expectancy as provided by participants}}{\text{unimpaired life expectancy}}
\]

where the unimpaired life expectancy is taken from the 2014-2016 ONS United Kingdom mortality tables, and all life expectancies are quoted as at the date of settlement. (Negative percentage reductions in life expectancy may therefore occur if insurers are using more recent (or different) mortality tables.)
Figure I.35: Distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009

Figure I.36: Distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009
Figure I.37: Distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date, for claims settled since 2009.

Figure I.38: Distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date, by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009.
Figure I.39: Scatter graph of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, and the age of claimant at settlement date

For the scatter graph in Figure I.39, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.38
- Spearman correlation coefficient: 0.38

Figure I.40: Scatter graph of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, and the age of claimant at settlement date, for claims settled since 2009

For the scatter graph in Figure I.40, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.38
- Spearman correlation coefficient: 0.38
Appendix J  General characteristics of Liability claims

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics for Liability PPO claims by the following characteristics:

- Age of claimant at accident date and gender of claimant (including class of business)
- Age of claimant at settlement date and gender of claimant
- Delay to settlement
- Life expectancy of claimant at settlement date
- Reduction in life expectancy of the claimant.

For ease of comparison between the summary statistics, a number of the figures in this appendix summarise the data for both Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims.

J.1  Age of claimant at accident date and gender of claimant

Figure J.1: Distribution of the number of Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date
Figure J.2: Split of the number of Liability PPO claims, by gender of claimant

Figure J.3: Number of Liability PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date
Figure J.4: Number of Liability PPO claims, for Employers’ Liability, by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant

Figure J.5: Number of Liability PPO claims, for Public Liability, by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant
J.2  Age of claimant at settlement date and gender of claimant

![Distribution of the number of Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date](image1)

*Figure J.6: Distribution of the number of Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date*

![Number of Liability PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date and by gender of claimant](image2)

*Figure J.7: Number of Liability PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date and by gender of claimant*
J.3  Delay to settlement

The delay to settlement is calculated as the time elapsed between the accident date and PPO settlement date, rounded to the nearest whole year.

Figure J.8: Distribution of the delay to settlement for Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009

Figure J.9: Distribution of the delay to settlement for Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date, for claims settled since 2009
J.4 Life expectancy of claimant at settlement date

The term “life expectancy” in this document is defined as the future life expectancy at the time of settlement, as per the quantitative industry survey responses. It is not clear whether the data collected represents the claimant experts’ views, the defendant experts’ views, internal views, or a combination of these.

![Distribution of life expectancy of claimant at settlement date](image)

*Figure J.10: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009*

![Distribution by age of claimant](image)

*Figure J.11: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date, for claims settled since 2009*
J.5 Reduction in life expectancy of the claimant

The percentage reduction in life expectancy is defined as:

\[
\frac{\text{unimpaired life expectancy} - \text{life expectancy as provided by participants}}{\text{unimpaired life expectancy}}
\]

where the unimpaired life expectancy is taken from the 2014-2016 ONS United Kingdom mortality tables, and all life expectancies are quoted as at the date of settlement. (Negative percentage reductions in life expectancy may therefore occur if insurers are using more recent (or different) mortality tables.)

Figure J.12: Distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant, for Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
Figure J.13: Distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant, for Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date, for claims settled since 2009.
Appendix K  General characteristics of Motor (MIB) PPO claims

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics for Motor (MIB) PPO claims by the following characteristics:

- Age of claimant at accident date and gender of claimant (including class of business and cover type)
- Age of claimant at settlement date and gender of claimant
- Delay to settlement
- Life expectancy of claimant at settlement date
- Reduction in life expectancy of the claimant.

For ease of comparison between the summary statistics, a number of the figures in this appendix summarise the data for both Motor (MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims.

K.1  Age of claimant at accident date and gender of claimant

![Figure K.1: Distribution of the number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date](image)

![Figure K.2: Split of the number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims, by gender of claimant](image)
Figure K.3: Number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date and by gender of claimant

K.2 Age of claimant at settlement date and gender of claimant

Figure K.4: Distribution of the number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date
K.3 Delay to settlement

The delay to settlement is calculated as the time elapsed between the accident date and PPO settlement date, rounded to the nearest whole year.

Figure K.5: Number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date and by gender of claimant

Figure K.6: Distribution of the delay to settlement for Motor (MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
K.4 Life expectancy of claimant at settlement date

The term “life expectancy” in this document is defined as the future life expectancy at the time of settlement, as per the quantitative industry survey responses. It is not clear whether the data collected represents the claimant experts’ views, the defendant experts’ views, internal views, or a combination of these.
K.5 Reduction in life expectancy of the claimant

The percentage reduction in life expectancy is defined as:

\[
\text{Percentage Reduction} = \frac{\text{unimpaired life expectancy} - \text{life expectancy as provided by participants}}{\text{unimpaired life expectancy}}
\]

where the unimpaired life expectancy is taken from the 2014-2016 ONS United Kingdom mortality tables, and all life expectancies are quoted as at the date of settlement. (Negative percentage reductions in life expectancy may therefore occur if insurers are using more recent (or different) mortality tables.)

Figure K.9: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at settlement date, for claims settled since 2009

Figure K.10: Distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant, for Motor (MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
Figure K.11: Distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant, for Motor (MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date, for claims settled since 2009.
Appendix L  Indexation of PPO claims

The index used to inflate PPO claim regular payments was originally automatically linked to the Retail Prices Index (“RPI”).

However, in 2006, a court case was brought in the form of Thompstone vs Tameside and Glossop Acute Services NHS Trust which questioned this assumption and suggested that the payments for future cost of care would be better linked to wage inflation. The court agreed and the annual inflation increase was linked to the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (“ASHE”). The case was appealed and a number of other cases were put on hold pending the outcome. In 2008, the Court of Appeal upheld the ruling that an index other than RPI can be chosen if thought more appropriate. Since then the majority of PPO claims have had inflation linked to ASHE.

ASHE is produced by the Office for National Statistics (“ONS”) every November, based on data as at April. It covers a wide range of occupations, though the vast majority of PPO claims so far have, in respect of care costs, been linked to sub-category 6115, relating to care assistants and home carers.

Within a particular job category, the ASHE earnings inflation measures are further split into percentiles. A PPO claim will have the annual inflation linked to a specific percentile, for example to those whose earnings are in the top 10% of earners in the category (i.e. the 90th percentile).

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims by the following characteristics:

- The index applicable for the primary head of damage of the regular payments
- The head of damage and applicable index for the regular payment streams
- The specific percentiles, where the applicable index for the primary head of damage is ASHE.

In this appendix, we also provide summary statistics for the annual inflation in ASHE 6115 by specific percentile.

L.1  Introductory notes on the summary statistics shown

PPO claims can have different elements included within the regular stream of payments, for example they can include both a Loss of Earnings and a Cost of Care head of damage. These different elements can be linked to different indices.

Figure L.1, Figure L.4 and Figure L.7 show the index applicable for the primary head of damage of the regular payment, where the primary head of damage has been defined as the one for which the associated regular payment amount is the largest.

Figure L.2, Figure L.5 and Figure L.8 show the index applicable for each head of damage payment stream.

Where the applicable index for the primary head of damage is ASHE, Figure L.3, Figure L.6 and Figure L.9 show the proportion of PPO claims linked to specific percentiles, for each settlement year.
L.2 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

Figure L.1: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement quarter and by the index applicable for the primary head of damage of the regular payments

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<td>27</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure L.2: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claim regular payment streams, by head of damage and applicable index

Figure L.3: Where the applicable index for the primary head of damage is ASHE, the proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims linked to specific percentiles, by settlement year
L.3 Liability PPO claims

Figure L.4: Number of Liability PPO claims, by settlement quarter and by the index applicable for the primary head of damage of the regular payments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Care and Case Management</th>
<th>ASHE 6115</th>
<th>ASHE Other</th>
<th>RPI</th>
<th>Not Indexed</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care and Case Management</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Earnings</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A or Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure L.5: Number of Liability PPO claim regular payment streams, by head of damage and applicable index

Figure L.6: Where the applicable index for the primary head of damage is ASHE, the proportion of Liability PPO claims linked to specific percentiles, by settlement year
L.4 Motor (MIB) PPO claims

**Figure L.7:** Number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims, by settlement quarter and by the index applicable for the primary head of damage of the regular payments

**Figure L.8:** Number of Motor (MIB) PPO claim regular payment streams, by head of damage and applicable index

**Figure L.9:** Where the applicable index for the primary head of damage is ASHE, the proportion of Motor (MIB) PPO claims linked to specific percentiles, by settlement year
L.5 ASHE

Implemented in the 2011 survey, ASHE code 6115 (“Care Assistants and Home Carers”) has been split into two new codes: code 6145 (“Care Workers and Home Carers”) and code 6146 (“Senior Care Workers”). Even though the ONS has stated that it will continue to publish figures for code 6115, albeit separately to the main tables, “for the foreseeable future”, there is an additional complication since the basis of the ASHE code 6115 figures has changed, and so a slight adjustment is required to be made to the figures for 2011 onwards (details are available within the ONS download of ASHE Table 26 which corresponds to SOC 6145 and 6146).

Figure L.10 and Figure L.11 show the annual inflation in ASHE 6115 by specific percentile. These figures are taken from Table 26.5a (Table 14.5a for 2011 and prior), which relates to hourly gross pay. Figure L.12 compares this annual inflation with that observed for Average Weekly Earnings (“AWE”), taken from the “Not Seasonally Adjusted - Index Figures Excluding Bonuses, Including Arrears” section of the “EARN02: Average Weekly Earnings by Sector” ONS publication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.54%</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
<td>2.29%</td>
<td>2.71%</td>
<td>2.59%</td>
<td>3.64%</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>3.27%</td>
<td>2.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.56%</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
<td>2.93%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>3.06%</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
<td>2.41%</td>
<td>2.72%</td>
<td>2.47%</td>
<td>3.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>0.77%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>-0.61%</td>
<td>-0.74%</td>
<td>-0.85%</td>
<td>-1.33%</td>
<td>-2.07%</td>
<td>-1.38%</td>
<td>-1.11%</td>
<td>-1.05%</td>
<td>-1.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>-0.23%</td>
<td>-1.39%</td>
<td>-1.12%</td>
<td>-0.87%</td>
<td>-0.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.45%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>-0.27%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>1.76%</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>-0.10%</td>
<td>-0.78%</td>
<td>-0.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3.59%</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>1.65%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>8.43%</td>
<td>5.44%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>5.48%</td>
<td>4.66%</td>
<td>3.32%</td>
<td>3.28%</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>5.43%</td>
<td>5.73%</td>
<td>4.81%</td>
<td>4.21%</td>
<td>3.77%</td>
<td>2.97%</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
<td>3.28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure L.10: Annual Inflation in ASHE 6115, by specific percentile and by year (as at April of that year)**
Figure L.12: Annual Inflation in ASHE 611S, by specific percentile, and in AWE, by year (as at April of that year)
Appendix M  Payment components for PPO claims

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics for the lump sum element of PPO claims and for the initial regular payment amount of PPO claims, separately for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims.

The lump sum element in these summary statistics excludes the first regular payment amount for the PPO claim. Unless otherwise stated, all the lump sum amounts are in nominal terms, i.e. at the time of settlement.

For the initial regular payment amount of PPO claims, in cases where one claimant is awarded more than one series of payments (corresponding to different heads of damage), the initial PPO amount is the sum of the payments for all heads of damage. Once again, unless otherwise stated, the initial PPO amounts are in nominal terms, i.e. at the time of settlement, and are before any stepped payments kick in.

We provide summary statistics for the following:

- Distribution of payment components
- Nominal payment components and payment components with inflation removed – Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims only
- Payment components correlations – Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims only.

For the purposes of comparison, we also provide some of the equivalent summary statistics for Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims.

M.1  Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – distribution of payment components

Figure M.1: Distribution of the size of the lump sum element of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
Figure M.2: Distribution of the size of the lump sum element of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year

Figure M.3: Distribution of the initial regular payment amount of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
M.2 Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims – distribution of payment components

Figure M.4: Distribution of the initial regular payment amount of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year

Figure M.5: Distribution of the size of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
**Figure M.6: Distribution of the size of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims, by settlement year**

**Figure M.7: Distribution of the size of the lump sum element of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and the size of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009**
M.3 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and non-PPO claims – nominal payment components and payment components with inflation removed

Figure M.8: Average size of the lump sum element of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, nominal and with inflation removed (assuming inflation of 7% per annum), by settlement year

Figure M.9: Average size of the initial regular payment amount of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, nominal and with inflation removed (assuming inflation of 7% per annum), by settlement year
Figure M.10: Average size of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims, nominal and with inflation removed (assuming inflation of 7% per annum), by settlement year

Figure M.11: Average size of the lump sum element of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and the size of Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO claims, nominal and with inflation removed (assuming inflation of 7% per annum), by settlement year
M.4 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – payment components correlations

For the scatter graph in Figure M.12, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.49
- Spearman correlation coefficient: 0.52

The coefficients represent the strength and direction of the correlation between the two variables, ranging between -1.00 and +1.00. A larger absolute value represents a stronger relationship in the data, the sign indicating the direction.

For the scatter graph in Figure M.13, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.48
- Spearman correlation coefficient: 0.52
Figure M.14: Scatter graph of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant and the initial regular payment amount of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

For the scatter graph in Figure M.14, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.53
- Spearman correlation coefficient: 0.54

The term “life expectancy” in this document is defined as the future life expectancy at the time of settlement, as per the quantitative industry survey responses. It is not clear whether the data collected represents the claimant experts’ views, the defendant experts’ views, internal views, or a combination of these.

The percentage reduction in life expectancy is defined as:

\[
\text{percentage reduction in life expectancy} = \frac{\text{unimpaired life expectancy} - \text{life expectancy as provided by participants}}{\text{unimpaired life expectancy}}
\]

where the unimpaired life expectancy is taken from the 2014-2016 ONS United Kingdom mortality tables, and all life expectancies are quoted as at the date of settlement. (Negative percentage reductions in life expectancy may therefore occur if insurers are using more recent (or different) mortality tables.)
Figure M.15: Scatter graph of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant and the initial regular payment amount of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009

For the scatter graph in Figure M.15, the correlation coefficients are:

- Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.54
- Spearman correlation coefficient: 0.55
M.5 Liability PPO claims – distribution of payment components

Figure M.16: Distribution of the size of the lump sum element of Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009

Figure M.17: Distribution of the initial regular payment amount of Liability PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
M.6 Motor (MIB) PPO claims – distribution of payment components

Figure M.18: Distribution of the size of the lump sum element of Motor (MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009

Figure M.19: Distribution of the initial regular payment amount of Motor (MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009
Appendix N   Special features of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and other statistics

In this appendix, we provide summary statistics on stepped payments, variation orders and indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, together with a small number of other statistics for these PPO claims.

N.1 Definitions

**Stepped payments**

A PPO claim with stepped payments is one where there is a provision for step changes in the regular payment amount to be made. These step changes will apply at fixed points in time, to situations where a specific change in circumstance has already been foreseen at the time of settlement. For example, there could be a stepped payment for a one-off increase in payments to be made to a claimant whose parents are the primary carers: this would allow for a time when the parents are no longer able to deliver the same standard of care and additional care costs will therefore be incurred.

While the majority of step changes tend to be increases, it should be noted that the step change could be either upward or downward.

**Variation orders**

A variation order is an allowance for a change in the regular payment amount, usually triggered by a certain event. An example would be the claimant developing additional symptoms in the future, as a result of the original accident.

Variation orders only specify the conditions of the trigger event at the time of settlement and do not specify the amounts that the regular payments will change to.

**Indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees**

An indemnity guarantee is a guarantee given by the insurer to pay additional costs in circumstances such as where services provided by the local council are reduced or withdrawn in the future.

A reverse indemnity guarantee covers the opposite situation. For example, where the insurer is able to reduce its payments if the claimant increases his or her reliance on public provision of care.
N.2 Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims with special features

Figure N.1 shows the proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims with special features, together with the number of responses received on each special feature. To provide context for the credibility of these summary statistics, there are 517 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims in the quantitative industry survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Proportion of PPOs</th>
<th>Number of Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stepped Payments</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation Orders</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indemnity Guarantees</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse Indemnity Guarantees</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributory Negligence</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure N.1: Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims with special features, together with the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims in the survey with responses received on those special features*

N.3 Stepped payments and variation orders by age of claimant at settlement

*Figure N.2: Number and proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims with stepped payment agreements, by age of claimant at accident date*
Figure N.3: Number and proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims with variation order agreements, by age of claimant at accident date

N.4 Stepped payments and variation orders by injury type

In terms of injury type:

- 27% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims relating to brain injury have a stepped payment.
- 62% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims relating to spinal injury have a stepped payment.

This compares with a general Motor (non-MIB) PPO claim population average of 35%, as shown in Figure N.1.

Again in terms of injury type:

- 13% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims relating to brain injury have a variation order.
- 42% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims relating to spinal injury have a variation order.

This compares with a general Motor (non-MIB) PPO claim population average of 19%, as shown in Figure N.1.

N.5 Other statistics

In terms of payment frequency:

- 82% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims are paid annually.
- 13% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims are paid quarterly.
- The remainder (4%) of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims are paid monthly, bi-monthly, 4-weekly or bi-annually.
In terms of number of claimants:

- 87% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims have one PPO claimant.
- 9% of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims have two PPO claimants.
- The remainder (4%) of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims have three or more PPO claimants.

In terms of the driving force behind the decision for a claim to be settled as a PPO, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims for which information was provided:

- In 84% of cases, it was solely the claimant.
- In 14% of cases, it was a mutual decision between claimant and defendant.
- In 2% of cases, it was the court.
Appendix O  IFoA PPO Working Party injury type and care regime categorisation

The IFoA PPO Working Party, with the help of a number of claims professionals, devised a categorisation of PPO injury types and care regimes, with the intention of this categorisation becoming UK standard practice, to be used by all insurers and reinsurers.

This categorisation was first presented as part of the output of the IFoA PPO Working Party in 2014.

28% of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims we received for the 2017 quantitative industry survey, the data for which was taken as at 31 December 2016, had this categorisation attached. Additionally, 20% of the Liability PPO claims we received for the 2017 quantitative industry survey also had this categorisation attached. The equivalent proportions for the 2016 quantitative industry survey (as at 31 December 2015) were 28% and 27% respectively.

As a consequence, for this survey, we continue to be able to provide more in depth analysis of how the characteristics of PPO claims are affected by the type of injury sustained by the claimant and the type of care they receive. We have restricted this analysis to the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims only.

In this appendix, we reproduce the IFoA PPO Working Party injury type and care regime categorisation, and we provide the following summary statistics for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims:

- Distribution of PPO claims by injury type categorisation
- Distribution of PPO claims by care regime categorisation
- PPO claim payment components by categorisation
- Life expectancy of the claimant at settlement date by categorisation
- Reduction in life expectancy of the claimant by categorisation.

The summary statistics provided in this appendix are based on only a small subset of data (as noted above, only 28% of the 517 Motor (non-MIB) claims received had the categorisation attached). The small number of claims is likely to have contributed to the volatility in experience in the summary statistics provided in this appendix.

We encourage insurers and reinsurers to use this categorisation – the more PPO claims have this categorisation attached, the more in depth analysis the IFoA PPO Working Party will be able to provide and the less volatility there will be in the experience summarised.

We also encourage insurers and reinsurers to apply this coding to all large claims. This additional information will give further insight at an industry level into the drivers of the changes in PPO propensity.
## 0.1 Injury type and care regime categorisation

Figure O.1 summarises the IFoA PPO Working Party injury type and care regime categorisation.

### Injury type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>PVS</td>
<td>Permanent Vegetative State – No purposeful motor or cognitive function. Requires a feeding tube.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Cannot walk - Fed by others</td>
<td>Does not feed self, must be fed completely (either orally or by a feeding tube)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Cannot walk - Self feeds</td>
<td>Can feed self with fingers or utensils, with assistance and/or spillage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4</td>
<td>Some walking ability</td>
<td>Walks with support, or unsteadily alone at least 10 feet but does not balance well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5</td>
<td>Walks well alone</td>
<td>Walks well alone for at least 20 feet, and balances well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6</td>
<td>No mobility issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Spinal |
| S1    | Tetraplegia, Ventilator Dependent  | C1-C3                                                                      |
| S2    | High level Tetraplegia             | C4-C5                                                                      |
| S3    | Low level tetraplegia              | C6-C7                                                                      |
| S4    | High level Paraplegia              | Thoracic T1-T12                                                           |
| S5    | Low level paraplegia               | Lumbar                                                                     |

| Spinal 2 |
| Complete/incomplete flag |
| Complete or incomplete selected |

| Amputation |
| A1         | Double upper limb double upper limb amputation (or loss of use), including bilateral brachial plexus injuries etc |
| A2         | Leg - above knee                    |
| A3         | Leg - below knee                    |
| A4         | Other Amputation                    |

| Other   |
| C1      | 24/7 2 or more care ratio 24 hour care needing two or more carers for all that time |
| C2      | 24/7 1-2 care ratio time 24 hour care needing one to two carers for all that time |
| C3      | 24/7 but night sleeper 24 hour care with at least one carer but carers can sleep at night |
| C4      | 9 or more hours duty care a day 24 hour care |
| C5      | 5 to 8 hours duty care a day 24 hour care |
| C6      | 0 to 4 hours duty care a day 24 hour care |
| C7      | Domestic help only, no personal care |
| C8      | No regular care                    |

*Figure O.1: IFoA PPO Working Party injury type and care regime categorisation*
0.2 Distribution of PPO claims by injury type categorisation

Figure O.2: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party injury type categorisation

Figure O.3: High-level split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party injury type categorisation
Figure O.4: Detailed split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party injury type categorisation
0.3 Distribution of PPO claims by care regime categorisation

Figure O.5: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party care regime categorisation

Figure O.6: Detailed split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party care regime categorisation
0.4 PPO claim payment components by categorisation

Figure O.7: Average lump sum amount and initial PPO amount (annual payment) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party injury type categorisation

Figure O.8: Average lump sum amount and initial PPO amount (annual payment) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party care regime categorisation
0.5  Life expectancy of the claimant at settlement date by categorisation

The term “life expectancy” in this document is defined as the future life expectancy at the time of settlement, as per the quantitative industry survey responses. It is not clear whether the data collected represents the claimant experts’ views, the defendant experts’ views, internal views, or a combination of these.

Figure O.9: Life expectancy of the claimant at settlement date for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party injury type categorisation

Figure O.10: Life expectancy of the claimant at settlement date for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party care regime categorisation
0.6 Reduction in life expectancy of the claimant by categorisation

The percentage reduction in life expectancy is defined as:

\[
\text{unimpaired life expectancy - life expectancy as provided by participants} \over \text{unimpaired life expectancy}
\]

where the unimpaired life expectancy is taken from the 2014-2016 ONS United Kingdom mortality tables, and all life expectancies are quoted as at the date of settlement. (Negative percentage reductions in life expectancy may therefore occur if insurers are using more recent (or different) mortality tables.)
Appendix P  Nature of injury

In this appendix, we provide high-level summary statistics on the nature of injury for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims.

Where claimants suffered multiple injuries, the summary statistics represent the primary injury.

We also provide summary statistics on the nature of injury for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims by the following characteristics:

- Age of claimant at accident date
- Delay to settlement
- Life expectancy of claimant at settlement date
- Reduction in life expectancy of the claimant
- Payment components.

P.1 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – nature of injury

Figure P.1: Split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by nature of injury
Figure P.2: Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for Private Motor, by nature of injury and by cover type

Figure P.3: Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year and by nature of injury
P.2 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – age of claimant at accident date

![Bar chart showing the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims by age of claimant at accident date and by nature of injury.](chart1.png)

*Figure P.4: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date and by nature of injury*

![Bar chart showing the proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims by age of claimant at accident date and by nature of injury.](chart2.png)

*Figure P.5: Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date and by nature of injury*

P.3 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – delay to settlement

The delay to settlement is calculated as the time elapsed between the accident date and PPO settlement date, rounded to the nearest whole year.
Figure P.6: Distribution of the delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by nature of injury

P.4 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – life expectancy of claimant at settlement date

The term “life expectancy” in this document is defined as the future life expectancy at the time of settlement, as per the quantitative industry survey responses. It is not clear whether the data collected represents the claimant experts’ views, the defendant experts’ views, internal views, or a combination of these.
P.5 Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – reduction in life expectancy of the claimant

The percentage reduction in life expectancy is defined as:

\[
\text{unimpaired life expectancy} - \text{life expectancy as provided by participants} \over \text{unimpaired life expectancy}
\]

where the unimpaired life expectancy is taken from the 2014-2016 ONS United Kingdom mortality tables, and all life expectancies are quoted as at the date of settlement. (Negative percentage reductions in life expectancy may therefore occur if insurers are using more recent (or different) mortality tables.)

Figure P.8: Distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy of a claimant, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by nature of injury
P.6  Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims – payment components

**Figure P.9: Distribution of the size of the lump sum element of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by nature of injury**

**Figure P.10: Distribution of the initial regular payment amount of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by nature of injury**
P.7 Liability PPO claims – nature of injury

![Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Liability PPO claims, by nature of injury](image)

*Figure P.11: Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Liability PPO claims, by nature of injury*

P.8 Motor (MIB) PPO claims – nature of injury

![Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims, by nature of injury](image)

*Figure P.12: Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims, by nature of injury*
Appendix Q  Mortality of PPO claimants

In this appendix, we provide the following summary statistics in relation to the mortality of PPO claimants:

- Number of deaths for PPO claimants
- Actual versus expected number of deaths
- Comparison of PPO claimant mortality rates assumed by insurers to those for unimpaired lives
- PPO claimant mortality multipliers and the equivalent reduction in life expectancy figures
- PPO claimant life expectancy, experience analysis and assumed
- Assumed PPO claimant life expectancy / reduction in life expectancy by insurer.

To increase the sample size, we have considered all PPO claims in this analysis, i.e. Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, Liability PPO claims and Motor (MIB) PPO claims combined.

We note, however, that there remains very limited data on which to base any firm conclusions.

We also note that there is an inherent bias in any such analysis, in that we will not observe people living much longer than expectations for a very long time to come, which is more likely to overstate mortality than to understate mortality.

We therefore stress caution in using the results of the analysis presented in this appendix.

In considering unimpaired mortality within the analysis in this appendix, we have used the most recent two-way ONS forecast projections (National Life Tables, United Kingdom 2012-2014) rather than the ONS mortality rates that underlie the Ogden tables (seventh edition).

Q.1  Number of deaths for PPO claimants

Figures Q.1 and Q.2 show the “initial exposure” and number of deaths by age group for male and female claimants respectively.

The “initial exposure” is a measure of the total number of years of exposure for PPO claims in the quantitative industry survey, taken as the number of years from settlement date to 31 December 2016 or date of death if applicable.

The “initial exposure” has been taken from the settlement date of the PPO, as we only receive data for claimants who survive to settlement of the claim, and do not receive information on claimants who die before a settlement.
**Figure Q.1:** Number of years of exposure for PPO claims and number of deaths, for male PPO claimants, by age of claimant at settlement date

**Figure Q.2:** Number of years of exposure for PPO claims and number of deaths, for female PPO claimants, by age of claimant at settlement date

Figure Q.3 shows the number of PPO claims where the claimant has died by:

- The number of years since settlement date that the claimant died.
- The number of years between accident date and settlement date.
- The number of years between the accident date and death.

(Note that this data includes one death prior to settlement.)
Q.2 Actual versus expected number of deaths

We have calculated the multiplicative adjustment to the ONS mortality rates (its most recent forecast projections, as described above), for individuals in the quantitative industry survey, which would be required to produce the number of deaths observed over the period.

We have assumed that the ratio of actual to expected death rates fits to a Poisson distribution, parameterised based on the actual exposed to risk (the “initial exposure”, as described above) and the mortality rates from the ONS tables. By using this method we have produced confidence levels around the median result.

The analysis is subject to a number of significant simplifications and assumptions, for example:

- We have assumed that the cohort is homogeneous in terms of life expectancy. We know that is very unlikely to be the case, as some claimants are likely to have a very different prognosis to others as a result of their particular injuries (without taking into account differences in lifestyles). For example, those with serious brain injury will be likely to have lower life expectancies, often significantly so, than those with moderate brain injury.

- We have assumed that it is appropriate to apply a single multiplier to the $q_x$ (the probability of an individual aged exactly $x$ years will die within the next year). In fact, we do not know the shape of the mortality curve for these impaired lives; indeed the shape may well be different for different injury types. One particular impact of this may be that it is not appropriate to apply the same multiplier as derived from observing the data at this relatively early stage of the experience to future mortality rates, the reason being that, for these kinds of injuries, mortality (relative to unimpaired mortality rates) is often higher in the early years after the accident.

In addition, the analysis was conducted on a small sample of claims over a short time period (2006 to 2016), and as such cannot be considered to be particularly credible. Therefore, there is some uncertainty surrounding the results – one additional or one fewer death would have a material impact on these figures. (Similar analyses that pension funds may conduct are likely to have significantly narrower confidence intervals as pension funds typically have much greater sample sizes.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of years</th>
<th>Years since settlement</th>
<th>Delay to settlement</th>
<th>Years since accident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure Q.3: Number of deaths for PPO claimants, by various measures of the number of years*
Figure Q.4 shows the output of the analysis. The median result suggests that:

- PPO claimants are likely to have a higher mortality rate than the general population as defined by the ONS mortality rates (its most recent forecast projections, as described above), at least initially.
- The mortality rate for male PPO claimants is 3.7 times that of the general population (compared with 3.6 times in last year’s industry survey).
- The mortality rate for female PPO claimants is 4.2 times that of the general population (compared with 3.2 times in last year’s industry survey).

The model has output confidence intervals around the median figures, although it should be noted that we would expect the actual confidence intervals to be even broader than those shown in Figure Q.4 due to elements of model error as described above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentiles</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>500%</td>
<td>626%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>419%</td>
<td>491%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>50th</strong></td>
<td><strong>371%</strong></td>
<td><strong>415%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>328%</td>
<td>351%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th</td>
<td>293%</td>
<td>301%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th</td>
<td>274%</td>
<td>275%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure Q.4: Median and percentile values for the required adjustment to ONS mortality rates which would be required to produce the number of PPO claimant deaths observed over the period**

Figure Q.5 shows the observed (i.e. actual) number of deaths by claimant age band (at settlement date) against those that would have been expected for the survey sample using unimpaired mortality rates based on the ONS mortality rates (its most recent forecast projections, as described above).

In total there have been 46 observed deaths since settlement, against an expected number of 11.5 deaths assuming unimpaired mortality, representing a multiplier of 4.0 (for male and female PPO claimants combined). This result is statistically significant.
Figure Q.5: Actual number of PPO claimant deaths, expected number of PPO claimant deaths assuming unimpaired mortality, and the multiplier (actual / expected), by age of claimant at settlement date

We encourage readers to place a limited degree of reliance on these estimates and to reference other indicators and data sources to support any assumptions they are using for their own purposes. To reiterate; we advise readers to treat these results with caution due to:

- The small sample size.
- The simplifying assumptions which have been made in the model (homogeneity of underlying mortality in the cohort and the appropriateness of a single multiplier).
- The mortality experience only being considered for those individuals who survive beyond the period it takes for their PPO claim to settle.

Q.3 Comparison of PPO claimant mortality rates assumed by insurers to those for unimpaired lives

By assuming that the shape of the mortality curve is the same for unimpaired and impaired lives, we have converted the impaired life expectancies provided by insurers in the survey to be expressed as a mortality multiplier relative to the ONS mortality rates (its most recent forecast projections, as described above). A value of 100% is representative of life expectancy (or mortality rate) equal to that for an unimpaired life (according to the ONS mortality rates).

These results consider the range of estimates for individual claimants and hence the range of percentiles is considerably wider than the previous analysis.

Figure Q.6 shows the output of the analysis. The median result suggests that:

- Insurers assume that PPO claimants are likely to have a higher mortality rate than the general population as defined by the ONS mortality rates (its most recent forecast projections, as described above).
- Insurers assume that the mortality rate for male PPO claimants is 3.7 times that of the general population (compared with 3.2 times in last year’s industry survey).
• Insurers assume that the mortality rate for female PPO claimants is 3.2 times that of the general population (compared with 3.0 times in last year’s industry survey).
• Insurers’ assumptions around increased mortality for PPO claimants are lower than the observed increased mortality for PPO claimants for the 50th percentile and higher percentiles, and higher than the observed increased mortality for lower percentiles, as summarised in Figure Q.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentiles</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>3291%</td>
<td>5664%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>688%</td>
<td>651%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th</td>
<td>367%</td>
<td>316%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>192%</td>
<td>160%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th</td>
<td>136%</td>
<td>130%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th</td>
<td>111%</td>
<td>114%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure Q.6: Median and percentile values for the required adjustment to ONS mortality rates which would be required to match insurers’ expectations of PPO claimant mortality

Figure Q.7 shows the distribution of these mortality multipliers. It should be noted that this distribution is highly skewed, with, for example, over 5% of male PPO claimants and almost 10% of female PPO claimants having assumed mortality rates of more than 22 times the unimpaired rate.

Figure Q.7: Distribution of insurers’ mortality multipliers (insurers’ expectations of PPO claimant mortality relative to unimpaired lives), by gender of claimant
Q.4  PPO claimant mortality multipliers and the equivalent reduction in life expectancy figures

Figure Q.8 tabulates how the above mortality multipliers translate to the percentage reduction in life expectancy measure for sample male and female lives aged 20, 40, and 60 years in 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multiplier</th>
<th>Male 20</th>
<th>Male 40</th>
<th>Male 60</th>
<th>Female 20</th>
<th>Female 40</th>
<th>Female 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure Q.8: Percentage reduction in life expectancy for sample lives implied by the PPO claimant mortality multipliers*

Q.5  PPO claimant life expectancy, experience analysis and assumed

The results from the mortality analysis can also be expressed in terms of future life expectancy (in years). This is summarised in Figure Q.9:

- The purple dots show the ONS unimpaired life expectancy for a 34 year old male (52.7 years) and a 34 year old female (56.0 years).
- The dark blue bars and stalks show the 5th to 25th (stalk), 25th to 50th (bar), 50th to 75th (bar) and 75th to 95th (stalk) percentiles of the experience analysis (i.e. based on the analysis of the number of deaths in the industry survey). This applies the mortality multipliers in Figure Q.4 to a 34 year old claimant.
- The light blue bars and stalks show the 5th to 25th (stalk), 25th to 50th (bar), 50th to 75th (bar) and 75th to 95th (stalk) percentiles of the insurer analysis (i.e. based on the insurer assumptions of life expectancy in the industry survey). This applies the mortality multipliers in Figure Q.6 to a 34 year old claimant.
Figure Q.9 shows the much larger ranges of values around the insurer assumptions of life expectancy in the market compared to the experience analysis. This is to be expected due to the lack of homogeneity in the underlying mortality of PPO claimants and also the inconsistent approaches taken to estimating the mortality on a case by case basis (in the case of the insurers) and by estimating the mortality on the entire cohort of PPO claims (experience analysis).

It is also worth reiterating that our analysis assumes it is appropriate to apply a single multiplier to the $q_x$s. However it is not unreasonable to presume that for brain and spinal injuries, mortality will be higher in the early years after the injury has occurred. Consequently, as the analysis in most cases only covers an early stage of development since the accidents occurred, these results may be overstated. However, there is an average delay before settlement for these claims of six years, which would mitigate this effect to some extent.

Q.6 Assumed PPO claimant life expectancy / reduction in life expectancy by insurer

Figure Q.10 shows the cumulative distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy assumed by each insurer. A couple of insurers have been excluded for data reasons, and the data is presented as a range across those insurers included in the analysis.

As elsewhere in this report, the percentage reduction in life expectancy is defined as:

$$\frac{\text{unimpaired life expectancy} - \text{life expectancy as provided by participants}}{\text{unimpaired life expectancy}}$$

where all life expectancies are quoted as at the date of settlement.
Figure Q.10: Cumulative distribution of the percentage reduction in life expectancy assumed by different insurers

It can be seen that there are significant differences in the life expectancy distributions from insurer to insurer. Some of the observed difference could be explained by differences in the nature of the claimants to each insurer because, as discussed above, individual claimants exhibit large differences in their impairment. Additionally, the relatively small sample size of PPO claims, and the accompanying volatility, could cause significant differences to be observed across insurers.
Appendix R  Reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

In this appendix, we provide the following summary statistics in relation to the size of reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims:

- Impact of real discount rate assumption on reserves for PPO claims and total cost of PPO claims
- Comparison of total cost of PPO claims to insurers’ Ogden-equivalent lump sum estimate
- Comparison of reserves for PPO claims to insurers’ estimates of reserves
- Lump sum element of PPO claims as a proportion of total cost of PPO claims
- Reserves for PPO claims by class of business
- Reserves for PPO claims by nature of injury
- Scatter plots of reserves for PPO claims against a number of factors.

In order to consider the size of reserves on a consistent basis, we have estimated the total cost and outstanding reserve for each of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims in the quantitative industry survey on a cashflow basis, using the same methodology and assumptions for all claims (including stochastic mortality). However, the parameters used (such as life expectancy from settlement) were taken from individual participating insurer estimates.

We have estimated the total cost and outstanding reserve for each of the Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims using discount rate assumptions ranging from -2% per annum to +2.5% per annum, discounting to 31 December 2016.

In deriving these estimates, we have made no allowance for some factors that will affect the size of a claim, such as variation orders and indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees. We have, however, allowed for factors such as stepped payments, where that information has been provided.

The estimates in this appendix are shown gross of reinsurance.

R.1 Impact of real discount rate assumption on reserves for PPO claims and total cost of PPO claims

Figure R.1 compares our estimate of outstanding reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims (i.e. PPO claims in payment), as at 31 December 2016, using discount rate assumptions ranging from -2% per annum to +2% per annum, to an estimate at the prevailing Ogden discount rate of +2.5% per annum.

Figure R.2 shows the same information for the total cost of PPO claims (from ground up), as at 31 December 2016.

Figure R.3 shows the same information for the total cost of PPO claims, as at the PPO settlement date.
Figure R.1: Reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at various real discount rates, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, expressed as a multiple of the reserve estimated at a +2.5% per annum real discount rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Discount Rate</th>
<th>Reserve Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2.00%</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.00%</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.75%</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure R.2: Total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at various real discount rates, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, expressed as a multiple of the total cost estimated at a +2.5% per annum real discount rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Discount Rate</th>
<th>Total Cost Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2.00%</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.00%</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.75%</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure R.3: Total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at settlement date, at various real discount rates, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, expressed as a multiple of the total cost estimated at a +2.5% per annum real discount rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Discount Rate</th>
<th>Total Cost Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2.00%</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.00%</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.75%</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R.2 Comparison of total cost of PPO claims to insurers’ Ogden-equivalent lump sum estimate

Figures R.4 to R.7 compare our estimate of the total cost of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims (i.e. PPO claims in payment) (from ground up) to the estimated cost if they were to settle as a lump sum (under a +2.5% per annum Ogden real discount rate). The Ogden-equivalent lump sum estimates were provided by the participating insurers.
• Figure R.4 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of +2% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016.
• Figure R.5 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of +2% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at settlement date.
• Figure R.6 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of 0% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016.
• Figure R.7 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of 0% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at settlement date.

![Figure R.4: Total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a +2% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, compared to the Ogden-equivalent lump sum value, estimated by participating insurers](image)

![Figure R.5: Total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at settlement date, at a +2% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, compared to the Ogden-equivalent lump sum value, estimated by participating insurers](image)
Figure R.6: Total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, compared to the Ogden-equivalent lump sum value, estimated by participating insurers.

Figure R.7: Total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at settlement date, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, compared to the Ogden-equivalent lump sum value, estimated by participating insurers.

R.3 Comparison of reserves for PPO claims to insurers’ estimates of reserves

Figures R.8 and R.9 compare our estimate of outstanding reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims (i.e. PPO claims in payment), as at 31 December 2016, to the reserve estimates provided by the participating insurers.

- Figure R.8 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of +2% per annum for valuing the PPO claims within our estimate.
Figure R.9 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of 0% per annum for valuing the PPO claims within our estimate.

Figure R.8: Reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a +2% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, compared to the reserve estimates of participating insurers

Figure R.9: Reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, compared to the reserve estimates of participating insurers
R.4 Lump sum element of PPO claims as a proportion of total cost of PPO claims

Figures R.10 to R.13 show the lump sum element of PPO claims as a proportion of our estimate of the total cost of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims (i.e. PPO claims in payment) (from ground up).

- Figure R.10 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of +2% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016.
- Figure R.11 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of +2% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at settlement date.
- Figure R.12 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of 0% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016.
- Figure R.13 shows this comparison at a real discount rate of 0% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at settlement date.

![Graph showing distribution of lump sum element of PPO claims](image)

*Figure R.10: Distribution of the (nominal) lump sum element of PPO claims as a proportion of the total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a +2% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party*
Figure R.1: Distribution of the (nominal) lump sum element of PPO claims as a proportion of the total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at settlement date, at a +2% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party

Figure R.12: Distribution of the (nominal) lump sum element of PPO claims as a proportion of the total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party
**R.5 Reserves for PPO claims by class of business**

Figure R.14 shows the distribution of our estimate of outstanding reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims (i.e. PPO claims in payment) at a real discount rate of 0% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, by class of business.

**Figure R.13: Distribution of the (nominal) lump sum element of PPO claims as a proportion of the total cost (from ground up) for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at settlement date, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party**

**Figure R.14: Distribution of the reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, by class of business**
R.6 Reserves for PPO claims by nature of injury

Figure R.15 shows the distribution of our estimate of outstanding reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims (i.e. PPO claims in payment) at a real discount rate of 0% per annum for valuing the PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, by the nature of injury.

Figure R.15: Distribution of the reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, by nature of injury

R.7 Scatter plots of reserves for PPO claims against a number of factors

Figure R.16: Scatter plot of reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, against the age of claimant at settlement date
Figure R.17: Scatter plot of reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, against the delay to settlement.

Figure R.18: Scatter plot of reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, against the life expectancy of the claimant at settlement date.
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Figure R.20: Scatter plot of reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, against the initial regular payment amount of the PPO claim.
Figure R.21: Scatter plot of reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at a 0% per annum real discount rate, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, against the initial regular payment amount of the PPO claim, by whether the PPO claim has stepped payments.
Appendix S  

Detail around the responses to the 2017 qualitative industry survey

In this appendix, we provide more detail around the responses to the 2017 qualitative industry survey.

14 insurers and 5 reinsurers were interviewed for the qualitative industry survey, the responses having been collected between December 2016 and March 2017 inclusive. The companies which have agreed to be acknowledged for their participation in this survey are listed in the Introduction to this report, although please note that the list does not include all participants.

It is worth noting that, very occasionally, some of the survey questions were unanswered by some participants. This was occasionally through choice, but more commonly as the interviewee did not know the answer or could not readily obtain the information.

S.1  Level of concern about PPO claims

We asked how concerned companies and their Boards were about PPO claims on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the most concerned.

Figure S.1 shows the responses for participating insurers last year (as at winter 2015-2016) and this year (as at winter 2016-2017), with the size of the bubble (the area) representing the number of insurers that gave a particular response. Figure S.2 shows the same metric but for the Boards of participating insurers. The average level of concern for both insurers and their Boards was 3.2.

![Figure S.1: Level of concern about PPO claims for participating insurers, as at winter 2015-2016 (last year) and as at winter 2016-2017 (this year) (scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being most concerned)](image-url)
The level of concern for participating reinsurers had not changed between last year and this year, and there was only one change in the scoring for a reinsurer’s Board (less concerned by one point). The average level of concern for both reinsurers and their Boards was 3.8.

For the majority of participating insurers and reinsurers (16 out of 19), the level of concern about PPO claims had not changed across the year. Reasons given for this included PPO propensity and severity being in line with expectations, improved reserving methodologies, and a better understanding of the risks and nature of liabilities; offset by the then forthcoming announcement on the Ogden discount rate and Brexit, both of which added uncertainty.

A small number of participating insurers and reinsurers (2 out of 19) reported an increase in the level of concern about PPO claims. Reasons given for this included uncertain investment and inflation assumptions and the difficulty in finding matching assets.

The remaining participant (1 out of 19) reported a decrease in the level of concern about PPO claims, the reason given being a PPO propensity lower than expectations.

The majority of participating insurers and reinsurers (13 out of 19) reported their Boards having the same level concern this year as last year. The reasons given included fewer claimants demanding PPOs and claimant lawyers pushing less hard for PPOs, offset by uncertainties around matching the liabilities.

A small number of participating insurers and reinsurers (4 out of 19) reported their Boards having an increased level of concern compared with last year. The reasons given included the Board now understanding the risk posed by PPOs, the sensitivity of the SCR / risk margin to volatility in the economic market, and the focus on the capital position under Solvency II.

The remaining participating insurers and reinsurers (2 out of 19) reported their Boards having a decreased level of concern compared with last year, attributing this to the then forthcoming Ogden
discount rate reduction (and potential resulting drop in the PPO propensity) and an improved mix of business.

S.2 Reserving for PPO claims

We asked a number of questions about the reserving of settled PPO claims and future PPO claims, and the economic assumptions used to value PPO claims. We also asked about the treatment of variation orders and indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees, bad debt provisions and the discount rate used for non-PPO reserves.

Reserving for settled PPO claims

Figure S.3 shows the reserving approach to mortality used by participating insurers for settled PPO claims: 11 out of 14 insurers used a probabilistic approach and 3 used an annuity certain method.

Figure S.3: Reserving approach for settled PPO claims for participating insurers, as at winter 2016-2017
Figure S.4 shows the reserving approach to mortality used by participating reinsurers for settled PPO claims: 4 out of 5 reinsurers used a probabilistic approach and 1 used an annuity certain method.

The majority of those asked based their life expectancy on an expert medical opinion but not all allowed for mortality improvements.

In terms of the life expectancy assumption, the majority used medical expert opinions, but there were mixed responses on whether this allowed for any longevity improvements over the claimants’ lifetime.

All those insurers and reinsurers taking a probabilistic reserving approach used either the Ogden tables (seventh edition) or a more recently updated publication of the ONS table series which underlies the Ogden tables (seventh edition).

In order to scale these standard life tables to correspond to claimants’ impaired life expectancy, seven insurers and one reinsurer used an aging adjustment (where they considered the claimant had the mortality experience of someone “y”-years older than them) and four insurers and three reinsurers used a multiplicative adjustment (where they assumed that the claimant had a mortality experience “z” times more than the life tables suggest). Figure S.5 summarises these responses.

Figure S.4: Reserving approach for settled PPO claims for participating reinsurers, as at winter 2016-2017
Identification of future PPO claims (currently large open claims and pure IBNR)

All 14 participating insurers and all but one participating reinsurer said that they monitored open large claims and assessed the possibility of them settling as a PPO rather than a traditional large claim settlement. In the majority of cases this was done by the claims team. In one case, the insurer considered the likely number of IBNR PPO claims in aggregate (by considering propensity by size band benchmarks) alongside views on individual large claims.

The majority of the participating insurers monitored the accuracy of past predictions, however only one participating reinsurer did. There were mixed experiences in terms of whether predictions had been too light or too prudent, although on the whole past predictions appear to have been fairly accurate.

In terms of identifying potential PPO claims, not all participants monitored all claims: some participants only looked at a certain number by injury outstanding estimate; others only looked at open claims above £1 million; and others did analyse every claim separately. The most common approach was to split claims into bands by large claim threshold and to assign probabilities of settling as a PPO to each of these bands. Some insurers used a formal scoring matrix or mechanism to systematically determine the probability of a claim settling as a PPO based on a number of its features, whereas others used subjective views based on the claim characteristics. Frequent indicators used included injury type (particularly mental capacity), age, annual care cost and the share of contributory negligence, as well as information on how the settlement process was progressing.

Four of the five participating reinsurers monitored open large claims, either by liaising with the cedant insurer regularly or through the claims team.
Reserving for future PPO claims (currently large open claims)

Figure S.6 shows the reserving approach used by participating insurers for future PPO claims in relation to claims that have already been identified as large claims: although a variety of approaches are used, these have reduced in number compared with last year.

Eleven insurers used a probability weighting of the claims identified as having potential to settle as a PPO. All except one of these used a method that probability-weighted the potential PPO costs derived from a cashflow projection of each identified large claim. The other applied a 30% uplift to general damages to determine the likely cost of the potential PPO.

One insurer made an assumption about which potentials would settle as a PPO and valued these as if they had 100% probability of settling as a PPO. This insurer assumed all identified potentials would settle as a PPO, with the prudent margin accounting for the pure IBNR element of the PPO reserves.

Two insurers used a frequency-severity method, in which the numbers of PPO claims were projected by size band.

Reserving for future PPO claims (pure IBNR)

Most of the participating insurers reserved for future pure IBNR PPO claims within the reserving approaches discussed above and shown in Figure S.6.

For the remaining participating insurers, Figure S.7 shows the reserving approach used for future pure IBNR PPO claims: the majority of those insurers considering pure IBNR added a proportional loading to the PPO reserves.

Figure S.6: Reserving approach for future PPO claims on existing large claims for participating insurers, as at winter 2015-2016 (2015) and as at winter 2016-2017 (2016)
All five participating reinsurers established their own reserves for future PPO claims, using frequency-severity methods or frequency-severity uplift methods.

**Discounting future PPO claims – to which date**

Figure S.8 shows the date to which participating insurers discount future PPO claims: nearly two-thirds of participating insurers (9) discount future PPO claims to valuation date with the remainder of respondents (5) discounting to future expected settlement date.
Discounting PPO claims – real discount rate and underlying economic assumptions for reporting under current UK GAAP / IFRS

In valuing PPO claims for reserving purposes, all participating insurers discounted their PPO cashflows. However, the real discount rate (considering both the inflation of payments and discounting in respect of investment returns) has continued to vary significantly by insurer. This is not unexpected, as the real discount rate is a function of two components, both of which will vary by insurer: there are likely to be differences in proportions of PPO claims linked to various indices and differences in investment strategies.

Figure S.9 shows the real discount rates used by participating insurers rounded to the nearest 0.5%, both this year (winter 2016-2017, displayed as 2016) and last year (winter 2015-2016, displayed as 2015). For those using a fixed real discount rate, the most commonly used real discount rate was 0% per annum, with two insurers using a slightly positive real discount rate, and three insurers using a slightly negative real discount rate. The range of real discount rates used was between -1.5% per annum and +1% per annum. While the range of real discount rates used by insurers has remained constant since our previous survey, the distribution of the real discount rates used has shifted slightly to more negative discount rates.

For participating reinsurers, the range of real discount rates used was between -1% per annum and 0% per annum, with two participating reinsurers not discounting at all due to US GAAP reporting requirements.

Most participating insurers stated that they set their ASHE inflation assumption and investment return assumption explicitly, but then check that the implied resulting real discount rate was appropriate.

Figure S.10 shows the ASHE (or payment) inflation rate assumption underlying the real discount rates used by participating insurers, both this year (winter 2016-2017, displayed as 2016) and last
year (winter 2015-2016, displayed as 2015). For those using a fixed assumption, the range of ASHE inflation rates used was between +3% per annum and +4.5% per annum, with the distribution shifting upwards compared with last year. In setting this assumption, most participating insurers relied on published research and past ASHE data.

![Figure S.10: ASHE inflation rate used by participating insurers to value PPO claims under current UK GAAP / IFRS, as at winter 2015-2016 and as at winter 2016-2017](image)

Figure S.10 shows the investment return assumption underlying the real discount rates used by participating insurers, both this year (winter 2016-2017, displayed as 2016) and last year (winter 2015-2016, displayed as 2015). For those using a fixed assumption, the range of investment returns used was between +2.0% per annum and +5.0% per annum, with the distribution perhaps shifting downwards compared with last year. In setting this assumption, participating insurers made reference to a rate in line with the yields on actual assets held, expected long term returns, group policies, a risk-free rate, and gilts, although many insurers relied on the assumption that expected investment returns will equal ASHE (or payment) inflation in the long term.
Figure S.1: Investment return used by participating insurers to value PPO claims under current UK GAAP / IFRS, as at winter 2015-2016 and as at winter 2016-2017

Discounting PPO claims – reporting under current Solvency II

Under Solvency II, as the investment return assumption is prescribed by EIOPA, it is the choice of the ASHE (or payment) inflation rate that will determine the real discount rate used.

Figure S.12 shows the ASHE (or payment) inflation rate assumption underlying the real discount rates used by participating insurers under Solvency II, both this year (winter 2016-2017, displayed as 2016) and last year (winter 2015-2016, displayed as 2015).

Figure S.12: ASHE inflation rate used by participating insurers to value PPO claims under Solvency II, as at winter 2015-2016 and as at winter 2016-2017

The majority of participating insurers maintained the ASHE inflation rate used under current UK GAAP / IFRS, with two insurers maintaining a 0% per annum real discount rate by setting the ASHE
assumption to equal the EIOPA investment return assumption. Of the other approaches used by participating insurers, responses included using RPI and using market-implied risk free yields.

None of the participating insurers had any transitional arrangements in place.

Most of the participating insurers that responded had considered using a matching adjustment or volatility adjustor, although only four of them had actually implemented a volatility adjustor.

None of the participating reinsurers used a matching adjustment or volatility adjustor.

**Variation orders, indemnity guarantees and reverse indemnity guarantees**

Half of participating insurers did not consider making an allowance within their reserves for the impact of variation orders or indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees coming into force, and instead valued PPO claims based on the current payment schedule alone.

Of the other half, only two participating insurers allowed for variation orders or indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees coming into force after considering them.

Two reinsurers considered variation orders, but not indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees.

This finding is unsurprising, given that very few variation orders or indemnity / reverse indemnity guarantees have been triggered to date.

**Bad debt**

Most participating insurers and reinsurers did not include a bad debt provision for PPO claims under current UK GAAP / IFRS (only 5 out of 14 participating insurers and one out of five participating reinsurers did include a provision), with all participating insurers including a bad debt provision under Solvency II.

**Reserve uncertainty**

The majority of participating insurers (12 out of 14) and all participating reinsurers estimate reserve uncertainty for PPOs either stochastically or though scenario testing.

For those participants able to provide an estimate, the coefficient of variation on a gross of reinsurance basis ranged from 20% to 156%, depending on whether it was settled PPOs, potential PPOs or pure IBNR PPOs being considered. When considering just settled PPOs, the majority of the gross of reinsurance coefficients of variation provided were between 20% and 30%.
PPO risk margin

For those participating insurers that calculated (or could estimate) a PPO risk margin, the distribution of the (approximate) risk margin as a proportion of best estimate is shown in Figure S.13, with responses ranging between 15% and 85%.

![Figure S.13: Approximate risk margin as a proportion of best estimate for PPO claims as estimated by participating insurers, as at winter 2016-2017](image)

S.3 Treatment of PPO claims within capital modelling

We asked how companies treat PPO claims in the SCR, and about any observed differences between the Pillar I and Pillar III capital requirements for PPO claims.

Treatment of PPO claims in the SCR

Figure S.14 shows the approaches used by participating insurers and reinsurers to allow for PPO claims in the SCR calculation, both this year (winter 2016-2017, displayed as 2016) and last year (winter 2015-2016, displayed as 2015): the majority of participating insurers and reinsurers used an internal model or partial internal model to allow for PPO claims in the SCR calculation (around three-quarters of participating insurers and four out of five participating reinsurers).
Figure S.14: Approaches used by participating insurers and reinsurers to allow for PPO claims in the SCR calculation, as at winter 2015-2016 and as at winter 2016-2017

Stochastic model for PPO claims

Of those participating insurers using an internal model or partial internal model, half had an explicit stochastic PPO model, although how these models calculated the capital uplift required for PPO claims and fed into the overall models varied greatly – the PPO models generally allowed for uncertainty in mortality, life expectancy, nominal discount rate, the number of large claims, reinsurance recoveries, payment escalation and PPO propensity. Of those participating insurers that did not have a separate PPO model, PPO claims were allowed for implicitly, for example within Motor third party liability underwriting and reserve risks.

Of those participating reinsurers using an internal model or partial internal model, again half had an explicit stochastic PPO model.
Differences between Pillar I and Pillar III

In terms of the allowance for PPO claims under Pillar I (which considers the 1/200 level over a one year time horizon) and for the ORSA under Pillar III (which considers the volatility of the run off to ultimate), almost all participating insurers and reinsurers for which this work has been finalised for PPO claims noted a lower capital requirement for Pillar I vs Pillar III: five said that the one year measure of risk was between 25% and 40% of the ultimate measure of risk; one said the one year measure was only 15% of the ultimate measure; and one said there was no difference.

Three participating insurers said that they had different bases for evaluating economic and regulatory capital: of these, two used the standard formula for PPOs in evaluating their SCR but used an internal model for PPOs in evaluating their economic capital.

S.4 Treatment of PPO claims within pricing

We asked how companies allowed for PPO claims in the pricing of contracts, and whether the impact of the cost of capital was taken into account when pricing.

While all participating insurers allow for the cost of PPO claims within their pricing, only 3 of the 14 participating insurers apply an explicit load or margin to their prices to cover the cost of PPO claims. The remaining 11 participating insurers allow for PPO claims within a large loss component, and therefore PPO claims are included in their prices implicitly. For those with an explicit allowance, the methodologies utilised include:

- A frequency / severity method to produce a projected pay-out and reported loss pattern.
- The output from a large loss stochastic model.
- Capitalised within exposure pricing.

Six of the participating insurers explicitly allow for the cost of capital for PPO claims when pricing, with eight saying it was an implicit assumption. None of the participating insurers make no allowance for the cost of capital for PPO claims when pricing.

For the participating reinsurers, three out of the five reinsurers explicitly allow for PPO claims in the pricing of their contracts. One reinsurer noted that the cost of capital for PPO claims was the main reason for why their company ceased writing Motor XoL business.

S.5 The impact of PPO claims on reinsurance purchase and availability

We asked a number of questions about the reinsurance programmes purchased by participating insurers and offered by participating reinsurers, specifically in the context of PPO-related issues.
Reinsurance in the market

Figure S.15 shows the starting retention on the excess of loss reinsurance programmes purchased by participating insurers for Motor business: the retained risk ranges from £1 million to over £10 million. Only two participating insurers had explicitly changed their reinsurance programme as a result of PPO claims, with one commenting that they had reduced their starting retention over the last two years to actively reduce their exposure to PPOs.

Allowing for the cost of capital

Most participating insurers (12 out of 14) considered the impact of the cost of capital due to PPO claims when purchasing reinsurance, albeit less than half of these did so explicitly for PPO claims.

Reinsurance availability and capitalisation clauses

Of the five participating reinsurers:

- The reinsurance offerings for four reinsurers had changed as a result of PPO claims: one ceased writing Motor XoL business due to the cost of capital; one ceased writing uncapped UK and Ireland Motor XoL business; one reduced their Motor XoL participation significantly.
- One reinsurer insisted on capitalisation clauses while three used them on a case-by-case basis.
- One reinsurer said that the majority of its PPO business was written through capitalisation clauses while another said very little was.
- All reinsurers insisted upon an indexation clause in their reinsurance contracts.

The reasons given by the participating reinsurers for offering / requiring capitalisation clauses included:

- Internal requirements resulting in having to account for PPO claims on an undiscounted basis, thereby impacting the profit and loss account.
- The effect of the uncertainty of ASHE and longevity on the profitability of the treaty, the cost of a capitalised cover being less than the cost of a traditional XoL cover.
- To offer cedants another option.
To date, two of the participating reinsurers have reached the point of capitalisation on one (or more) of their PPO claims.

From the perspective of the participating insurers, only 4 out of 14 insurers had a capitalisation clause on their reinsurance contracts. Where capitalisation clauses were present, these were only on a proportion of the portfolio, and in some instances the presence of these clauses varied by layer. Of those participating insurers without a capitalisation clause, the clear majority stated that they were keen to avoid them.

S.6 Alternative risk transfer for PPO claims

We asked whether companies would consider transferring the risk associated with PPO claims, and the hurdles they may have encountered.

Of the participating insurers, all but one respondent would consider transferring the risk associated with PPO claims if the right option arose. The most significant hurdles in constructing a transaction were a prohibitively high price of such risk transfer solutions, and the lack of a solution that matched to ASHE inflation. While some participating insurers have been approached by a common third party regarding a potential offering, the general perception was that the risk transfer market was not growing, although some felt that it has the potential to grow.

S.7 Investment strategy in relation to PPO exposures

We asked companies whether their investment strategies had changed as a result of PPO claims, whether they have any assets ring-fenced for PPO claims, and what their biggest investment issues related to PPO claims were.

Figure S.16 shows the proportion of participating insurers for which the investment strategy had changed as a result of PPO claims: 10 of the 14 participating insurers had changed their investment strategy as a result of PPO claims, with two of these changes coming in the last year. Two participating insurers review their asset / liability matching position regularly, adapting for PPO claims implicitly but without explicitly changing investment strategy as such. One participating reinsurer had changed its investment strategy.
Figure S.16: Whether the investment strategy had changed as a result of PPO claims for participating insurers, as at winter 2016-2017

Only two participating insurers held ring-fenced assets specifically for PPO liabilities, although a number of other insurers held long duration assets to cover all longer-term liabilities. One participating reinsurer held assets specifically to match PPO liabilities.

Among the investment issues highlighted by participating insurers and reinsurers were finding assets to match the long durations associated with PPO claims and finding assets that track a similar index to ASHE.
Appendix T  Detail around the early indications of the impact of the change in the Ogden discount rate

The IFoA PPO Working Party supplemented the 2017 qualitative industry survey with further rounds of questions (firstly in spring 2017, and then again in August 2017) specifically in relation to the change in the Ogden discount rate to -0.75% per annum.

In spring 2017, many participants felt that they had had insufficient experience to draw any firm conclusions. We therefore asked a similar set of questions in August 2017.

In this appendix, we provide more detail around the responses to these further questions.

T.1  Discounting non-PPO claims – discount rate assumed within the Actuarial Best Estimate

In August 2017, all but two of the participating insurers (out of the 15 that responded) valued non-PPO claims within the Actuarial Best Estimate reserves on an Ogden -0.75% per annum basis (i.e. the prevailing discount rate).

Of the two participating insurers that valued non-PPO claims within the Actuarial Best Estimate reserves on a different basis, one did so at 0% per annum and the other at +0.25% per annum.

![Figure T.1: Discount rate assumed within the Actuarial Best Estimate for non-PPO claims by participating insurers, as at August 2017](image)
T.2 PPO propensity – reduction assumed within the Actuarial Best Estimate and scenario tests

Participating insurers were asked what percentage change in PPO propensity they had assumed as part of their Actuarial Best Estimate calculations. 14 participants responded to this question, with a wide range of responses from no reduction to a 90% reduction. The results are shown in Figure T.2.

![Figure T.2: Reduction in PPO propensity assumed within the Actuarial Best Estimate by participating insurers, as at August 2017](image)

Participating insurers were asked what their previous assumed reductions in PPO propensity would have been, from scenario analyses, had the Ogden discount rate fallen to 0% per annum, -0.75% per annum or -1.5% per annum. Generally, the lower the discount rate, the larger the percentage decrease in PPO propensity participating insurers expected. However, some participating insurers expected the same reduction in propensity in all three scenarios and others expected no change at all. 10 participants responded to this question, the results of which are shown in Figure T.3.

![Figure T.3: Reduction in PPO propensity assumed for different discount rate scenarios by participating insurers, as at August 2017](image)
T.3 Reserve margins for further reductions in the Ogden discount rate

In terms of additional reserve margins for further reductions in the Ogden discount rate, this was often as part of a general margin. In some cases, this was at a level being sufficient to cover a reduction to -2.0% per annum.

T.4 Claims experience

Participating insurers were asked if they had seen any changes in the speed of settlement of claims or in claimant / lawyer behaviour.

As at August 2017, some respondents said that it was too early to comment; some noted that very few (or no) claim settlements had occurred since the “announcement of an announcement” in December 2016; others noted a general slowing down of settlements, and that claimant lawyers had actively sought to slow down lump sum settlements until after the discount rate announcement.

Some respondents noted that they had succeeded in settling large claims at rates higher than -0.75% per annum since the Ogden discount rate change (i.e. at 0% per annum to +2.5% per annum).

T.5 PPO propensity – quantitative assessment

In August 2017, we received quantitative feedback regarding the number of non-PPO and PPO large claims for 2017 to date, pre- and post-the effective date of 20 March 2017 for the reduction of the Ogden discount rate to -0.75% per annum in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This quantitative feedback was provided by 7 participating insurers.

Within the data provided, no large claims settled as PPO claims between 1 January 2017 and 19 March 2017, whereas the equivalent period for 2016 saw around 20% of the year’s PPOs settle.

Within the data provided, in the period between 20 March 2017 and 31 August 2017, the PPO propensity was 12%. This represents a drop in PPO propensity of around 50% from 2016 whole year levels.

The PPO propensity for 2017 from 1 January 2017 to 31 August 2017 was 8%. This represents a drop in PPO propensity of 60-70% from 2016 whole year levels.
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Highlights of the 2017 quantitative industry survey

Figure 1: Summary statistics for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims

Figure 2: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims and Motor (non-MIB) non-PPO large claims underlying the PPO propensity statistics, by settlement year

Figure 3: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity and standardised Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by settlement year

Figure 4: Distribution of Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity for insurers that have settled at least 25 large claims (including PPO claims) in the last five years, separately for claims settled between 2009 and 2014 and claims settled in 2015

Figure 5: Number of Liability PPO claims and Liability non-PPO large claims underlying the PPO propensity statistics, by settlement year

Figure 6: Liability PPO propensity and standardised Liability PPO propensity, by settlement year

Figure 7: Distribution of Liability PPO propensity for insurers that have settled at least 25 large claims (including PPO claims) in the last five years, separately for claims settled between 2009 and 2014 and claims settled in 2015

Figure 8: Number of Motor (MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year

Figure 9: Proportion of PPO claims, by settlement year – MIB and the rest of the industry

Figure 10: Motor (non-MIB) PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009

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Figure 12: Liability PPO propensity, by incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), for claims settled since 2009

Figure 13: Liability PPO propensity, by grouped (£1m-£3m, £3m+) incremental large claim threshold band (2011 terms), and by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009

Figure 14: Number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of driver at accident date and by gender of driver

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Figure 17: Distribution of the delay to settlement for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by settlement year, for claims settled since 2009.

Figure 18: Distribution of the life expectancy of claimant at settlement date, for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, for claims settled since 2009.

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Figure 20: Triangle showing the accident year cumulative development of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims.

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Figure 27: Detailed split of the number of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by IFoA PPO Working Party injury type categorisation.

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Figure 29: Proportion of Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, by age of claimant at accident date and by nature of injury.

Figure 30: Number of years of exposure for PPO claims and number of deaths, for male PPO claimants, by age of claimant at settlement date.

Figure 31: Number of years of exposure for PPO claims and number of deaths, for female PPO claimants, by age of claimant at settlement date.

Figure 32: Actual number of PPO claimant deaths, expected number of PPO claimant deaths assuming unimpaired mortality, and the multiplier (actual / expected), by age of claimant at settlement date.
Figure 3: Reserves for Motor (non-MIB) PPO claims, as at 31 December 2016, at various real discount rates, estimated by the IFoA PPO Working Party, expressed as a multiple of the reserve estimated at a +2.5% per annum real discount rate

**Ogden discount rate**

Figure 34: Historical real yield on index-linked gilts (all stocks and those with a term to maturity of over 15 years)

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### Appendix S

**Detail around the responses to the 2016 qualitative industry survey**

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