

## **Agenda**

- Types of swaptions
- Case studies
- Market participants
- Practical considerations
- Volatility smiles
- Real world and market implied probabilities
- Future development of market
- Questions

# Types of swaption

- Fisher equation tells us the theoretical relationship that connects the rate, inflation and real rate markets
- (1+nominal rate)=(1+ inflation rate) x (1+real rate)
- Nominal rate ~ inflation rate + real rate

|                      | Underlying   | Payoff  |
|----------------------|--|---|
| Interest rate option | Interest rate swap   | Payer: max[ 0, PV (floating LIBOR leg) – PV( fixed leg at strike K)]  |
| (Swaption)           | Zero coupon or Par   | Receiver: max[ 0, PV (fixed leg at strike K) – PV( floating LIBOR leg)]   |
| Inflation option     | (RPI) Inflation swap   | Payer: max[ 0, PV (RPI <sub>n+t</sub> / RPI <sub>t</sub> ) – PV( fixed leg at strike K)]  |
|                      | Spot or forward starting inflation base  | Receiver: max[ 0, PV (fixed leg at strike K) – PV (RPI <sub>n+t</sub> / RPI <sub>t</sub> )]   |
| Real rate option     | Real rate swap   | Payer: max[ 0, PV (floating LIBOR leg) – PV ((1+K)^n x RPI <sub>n+t</sub> / RPIt <sub>t</sub> )]  |
|                      | Spot or forward starting inflation base  | Receiver: max[ 0, PV ((1+K)^n x RPI <sub>n+t</sub> / RPI <sub>t</sub> ) – PV (floating LIBOR leg)]  |
|                      | Underlying can be a zero coupon swap or a linker style profile i.e. with coupons | Spot inflation base (2-month lagged from trade date of swaption) is a bullish view on inflation during the expiry period if you are long the receiver and a bearish view if you are short the payer |
|                      | ,  | Forward inflation base (2-month lagged from the expiry date) is effectively a bearish view on inflation if you are long the receiver and a bullish view if you are short the payer                  |

## Typical strategies using swaptions

- An end-user with fixed and real (RPI-linked) risk exposures (liabilities, debt, market-making) will typically consider the following option strategies
- Terminology tip: payer and receiver refers to the position of the option buyer with respect to the fixed or real leg.
  - the buyer of a payer (interest rate) swaption has an option to pay a fixed rate (the strike) and receive a floating rate LIBOR
  - the buyer of an inflation receiver has an option to receive a fixed rate and pay RPI
  - the buyer of a real rate receiver has an option to receive the real rate (the strike) and pay a floating rate LIBOR

|                   | Option strategy                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|-------------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Monetise triggers | Sell interest rate or real rate payer   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                   | Sell inflation receiver                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tail-risk hedging | Buy interest rate or real rate receiver |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                   | Buy inflation payer                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Risk management   | Buy and sell payers and receivers       |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |

# Monetising inflation-hedging triggers

| Who was the end-user? | UK pension scheme  |  |  |  |  |  |
|-----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|                       | Client wished to monetise a trigger to hedge (RPI) inflation at 3.2% by selling away the opportunity to benefit from a fall in RPI inflation below 3.2%. |  |  |  |  |  |
| How did they do it?   | Sold an (RPI) inflation receiver swaption.   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                       | - Underlying was a zero coupon (RPI) inflation swap  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                       | - Strike rate was ATMF-30bps (Forward starting RPI base)   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                       | - 2y5y/10y/30y/50y   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                       | - large (underlying swap PV01)   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                       | - Swap settled, collateralised with third party valuations   |  |  |  |  |  |
| What was the outcome? | Unexpired  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                       |  |  |  |  |  |  |


# Protecting against a fall in real rates

| Who was the end-user?  | Buy-out insurance company  | Pension scheme (British Nuclear Fuels - BNF)   |  |  |  |  |
|------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Why did they transact? | Insurer wished to protect itself from a fall in real yields of more than 25bps relative to those assumed in the buy-out price. | Corporate was concerned about an increase in the accounting deficit as a result of falling real yields. An imminent change in sponsorship meant that BNF would not, however, benefit from a rise in real yields. |  |  |  |  |
| How did they do it?    | Bought a real rate receiver swaption   | Bought a real rate receiver swaption, financed by the sale of a real rate payer swaption such that structure was zero premium.   |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - Underlying was a zero coupon real rate swap  | - Underlying was a zero-coupon real rate swap  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - Strike rate was ATMF-25bps   | <ul><li>Strike rates on the swaptions were symmetrically<br/>17bps wide of the ATMF</li><li>1y20y</li></ul>  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - 3m20y  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - 50k (underlying swap PV01)   | <ul><li>- 400k (underlying swap PV01)</li><li>- Cash settled and uncollateralised</li></ul>  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - American exercise  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - Swap settled and collateralised  |  |  |  |  |  |
| What was the outcome?  | Real rates fell slightly → structure finished inthe money  | Real rates rose slightly → structure finished out-of-the-<br>money   |  |  |  |  |
|                        | Client satisfied that structure delivered what was "on the tin"  | Client satisfied that structure delivered what was "on the tin"  |  |  |  |  |

# Protecting against a rise in real rates

| Who was the end-user?  | Corporate with inflation-linked revenue stream  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Why did they transact? | Planned index-linked bond issuance and so concerned about a rise in real yields which would increase their cost of financing.   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | Uniquely, the bond issuance was contingent on a non-market event (e.g. competition authority ruling) and so their hedge was contingent – i.e. no premium would be paid by the client or trade entered into with the bank if the contingent event failed to materialise. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| How did they do it?    | Contingent real rate swap. End user would not necessarily recognise the contingent swap as a swaption but this is how the contingent trade is risk managed.   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - underlying was a (linker-style) real rate swap  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - Strike rate was ATMF+20bps  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - 3m25y   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - large (underlying swap PV01)  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                        | - Uncollateralised. Swap settled if contingent event took place   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| What was the outcome?  | Contingent event took place and swap was entered into. Swaption expired and the bank's potential loss should trade not take effect was limited.   |  |  |  |  |  |  |

### Other market participants – hedge funds



### Why?

Motivated by i) alpha and ii) tail risk hedging against extreme macro events


#### How?

- Shorter expiries for liquidity but will play in longer-tails so are a liquidity provider for the types of trades pension funds and insurers are considering
- RV trades on volatility surface
- Increasingly trading rates and inflation markets via options

### Outcome?

 Short-term distortions in rates and inflation vol and skew creates opportunities for pension funds and insurers

### Other market participants – banks and dealers



### Why?

 i) non-interest rate trading desks (eg CVA, inflation, vol desks) are hedging (mainly) for risk management and ii) dealers are market-making for profit

### How?


- CVA desks buy rates receivers and inflation payers
- Inflation trader hedges an inflation swap's cross gamma risk to real interest rates using conditional real rate instruments
- Strip options from sterling corporate linkers e.g. puttable and callable bonds


### Outcome?


Creates supply/axes for pension fund and insurer's transactions


### **Practical considerations**


| Designing a programme   | <ul> <li>Extend the toolkit and measure fund manager against a liability benchmark. Fund manager<br/>should have a clear view on the discretion they would like but should be expected to commit to a<br/>benchmark.</li> </ul> |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|-------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|                         | <ul> <li>Additional risk of conditional hedging can be controlled and allowed for when setting a tracking<br/>error for the manager's portfolio</li> </ul>  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | - Manager should then be expected to assess and make the following decisions:   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | -Type of swaption to use (rates, inflation, real)   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | -Choice of expiry / tail  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | -Proportion of liabilities to be covered by swaptions vs. swaps/linear instruments  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Execution               | Sterling vol market can lurch between being "bid" and "offered".  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | Price discovery   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | Discretion  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | Don't comp large trades   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | Large programmes may mean splitting the delta and the vega trading and running the "gap" risk   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ongoing risk management | Bilateral collateralisation – no central clearing   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | Independent valuations  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |












## Volatility smiles: vanilla rates swaptions

Vanilla rates swaption is the option to pay fixed ("payer") or receive fixed ("receiver") in a standard (par) interest rate swap

### What volatility?

| "% Yield vol" $\sigma_Y$ if swap rate ~ lognormal                    | e.g. 30%     |
|--|--------------|
| "normalised vol" = swap rate * $\sigma_Y$                            | e.g. 0.75%   |
| "normal vol" $\sigma_{\!\scriptscriptstyle N}$ if swap rate ~ normal | e.g. 0.75%   |
| "bp/day vol" = 10000 * bp normal vol / $\sqrt{250}$                  | e.g. 4.7/day |


### Volatility smiles: vanilla rates swaptions



# Volatility smiles must avoid arbitrage e.g. SABR model negative probabilities

SABR model implied density for F=3.63%,  $\alpha$ =1.25%,  $\beta$ =50%,  $\rho$ =15%,  $\nu$ =22%

### SABR implied density for 30y 6-month LIBOR rate



# Volatility smiles: vanilla rates swaptions

Payoff of an interest rates payer swaption at expiry

So swaption price =

$$E_{Q}[\max[0, (fwd market rate - K)]] * dv01$$

 $BlackScholes(\sigma_{Y}(K))$  if  $market\ rate$  follows geometric BM; or  $normal\ option\ formula(\sigma_{N}(K))$  if  $market\ rate$  follows BM

## **Black Scholes pricing formulae**

### Black Scholes (1976) option pricing formula:

The value of a call option for a non-dividend paying underlying stock in terms of the Black-Scholes parameters is:

$$C(S,t) = N(d_1) S - N(d_2) K e^{-r(T-t)}$$

$$d_1 = \frac{\ln(\frac{S}{K}) + (r + \frac{\sigma^2}{2})(T-t)}{\sigma\sqrt{T-t}}$$

$$d_2 = \frac{\ln(\frac{S}{K}) + (r - \frac{\sigma^2}{2})(T-t)}{\sigma\sqrt{T-t}} = d_1 - \sigma\sqrt{T-t}.$$

The price of a corresponding put option based on put-call parity is:

$$P(S,t) = Ke^{-r(T-t)} - S + C(S,t)$$
  
=  $N(-d_2) Ke^{-r(T-t)} - N(-d_1) S$ .

Normal option pricing formula based on Black Scholes assumptions but Brownian motion not geometric Brownian motion, e.g. Bachelier (1900), Iwasawa (2001)

$$C = e^{-r(T-t)}[(F-K)N(d_1) + \frac{\sigma\sqrt{T-t}}{\sqrt{2\pi}}e^{-d_1^2/2}]$$

$$P = e^{-r(T-t)}[(K-F)N(-d_1) + \frac{\sigma\sqrt{T-t}}{\sqrt{2\pi}}e^{-d_1^2/2}]$$

### Volatility Smiles: zero coupon rates swaptions

Zero coupon rates swaption is the option to pay compounded fixed ("payer") or receive fixed ("receiver") against a compounded LIBOR floating leg, i.e. enter a zc interest rate swap

Payoff of a zc rates payer swaption at expiry

= max[ 0, PV(
$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} (1+LIBOR_{i})-1$$
) - PV( $\prod_{i=1}^{n} (1+K)$ )]

So swaption price =

$$E_{Q}[\max[0, (1+fwd\ zc\ market\ rate)^{n}-(1+K)^{n}]*DF]$$

### Volatility Smiles: zero coupon rates swaptions

e.g. 1y20y zero coupon payment  $(1+zc market rate)^n$  can be replicated with a set of 1y20y par swaps:

|     | 1y20y   | bucketed  | par atm |  |  |
|-----|---------|-----------|---------|--|--|
|     |         | positions | vols    |  |  |
| 5y  | 1,090   | 1,090     | 0.78%   |  |  |
| 10y | 976     | 976       | 0.90%   |  |  |
| 15y | 1,533   | 1,533     | 0.88%   |  |  |
| 20y | -11,821 | -11,821   | 0.87%   |  |  |
| 25y | -3,253  | -3,253    | 0.85%   |  |  |
| 30y | 0       | 0         | 0.84%   |  |  |
| 40y | 0       | 0         | 0.80%   |  |  |
| 50y | 0       | 0         | 0.76%   |  |  |
|     | -11,475 |           |         |  |  |

zc rate volatility derived from basket of european par swaptions with same expiry dates and zc swaption priced as:

$$E_{Q}[\max[0, fwd\ zc\ market\ rate - K]] * dv01$$

## Volatility smiles: inflation swaptions

Payoff of a zc inflation payer swaption at expiry t

= max[0, PV(
$$RPI_{n+t}/RPI_t$$
) - PV( $(1+K)^n$ )]

So swaption price =

$$E_{Q}[\max[0, (1+fwd\ zc\ market\ rate)^{n}-(1+K)^{n}]*DF]$$

 $BlackScholes(\sigma_{Y}(K))$  if  $RPI_{n+t} / RPI_{t}$  follows geometric BM; or  $normal\ option\ formula(\sigma_{N}(K))$  if  $zc\ market\ rate$  follows BM

### Volatility smiles: inflation swaptions calibration

Note the zc inflation swaption vol model should recover index option implied vols since the underlying is similar:

swaption = 
$$\max[0, PV(RPI_{n+t}/RPI_t) - PV((1+K)^n)]$$
 at time  $t$  (fwd) index option =  $\max[0, RPI_{n+t}/RPI_t) - (1+K)^n$  at time  $n+t$ 

### Volatility smiles: real rate swaptions

Payoff of a zc real rate payer swaption at expiry t


= max[0, PV(
$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} (1+LIBOR_{i})$$
) – PV((1+ $K$ )<sup>n</sup> \*  $RPI_{n+t}$  /  $RPI_{t}$ )] where  $K = zc$  real rate strike.

This is a spread option between interest rate and inflation legs, with implied vols from their respective zc swaption markets. So,

$$\Rightarrow \sigma_{\text{real}}^2 = \sigma_{\text{nominal}}^2 + \sigma_{\text{inflation}}^2 - 2\rho \sigma_{\text{nominal}}^2 \sigma_{\text{inflation}}^2$$
 where  $\sigma_{\text{inflation}}$  is scaled by  $(1+K)^n$ 


# Volatility smiles: LIBOR, RPI and real

**GBP1y20y normal vol smiles, 12 June 2012 (atmf = 2.90%)** 



### Volatility smiles: rates inflation correlation

There is a market in rates versus inflation correlation for expiries using correlation swaps.



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### Volatility smiles: real rate vol

Real rate swaption spread volatility is dominated by the higher of interest rates and inflation volatility for correlation  $\rho \approx 45\%$  and inflation vol around 60% of 0.86% rates normal vol


inflation normvol bump

| _      | -20%  | -16%  | -12%  | -8%                   | -4%     | 0%    | 4%    | 8%    | 12%   | 16%   | 20%   |
|--------|-------|-------|-------|-----------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| -0.10% | 0.88% | 0.86% | 0.84% | 0.81%                 | 0.79%   | 0.77% | 0.75% | 0.72% | 0.70% | 0.67% | 0.64% |
| -0.08% | 0.88% | 0.86% | 0.84% | 0.82%                 | 0.80%   | 0.77% | 0.75% | 0.72% | 0.70% | 0.67% | 0.64% |
| -0.06% | 0.89% | 0.87% | 0.85% | 0.82%                 | 0.80%   | 0.78% | 0.75% | 0.73% | 0.70% | 0.67% | 0.64% |
| -0.04% | 0.90% | 0.88% | 0.85% | 0.83%                 | 0.80%   | 0.78% | 0.75% | 0.73% | 0.70% | 0.67% | 0.64% |
| -0.02% | 0.91% | 0.88% | 0.86% | 0.83%                 | 0.81%   | 0.78% | 0.76% | 0.73% | 0.70% | 0.67% | 0.64% |
| 0.00%  | 0.91% | 0.89% | 0.87% | 0.84%                 | 0.81%   | 0.79% | 0.76% | 0.73% | 0.70% | 0.67% | 0.64% |
| 0.02%  | 0.92% | 0.90% | 0.87% | 0.85% /               | > 0.82% | 0.79% | 0.77% | 0.74% | 0.71% | 0.67% | 0.64% |
| 0.04%  | 0.93% | 0.91% | 0.88% | 0.85%//               | 0.83%   | 0.80% | 0.77% | 0.74% | 0.71% | 0.68% | 0.64% |
| 0.06%  | 0.94% | 0.91% | 0.89% | 0.86%                 | 0.83%   | 0.81% | 0.78% | 0.75% | 0.71% | 0.68% | 0.64% |
| 0.08%  | 0.95% | 0.92% | 0.90% | 0.8 <mark>7</mark> /% | 0.84%   | 0.81% | 0.78% | 0.75% | 0.72% | 0.68% | 0.65% |
| 0.10%  | 0.96% | 0.93% | 0.90% | 0 <mark>//</mark> 8%  | 0.85%   | 0.82% | 0.79% | 0.76% | 0.72% | 0.69% | 0.65% |

real rate normal vol ranges between 85% and 99% of rates norm vol

## Volatility smiles: real rate vol

Real rate swaption spread volatility is dominated by the higher of interest rates and inflation volatility for correlation  $\rho \approx 45\%$  and inflation vol around 60% of rates implied vol





Payer spreads (i.e. call spreads) can be used to derive CDF and density for forward nominal, inflation and real rates:


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e.g. Pr[1y20y RPI \text{ fwd rate} > K]
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
 $\approx$  (1y20yPayer(*K*-0.01%)- 1y20yPayer(*K*+0.01%))

fwd swap dv01 \* 2









### Strategies based on risk neutral probabilities

Volatility smiles imply unique risk neutral probability distribution functions for nominal, real and inflation forward rates.

These probabilities and expectations can be compared with investors' subjective views to appraise strategies.

Sophisticated end users (e.g. LDI asset managers) are very informed about structure of supply and demand in underlying swap markets.

Implied volatility >> historical volatility may motivated covered writes.

High inflation swap rate mean reversion means dealers must capture gamma from on intra-day moves, something difficult for end users to do.

### Outlook and future development of market

Sufficient natural flow for viable rates, inflation and real swaptions markets

Virtuous liquidity cycle is building

Quick reactions to market conditions advantageous

Credit and capital concerns can be mitigated in practical terms

### References

### **OPTION PRICING MODELS**

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### **VOLATILITY MODELS**

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### **Questions or comments?**

Expressions of individual views by members of The Actuarial Profession and its staff are encouraged.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the presenter.

### Slides reserved for potential discussion points

- rates swaptions realised vs implied volatilities
- historical bp/day swaption vol grid
- swaption pricing in Bloomberg
- market implied correlation
- indicative pricing

# Swaption pricing in Bloomberg (SWPM <GO>)



