



**The Actuarial Profession**

making financial sense of the future

# Financial Guarantee Business Time for a Reality Check

Chris Waites

Cormac Bradley

GIRO Conference 14-17 October 2003

## **Last Year – State of the ART**

---

- Securitisation
- Modelling the asset
- Structural issues
- The rating process
- Case study – private equity
- Modelling a new asset class
- Developing the business model

# Some Questions:

---

- Economic effects?
- Market origins?
- What does financial guarantee mean?
- Who are the key players?
- Impact of regulation and credit ratings?
- Impact of the downturn in credit performance?
- Has this market got legs?




# Contents

---




# The Growth in Credit Risk Transfer - Asset-Backed Securities

---




# The Growth in Credit Risk Transfer - Credit Derivatives

---



# Turbulent Times for Corporate Debt Globally



■ Defaults in 2002  
(US\$ Billions)

■ Total	163
■ Worldcom	23
■ Qwest CF	13
■ Marconi	3

■ > GDPs of  
Greece, Finland,  
Denmark

**A growing concern for the stability of the financial system**

## **The growth in credit risk transfer is a “good thing” because:**

---

- Less risk of banking meltdown – banks routinely mismatch assets and liabilities
- Risk is less concentrated
- Liquidity in the secondary markets
- Originators can concentrate on origination
- Insurers can diversify
- The financial system has withstood record levels of defaults and downgrades
- Increasing emphasis over time on genuine risk transfer for economic reasons

.....But



## **“The most toxic element of the financial markets today” (Howard Davies):**

---



- Specifically referring to synthetic CDOs
- More generally:
  - Losses may be borne by policyholders and pensioners
  - Insurance less well regulated than banking
  - Clear evidence of some regulatory arbitrage/accounting obfuscation
  - Insurance is less well capitalised
  - Sharp bankers are dumping unwanted risks on naïve insurers
  - Remoteness increases risk of moral hazard/adverse selection
  - Information asymmetries
  - Heavy reliance on portfolio manager
- Bank exposure to small number of insurance names

# Increasing Financial Stability?

---

- Differing opinions




- Worldcom case-study:

- At \$23 Billion default in 2002
- Largest corporate credit event experienced
- 50 cash CDOs identified
- 20 synthetic CDOs identified (Average exposure per portfolio 0.8%)
- Highlighted correlations between CDOs – demand for more granularity / hybrid pools

Source: FitchRatings 2003

# The Flow of Credit Risk from Banks to Insurers

---



# Products

---

- A mixture of insurance, banking and capital markets solutions for asset risks

## Insurance

- Credit Insurance
- Surety Bonds
- Residual Value Guarantees

## Banking

- Letters of credit

## Capital Markets

- Financial Guarantees
- Derivatives
- Credit Linked Notes
- ABS/CDOs

# Insurance and Financial Guarantees

---

## ■ Culture

- To an insurer a claim is just a claim
- To a banker a default is a problem

## ■ Essence of a financial guarantee

- Pay first and ask questions later
- Fixed income investors averse to indemnity type language

## ■ Essence of an insurance contract

- Investigation of claim precedes settlement

## ■ Film finance saga


## ■ Remedies sought by rating agencies

- Willingness vs ability to pay
- Introduction of FERs (“Financial Enhancement Ratings”) for insurers

## Case Study: Film Finance

---

- Zero coupon bonds placed with European investors
- Funds invested in film projects with revenues to repay bonds
- Insurance policy to guarantee proceeds
- Bonds rated AAA
- Substantial claims
- Allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, non-disclosure, breach of warranty
- Shock downgrade to CCC-overnight (rating agency credibility?)



### Insurers in the Dock



## Insurance and Capital Market Distinctions

---

- Duty of disclosure and utmost good faith
- Warranties and remedies for breach
- Existence of insurable interest
- Indemnity principle
- Transformer vehicles a solution



# Market Participation by Insurers

---

- Impact of soft insurance markets driving insurers to innovate
- Exploiting core strengths
  - underwriting
  - risk management on a holistic basis (unlike banks)
  - actuarial
- Regulatory arbitrage
  - recognition for diversification (unlike banks)
- Credit ratings drive appetite for risk
- Economic capital savings through reduced concentrations




# Focus on Credit

---

- Spectacular growth in exchange of credit risk through credit derivatives and CDOs
- Direction of flow a topic of interest to regulators
- Some insurers are large players
- Variety of instruments
  - Single name credit default swap
  - Total return swap
  - Credit linked notes
  - Portfolio credit default swap
  - Repackaging of credit risk through CDOs

# Insurer exposure to CDOs



# The Market Participants


---

- Monoline Primaries typically rated AAA
- Monoline Reinsurers AAA
- Niche Monolines AA
- Multilines Insurers/Reinsurers BBB-AAA
  - Often separately capitalised subsidiaries within a wider group
  - Capitalisation normally targets a required rating
  - Europeans – Swiss, Allianz, Scor
  - Bermudans – XL, Ace
  - US – Chubb, Berkshire Hathaway
  - Worldwide – QBE
- Competition between monolines and multilines not that common
- Ratings of participants determine their risk appetite



# The Business Model is the Credit Rating

CDO and Credit Derivative Exposure by Credit Rating



# Experience so Far

---


- Some real pain:
  - Notably single name Credit Default Swaps (“CDS”)
- Also CDO's
  - In particular equity and mezzanine tranches due to leverage
  - With cash flow CDOs - exposure to default
  - With market value CDOs - exposure to downgrades
  - Vintage year concentrations of name



# Experience so Far: CDOs

## European Corporate and CDO Downgrades 1998-2002

Source: Moody's



# The Market's Reaction

---

## Some Withdrawal of Capacity

- Some withdrawal of capacity / pulling back
- Limits being reached on credit risk
- Losses not the only reason
  - A risky business; credit is non-core to many insurers
  - Capital depletion and the need to redistribute capital within wider the insurance groups has caused some exits, eg. Zurich/Centre Solutions
  - Long term nature of the business which is capital intensive
  - Openly voiced regulator concerns
- Larger players showing a more long term commitment

# Regulation and Credit Ratings

---

## Impact of Basle II

### Banks

- Lower capital charges for highly rated assets
- Higher capital charges for mezzanine layers of CDOs
- Potential reduction on volume of business for monolines?
- Greater role for niche monolines
- Greater role for multilines able to accept mezzanine

### Insurance Regulation

- A lot of guarantee business is written offshore where regulation is less
- Rating agencies effectively become the regulators



# Where next for this market?

---

- Much of the over-exuberance is gone
- Regulatory arbitrage appears to be giving way to economic arbitrage
- Premium rates on P&C lines are attractive so some insurers have decided to refocus on their core business
- Time for the real applications to develop
- Time for insurers to demonstrate commitment to capital markets
- Capacity for credit risk is filling up
- The search for new asset risks begins – other ABS
- Technical risks could be attractive ie. those without a systemic component – eg. Pharmaceutical development, Oil & Gas, Decommissioning



# Assets of the Future

---

- Other asset backed securities including:

- Life embedded value
- Fund of funds
  - Private Equity
  - Mezzanine Loans
  - Hedge Funds
- Residual Values



- Technical Risks

- Pharma – first transaction in 2003
- Oil and Gas
- Litigation revenues
- Other royalties



- More consumer-related, non-financial and alternative assets have the potential to truly increase diversification

## Some tentative conclusions

---



- Credit – risk transfer has been demonstrably resilient and robust
- Insurers are following a disciplined approach and have a good understanding of the risks
- Impact of systemic risk has been reduced
  - Total capital in the financial system reduced
  - Risk of institutional and system failure also reduced through dispersion
- More work needed on reserving, capital and solvency implications
- Financial guarantees now mean what they say but caveat emptor

## Sources

---

- **FitchRatings:** Global Credit Derivatives: A Qualified Success 24 September 2003
- **FitchRatings:** Bond Insurers 2002 Six-Month Review
- **Moody's Investors Service:** Global Credit Research: Default and Recovery Rates of Corporate Bond Issuers 1920-2002
- **Moody's Investors Service:** European Structured Finance Transition Study
- **British Bankers' Association:** BBA Credit Derivatives Report 2001/2002
- **The Economist:** Special report – Bank Lending, Who's carrying the can?
- **Alternative Risk Strategies:** Morton Lane

# Contacts

---

- **chris.waites@tillinghast.com**
- **cormac.bradley@tillinghast.com**