

## Modelling Corporate Bonds

Current Issues In Life Assurance Edinburgh 20 May 2004


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# **Presentation Outline**

- Why model corporate bonds?
- Corporate bond investment characteristics
- Monte Carlo models
- Explaining bond spreads
- Conclusions



# Why Model Corporate Bonds?









## Corporate Bond Investment Characteristics


# **Recent Good Corporate Performance**



## **UK Corporate Bond Spreads: History**




## **Historic Cumulative Default Rates**






#### Monte Carlo Models



making financial sense of the future

# Structural Model (Merton) Equity = Geared Equity + Debt



- Credit spreads reflect an option premium
  - Interest is expensed in accounting terms
  - but the option has cost and value
- Prestige ratings reflect lower option value
  - not "better" companies



# Credit Graded vs Structural Models


- Model by grade is close to how portfolios are managed in practice
- Grades are subjective, out of date and sometimes arbitrary
- Historic data excludes the main catastrophe where modelling is needed

- Easily market consistent, because spread is a market price
- Correlations: bond/bond and bond/equity easily calibrated
- Structural model output can be arranged into bands and expressed as transition matrix



# Modelling Dilemma: Why we need to be careful about small effects


- Under arbitrage-free models, corporate bonds behave like a (dynamically rebalanced) mixture of gilts and equities. There is one equity risk, but two places in a model where that risk is priced – the equity model and the corporate bond model.
- A strategy "sell equities and buy corporate bonds" is a close substitution whose attractiveness is very dependent on asset model parameters – in particular the relative cost of equity risk implicit in the equity ad corporate bond models. Worse still, the decision can be dependent on flukes of a particular set of random simulations.
- Danger that asset selection outcome determined by asset model calibration and not (much) by business dynamics





## **Explaining Bond Spreads**

# Historic Default << Yield Spreads




# Yield Spread vs Default

- Yield spread >> historic default rates
- How do we explain the differences?
  - free lunch?
  - sampling error?
  - risk premium?
  - gilt collectors' premium?
  - Iiquidity premium?




### Default Risk Premiums are Explainable




- Default involves extreme downside events
- The existence of skews in volatilities is well known in out-ofmoney options
  - default equates with extreme out-of-money puts
- Yield spread vs default difference not an obvious anomaly
- If your asset model does not capture equity skew effect then its probably not worth trying to replicate historic bond defaults


## Historic Default Rates = Small Samples So true default rates very uncertain anyway




The Peso Effect: Rare default events are over-represented if they occur in the data set and under-represented if they do not.



# We can extrapolate equity returns but it is difficult to do the same for bond defaults




# Swap / Gilt spread explained by: credit risk (repo vs libmid) and transaction costs (libor vs libmid)



# Corporates – Subtle Considerations

- Corporate bonds might behave like equity plus gilts, but tax, statutory valuation and ECR treatment is different
- Liquidity needed to maintain credit exposure within limits, so estimate transaction costs carefully
- Investment management costs, including risk management and audit
- Possibility for income from repo market (especially on most liquid gilts if there is a squeeze and they go special on repo)
- What matters is effect on a life office relative to what is priced into bonds in the first place





#### Conclusions

# Conclusions

- Many similarities: puzzles for corporate bonds and puzzles for equities
  - why is the risk premium so high?
  - free lunch vs efficient markets vs arbitrage-free
- Building a complicated simulation model can (maybe, just maybe) give additional insights
  - Risk that a decision to hold corporate bonds (or not) is effectively hard-coded in the guts of an asset model calibration rather than deliberate consequence of the business model
- If an investment looks too good to be true it probably is
  - actuaries' equity free lunch claims discredited
  - Iet us not repeat the mistake with corporate bonds





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