The Actuarial Profession Pensions and Corporate Finance: An Empirical Perspective Presentation by Mike Orszag at the Seminar on Pension Finance and Economics June 11, 2004, Staple Inn, London Corporate pension finance Proposition 1 (Slide 3 of Bodie): Pensions are an integral part of the sponsoring firm and are viewed by the market as debt. Proposition 2: (Slide 7 of Bodie): Because pensions are bond-like companies should invest in bonds to hedge risk ("For a healthy company, the optimal pension policy is to immunize its defined-benefit liabilities with a fixed-income portfolio.") Proposition 3: (Slide 7 of Bodie): Optimal policy is to fully fund. ... and there are lot of obstacles to why this does not happen in practice (like accounting bias).

Corporate Pension Finance: Comments

- Proposition 3: Optimal policy is to fully fund?
 Modigliani Wher: value of company invariant to funding (Sharpe 1976). However, because deferred members cannot negotiate, shareholders may gain from underfunding, especially with closed schemes (deferred members).
- Proposition 2: Are pensions really bond like? Are rents bond like?

- Proposition 1: Pensions are viewed by the market as debt.
- Proposition 2: Healthy companies should invest in bonds.
- Proposition 3: Healthy companies should be closer to full funding.

Research Literature

- Largely US based
- Somewhat dated in cases
- Concentrates on proposition 1 and 3

Empirical Evidence

- Thies-Sturrock (JRI, 1988). Do profitable firms with high tax rates overfund their pension plans?
- Bodie (FAJ, 1985). Key conclusions:
 - Corporations manage their pension funds as if the funds were an integral part of overall corporate financial policy.
 Reported fund liabilities linked to company profitability by management's discount rate choice.

 - Profitability and the proportion of pension assets invested in fixed securities have positive associations with funding level.
- Bulow-Morck-Summers (1985, NBER volume),
- Feldstein-Morck (1985, NBER Volume).
- Feldstein-Seligman (1981)

Empirical Evidence

- Bulow-Morck-Summers (1985, NBER volume),
- Feldstein-Morck (1985, NBER Volume).
- Feldstein-Seligman (1981) They also find that the type of adjustment performed on the liabilities to set these onto a standard interest rate significantly affects the results.

The Actuarial Profession

Empirical Evidence

- Coronado and Sharpe (2003)
 - Market does not see through accounting veil accounting earnings matter more than financial earnings.
 - Multiplier on pension earnings higher than normal earnings.

The Actuarial Profession

Empirical Evidence

Other studies:

Chen Darcy (JRI 1986). Event study examines
the impact of mandated publication of plan
assets, liabilities and interest rate assumption
on share prices. Finds that low-interest rate
assumption share prices out performed high
interest rate assumption share prices.

Empirical Evidence

- Thies-Sturrock (JRI, 1988). Do profitable firms with high tax rates overfund their pension plans?
- Bodie (FAJ, 1985). Key conclusions:
 - Pensions appear to be viewed as significant by the market
 - Reported fund liabilities linked to company profitability by management's discount rate choice.
 - Profitability and the proportion of pension assets invested in fixed securities have positive associations with funding level.

The Actuarial Profession

Data

- UK listed companies have had to report pension liabilities on FRS17 basis since late 2001
- Collected roughly 150 data items for FTSE350 on corporate finance from FRS17 disclosures
- Matched data to other data on market returns/option price data, betas, etc.
- Some of this data also available for Japan, Europe, US

The Actuarial Profession

Accounting Dates

- Roughly 48% of FTSE350 (168 companies) use Dec. 31 as end of year, 17% (60 companies) use 31 March, 8% (29 companies) use 30 September, remainder use a variety of dates
- Define a panel with three waves:
 - 2001 Wave = Accounting dates between 30 June 2001 and 29 June 2002
 - 2002 Wave = Accounting dates between 30 June 2002 and 29 June 2003
 - 2003 Wave = Accounting dates between 30 June 2002 and 1 January 2004

Are Assumptions Reasonable?

- Yes, broadly so.
- Regressions of assumptions on risk fundamentals reveal no anomalies or correlations of a significant nature.

The Actuarial Profession making financial sense of the future

Proposition 1

- Look at how pension variables relate to volatility and beta
- Summary of results:
 - Pension variables do matter
 - But not necessarily as one would expect...
 - Liabilities matter more than deficits
 - Pension coefficients different than debt coefficients

The Actuarial Profession making financial sense of the future

Proposition 1

- Try to explain beta with pension variables in 2002
- Observations 253
- Exclude zero liability companies and investment trusts

	Coefficien t	T- statistics
Pension leverage	0.619	(3.48)**

- Try to explain beta with pension variables in 2002
- Observations 253
- Exclude zero liability companies and investment trusts

	Coefficien t	T- statistics
BS exposure	0.119	(3.12)**
Pension leverage	0.070	(0.28)

The Actuarial Profession making financial sense of the future

Proposition 1

 Try to explain volatility with pension variables in 2002

	Coefficien t	T- statistics
Pension leverage	.2398891	(5.54)**

The Actuarial Profession making francial sense of the future

Proposition 1

 Try to explain volatility with pension variables in 2002

	Coefficien t	T- statistics
BS exposure	.0277246	(3.00)**
Pension leverage	.1113416	(1.84)

- How about leverage?
- On its own it has an effect but not with pension variables

Effect on beta	Coefficient	T-statistics
BS exposure	.1140731	(2.98)**
Pension leverage	.0487195	(0.20)
Ordinary leverage	.0261252	(0.90)

The Actuarial Profession

Proposition 1

- How about with other controls?
- Same qualitative results

Effect on beta (including controls for maturity, leverage and equity allocation of pension plan)	Coefficient	T-statistics
BS exposure	.1127027	(2.84)
Pension leverage	.0462398	(0.18)

The Actuarial Profession making francial sense of the future

Proposition 1

- How about looking at lags?
- Worse: 2002 (N=238)

Explaining 2003 volatility		T-statistic
Pension BS exposure	.0481317	2.45
Pension leverage	0394235	-0.29

- How about looking at a panel?
- Random/fixed effect regressions
- Same basic pattern:
 - Pension liabilities relative to market cap matters much more than pensions as debt

The Actuarial Profession making financial sense of the tuture

Proposition 1


- How about looking at a panel?
- Random/fixed effect regressions
- Same basic pattern:
 - Pension liabilities relative to market cap matters much more than pensions as debt

The Actuarial Profession

Proposition 1

- How about implied volatility?
- Same basic results (at least in 2002)

How about other countries (Japan)




Proposition 1: Summary


- Market appears to take into account pensions
- ... but do participants seem to look at it as debt???

The Actuarial Profession making financial sense of the tutur

Proposition 2


- Proposition 2: Healthy companies should invest in bonds
- ... or are asset allocation of pension funds determined by corporate fundamentals?






Proposition 2 Possible fundamentals to consider Market/book ratio Price/earnings ratio Maturity of the scheme Credit rating

Do A rated companies hold less equity in their pension plans? Sample all S&P rated companies in 2002 A rated companies no more or less likely to hold equity Equity share of total assets arated 0.004 (0.11) (1.11) (1.11) (1.12) (1.15) (1.1



Not much of statistical significance... however, pension leverage coefficient lends some support to Proposition 2 Change in equity share coefficient Lagged Pension .0009908 0.11 Lagged Pension leverage Lagged .0740915 1.60 Pension leverage ftse100 -0010068 -0.10 Constant -0444145 -5.60 N=314



- Proposition 2: Asset allocation of pension plan determined by fundamentals
- Does not work well in practice....

The Actuarial Profession

Proposition 3

 Healthy companies should be closer to full funding

- A rated companies in 2003: 5.7% greater funding
- A rated companies in 2003: 6.4% greater funding (lower for FTSE100)
- Direction of change is also positive for top rated companies

The Actuarial Profession making financial sense of the future

Does the theory work in practice?

- Proposition 1: Pensions are viewed by the market as debt.
- Proposition 2: Healthy companies should invest in bonds.
- Proposition 3: Healthy companies should be closer to full funding.